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ABSTRACT
With advancement in communication technologies, the design of efficient
and lightweight reliability protocols seems like an achievable goal. However,
strategies for attacking and compromising communication reliability have
also seen comparable advancement. As a result, reliability still remains a key
concern for both the wired and wireless communication networks of today. In
this dissertation, we seek to understand the fundamental characteristics of the
problem of reliable communication. We develop algorithms for reliable com-
munication between a fault-free source-destination pair and design Byzantine
fault tolerance protocols based on the proposed algorithms. In view of the
fact that wireless networks have become an integral part of communication
networks, reliability concerns arise when these networks are used by applica-
tions possibly carrying mission critical or highly classified information. We
provide an extensive study of the interaction between reliability and wireless
broadcast. We discuss examples of real networks where wireless broadcast
may both be a problem as well as a solution. We study the implications of
using wireless watchdogs for reliability with TCP traffic. We identify the
factors responsible for degrading throughput of TCP when used in combina-
tion with watchdogs and address those. We also provide another use-case for
wireless watchdogs in the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) networks
that have gained popularity recently. We then study the source location
problem where the broadcast nature of the wireless medium is the underly-
ing cause of a breach in location privacy. We propose and evaluate several
solutions for the problem.
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They say that a thing of beauty is a joy forever; I am lucky, I have two of
those...
To Ayaana and Adeena.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Reliability remains a key concern in today’s communication networks, both
wired and wireless. Since the challenges to providing reliability may be posed
by elements that differ in their nature, e.g., malicious versus faulty, it remains
to be seen whether there may be a solution that applies to all scenarios.
This dissertation is divided into two parts. We start by discussing reliability
and security in wireless mesh-networks (Chapter 2) and revisit the watchdog
concept [1] for building a co-operative environment supporting misbehavior
detection in wireless TCP. Security in TCP is challenging since solutions
need to be efficient and lightweight, otherwise, throughput performance suf-
fers unacceptably. We start with very simple watchdog-based misbehavior
detection protocols, identify their shortcomings and then incrementally ad-
dress those shortcomings. Later, in Chapter 5, we discuss how watchdogs
may be used to thwart several potential attacks against a recently emerging
wireless mesh-network: the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) for the
smart grid.
Since watchdogs observe packets from the source and then also when they
are forwarded by the relays, the watchdogs may be considered as alternate
paths that are available in parallel with the paths containing the relays (and
being used for actual data transmissions). Therefore, as a next step, Chap-
ter 3 considers the problem of reliable communication when multiple, node-
disjoint parallel paths are available between a fault-free source and destina-
tion. The goal is to achieve reliable communication under the assumption
that a certain number of paths may be Byzantine faulty. In this context, we
propose algorithms based on replication, coding and cryptographic hashes,
respectively, for reliable communication. These algorithms are general and
applicable similarly to both wired and wireless networks.
Next, in Chapter 4, we look at another popular network architecture
namely the wireless sensor networks (WSN). These networks are charac-
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terized by small and inexpensive sensory devices spread over an area. The
job of sensors is to detect certain events of interest and report the occurrence
of these events to a sink. The sink is usually assumed to be a powerful de-
vice and may have a high-speed wired connection for sending observations
to authorized entities. The location privacy problem arises because wireless
is a shared medium and therefore information being sent out in the air is
vulnerable to unauthorized access. Furthermore, with recent advances in RF
localization techniques, it is also possible to locate the transmitter (sender) of
information sensed on a channel. This leads to the following concern: Even if
the content of messages may be protected by leveraging sophisticated cryp-
tography, an eavesdropper can still obtain valuable information merely from
the presence of messages. Therefore it is important to protect the location
of message sources in the WSN. We discuss solutions to this location privacy
problem in WSNs.
2
CHAPTER 2
WATCHDOGS FOR WIRELESS TCP
Wireless networks are known to suffer from many security issues. Multi-
hop networks are especially vulnerable to misbehavior of several kinds since
the wireless nodes must rely on others to forward their messages. Exam-
ples of misbehavior in multi-hop wireless networks include packet dropping
and packet tampering attacks where intermediate nodes respectively drop or
corrupts other nodes’ packets.
Ideally, in a multihop environment with omnidirectional antennas, a sender
can overhear its next-hop node forwarding the packets. This ability, termed
in literature as watchdog functionality, was first introduced for misbehavior
detection in [1] where packet senders act as watchdogs.
After watchdogs were introduced, a lot of work on misbehavior detection
using watchdogs followed (refer to Section 4.1). However, all these protocols
tend to use UDP and CBR for traffic [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7] and prior
work has not investigated performance of TCP with watchdogs. Some of the
prior work explicitly mention that they chose UDP to avoid particularities of
a complicated protocol like TCP [3]. There may be several reasons why TCP
is considered more challenging than UDP and we highlight some of them
below:
1. TCP is meant to guarantee reliable and in-order delivery whereas UDP
makes no such guarantees.
2. Time-consuming and “eventually” correct and accurate misbehavior
detection schemes may be appropriate for UDP in the long run, but
since TCP provides guarantees on reliable and in-order delivery, cor-
rectness of every single packet must be ensured to satisfy TCP seman-
tics.
3. Because of TCP’s congestion control algorithm, delays in misbehavior
detection can result in unacceptable throughput decay.
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In view of constraints just described, we understand that misbehavior de-
tection for TCP must provide per-packet monitoring. Moreover, detection
should be fast and must not cause TCP’s slow-start to kick in too often. This
implies that existing schemes for UDP that require many stages of observa-
tion collections and exchanges of suspect lists over time before making any
decision are unsuitable for TCP.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides an
overview of related work. In Section 2.2, we study watchdog feasibility and
availability in random networks. We formulate our notation in Section 2.3
and then Section 2.4 presents a simple watchdog-based security mechanism
called WD-TCP. Section 2.5 defines and explains watchdog induced losses
and establishes their severity. After identifying the issues, we propose so-
lutions to deal with throughput degradation and watchdog induced losses
in wireless TCP in Section 2.6. Up until Section 2.6, we focus only on us-
ing watchdogs for protecting data packets but then in Sections 2.7-2.10, we
discuss and evaluate watchdog-based solutions for protecting both data and
ACK packets. We briefly formulate the watchdog problem for the multi-
channel, multi-interface scenario in Section 2.11 and summarize the chapter
in Section 2.12.
2.1 Related Work
Wireless misbehavior detection and deterrence has long interested researchers.
A complete watchdog-based misbehavior detection and tolerance protocol
was first proposed by Marti et al [1]. It used NS-2 simulations to show im-
provements in UDP throughput. Since they avoid routing through suspected
nodes, their protocol must minimize frequency of false detections. Following
that, many trust and reputation based protocols became popular. CORE [8]
presents a theoretical framework for building reputation with watchdogs and
reputation tables. They use watchdog observations to formulate direct, indi-
rect and functional reputation such that a node’s positive reputation keeps
on increasing as long as it behaves well, but if its reputation goes negative
beyond a threshold, the node is shunned and excluded from the network.
CONFIDANT [3] uses watchdogs to build trust relationships and informs a
node-specific “friend list” about observed misbehavior. They do not, how-
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ever, propose a way to dynamically build/maintain this list and consider it
as pre-configured on user-to-user basis. Recently, Zouridaki et al. [9] pre-
sented numerical results for trust establishment where watchdogs are used to
form opinions about others in the network and this opinion is incorporated
in routing decisions to protect against misbehavior.
Another component of this dissertation involves source coding for protec-
tion against watchdog induced losses. This idea of mixing multiple packets
is not new especially with regards to opportunistic routing. In [10], [11]
and [12], this idea and work is used on batches of packets and so a source must
first accumulate enough packets to encode before it can begin sending them.
To avoid delays incurred by waiting for packets to accumulate, Sundarajan
et al. [13] showed throughput improvement using an online coding scheme
where the source sends out random linear combinations of packets currently
in the congestion window. Building upon online coding, CoMP, [14] presents
a combination of online coding and multipath forwarding to improve TCP.
Many of the references cited so far work with UDP or with TCP without
any misbehavior. We, however, consider TCP performance while allowing
packet tampering attacks in order to understand how watchdogs and coding
will interact with TCP intricacies.
2.2 Generalized Watchdogs and Their Feasibility
Watchdogs were introduced by Marti et al. [1] primarily for packet dropping
attacks where the receiver either gets correct data or no data at all and hence
does not need explicit information about misbehavior. We use the network
of Figure 2.1 to explain the approach. All antennas are omnidirectional.
Suppose node S sends traffic destined for node D relying upon node R to
forward it. Using the sender as watchdog, if S can overhear R forwarding
the message or otherwise, it can detect misbehavior. In essence, misbehavior
detection is all that is required for this attack and misbehavior tolerance can
be achieved with actions of S alone, by choosing an alternate route.
Now suppose R forwards the packets but corrupts the contents. Then, even
if S can detect packet modification, D will still accept it and pass it on to
the application. Afterward, even if S retransmits the packet explicitly asking
D to accept the new copy, it may be too late if the application has already
5
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Figure 2.1: An example 4-node network
consumed corrupted packets. To detect and tolerate such packet modification
attacks, we use the notion of Generalized Watchdogs [15] where a watchdog
must not necessarily be sender of a packet but may be any node that can
hear both the source and the intermediate node, e.g., W in Figure 2.1 may
be a watchdog for relay R.
Further, since a watchdog at the source can not protect the destination
from accepting corrupted packets, W must not only compare the packets it
overhears from S and R, but also inform D about it. Meanwhile, D does not
pass packets on to the application until it has heard from W. We incorporate
these ideas to come up with simple yet efficient misbehavior tolerance schemes
for TCP in Section 2.4.
2.2.1 Availability of Generalized Watchdogs in Random
Networks
Before we build misbehavior detection mechanisms employing watchdogs, we
need to establish their easy availability in commonly encountered network
scenarios.
Figure 2.2: Requirements for watchdog availability
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We begin by investigating feasibility of watchdog-based approaches for use
in reasonably dense networks. Refer to Figure 2.2 and consider placing N
wireless nodes randomly in a region of area A. All nodes have a transmission
range of r. Average number of nodes in a disc of radius r will then be pir2N
A
.
For a watchdog to be available for transmission from node A to node B, there
must be at least one node in the area of intersection of two circles of radii r,
centered at A and B respectively (the lens formed by the intersection of A
and B ’s transmission range in Figure 2.2). However, we require the watchdog
to also notify the next-hop. If B relays A’s packets to C, we need at least one
node in area of intersection of all three circles (darkest portion of Figure 2.2)
which represent the transmission radius of A, B and C. Since B lies strictly
inside the communication range of both A and C, there must be some non-
zero intersection between all three circles. For watchdog availability, we need
at least one node in this non-zero intersection and this is likely to hold w.h.p.
when N is large in random networks for a given area A. Next, we make some
claims about watchdog availability that hold in the asymptotic sense.
A random geometric graph (RGG) is a graph G = (n, r) = (V,E) with
n = |V | such that nodes of V are embedded in an area with the property that
e = (u, v) ∈ E if and only if Euclidean distance between u and v, d(u, v) ≤
r [16]. In wireless networks, r relates directly to broadcast communication
range of nodes and so RGGs are considered a standard model in theoretical
work on ad-hoc and wireless networks [17]. The following definition is useful.
Definition 1 Let G = (n, r) be an RGG. G is said to be µ-geo-dense [18]
for some µ ≥ 1, if every square bin of area A ≥ r2
µ
has Θ(nA) nodes.
The critical radius for connectivity is (rcon)
2 = logn
pin
in the sense that the
graph with rcon =
√
logn+Kn
pin
is connected with probability approaching one
as n → ∞ if and only if Kn → ∞ [17]. It has also been shown that for
constants c > 1 and µ ≥ 1, if r2 = cµ logn
n
, then w.h.p a random geometric
graph ζ(n, r) is µ-geo-dense [18]. That is w.h.p, any bin area of size r2/µ has
Θ(log n) nodes.
Using geo-density of RGG’s just established, we come up with conditions
required on network density to ensure availability of watchdogs. Let trans-
mission range of nodes be rt ≥ rcon. As a result, a transmission occurring
over distance rcon will reserve a circular area of radius rt (the transmission
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range). Geo-density ensures that at least Θ(log n) nodes will be present in
every square of area A ≥ (r)2
µ
. Suppose the total area is divided into a grid
where each cell in the grid has area A. Each cell has eight adjacent cells, (or
neighboring cells) in the grid. For connectivity, a node in one cell should be
able to communicate with nodes in any of its neighboring cells. The largest
distance between a node x in one cell and another node y in a neighboring
cell could be 2
√
2r2 =
√
8A and this happens when the two nodes under
consideration (i.e., x and y) are located at the opposite corners of adjacent
cells. Since there are at least Θ(log n) in each cell, as long as there is an-
other node z in a cell adjacent to both the cells containing x and y, choosing
rt =
√
8A will ensure watchdog availability w.h.p because z can communi-
cate with both x and y. However, as explained above, rt =
√
8A is also
the condition which ensures that a node in any cell can communicate with
another node in any of its eight neighboring cells. Therefore, considering the
transmission range and interference constraints from [19], we conclude that
requirement for availability and success of watchdogs can be satisfied with
similar interference and transmission range constraints and therefore order
of capacity bounds is preserved asymptotically.
For further insights, we did NS-2 simulations with the objective of quan-
tifying watchdog availability for monitoring a given communication over two
hops. We simulated 10 random network topologies each for 20, 30, 50 and
75 nodes placed randomly in a 1000 m × 1000 m area and repeated the
simulation 10 times with a random seed for each topology. All nodes have a
communication range of 250 m. We set up 15 UDP flows between randomly
selected source-destination pairs. Each time a packet is overheard twice by
a watchdog: first being received by a relay and then being forwarded by
the same relay, we say that the packet was watched. We then record how
many packets are watched, or equivalently, the number of intermediate relays
whose behavior was observed by a generalized watchdog and averaged over
all runs. The results are shown in Figure 2.3.
The X-axis shows number of times a packet was forwarded, say Ntotal. The
Y-axis plots Nheard
Ntotal
, i.e., the ratio of the number of times a packet was watched
with respect to the total number of times it was forwarded before reaching
its destination. A value of Y = 0.95 corresponding to X = 2 means
that 95% of all packets that were forwarded by two relays were watched at
both hops by some generalized watchdog and 5% were either watched over
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Figure 2.3: The availability of watchdogs
one-hop only or not watched at all. As our results show, for reasonably dense
networks (N ≥ 50 in Figure 2.3), more than 95% packets were successfully
watched by some node even over long paths. Consider the curve for 75
nodes in Figure 2.3. Since it is always close to 1, this shows that even when
packets are forwarded by 7 relays (X = 7), some watchdog was always
available at each hop to monitor the packets. The figure also shows how the
curves fall rapidly as route length increases for less dense networks. These
results strongly back the claim that watchdogs are readily available in dense
networks. Not surprisingly, Figure 2.3 also suggests that watchdogs based
schemes are not well suited to sparsely populated networks.
2.3 Notation and Assumptions
Throughout this chapter, we propose several watchdog-based reliability schemes
for TCP. As a general convention, we refer to these schemes as WD-TCP.
All our watchdog-based TCP schemes, i.e., WD-TCP, rely on the watch-
dogs sending a notification (described in Section 2.4), for either data packets
only, or both data and ack packets. We refer to them as WD-TCP+D and
WD-TCP+D+A respectively, i.e., we use the notation “+” to represent a
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combination of modifications made to TCP, e.g., the notation TCP+X+Y
indicates that the scheme uses TCP with modification X and also modifica-
tion Y. We propose two variations of these schemes for improving throughput
and reducing overheads. The first relies on adapting the frequency of sending
notifications and we refer to it as WD-TCP+DAd+AAd to show whether the
adaptation is being done for data packets (DAd) or for ACK packets (AAd)
or both. In addition to interval adaptation, we propose coding based solu-
tions for different versions of TCP that we evaluate. These are represented as
X-TCP+..+C where the C indicates that coding is being used. Finally, when
we discuss notifications for ACK (Section 2.7 onward), we use the notation
WD-TCP+X+Y to indicate that notifications for X and Y are being sent
independently of each other while we use the notation WD-TCP+(X+Y) to
indicate that we send a combined notification for X and Y (here X and Y
represent the types of packets, e.g., X = D and Y = A indicate that no-
tifications are being sent per-packet for data and ACK packets. Similarly
X = DAd indicates that notifications for data packets are being sent using
adaptive interval and so on).
We compare our WD-TCP versions with respect to a baseline version of
TCP. This baseline is the version as in NS-2 simulator. Therefore, all the
baseline TCP characteristics that we show in our results are actually for a
version of TCP according to the NS-2 simulator.
For all the simulation results presented in this chapter, we assume that all
the links in the network have the same rates. In our results, we show this as
the “wireless transmission rate”.
2.4 WD-TCP: A Protocol for TCP Security with
Generalized Watchdogs
With the objective of ensuring that TCP-based application never has to
accept a corrupted packet, we now propose and evaluate a simple watchdog
protocol WD-TCP. Our goal is to achieve single fault tolerance, i.e., when
either a relay or a watchdog can misbehave. If a node receives a packet
via a relay (e.g., D receives S ’s packets from R in Figure 2.1), it waits to
hear from a watchdog before forwarding the packet onward (at relays) or
passing it up to application (at the destination) [15]. From watchdogs, we
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require that they send a notification to next-hop of the packet, containing
information about the forwarding node, observed packet sequence number
and a 1-bit indicator of whether the packet is good or bad. The algorithm
Algorithm 1 WD-TCP Algorithm
1: At node i:
2: Received pkt = p
3: if (dst(p) == i) AND (type(p) == data) then
4: if (notif(p) == received) then
5: if ((notif(p)→is Bad == 0)) then
6: fwd(p);
7: else
8: drop(p);
9: else
10: PendingNotification ← p;
11: else if (dst(p) == i) AND (type(p) == Notif) then
12: notif(p) = received;
13: if (notif == good) then
14: fwd(PendingNotif(p));
15: else
16: drop(PendingNotif(p));
17: else if (dst(p) != i) AND (type(p) == Data) then
18: if (p ∈ HeardOnce) then
19: if (p == HeardOnce(p)) then
20: sendNotif(0);
21: else
22: sendNotif(1);
23: Delete(HeardOnce(p))
24: else
25: HeardOnce ← p;
at each node is explained in Algorithm 1. Each node maintains two sets of
packets: PendingNotif for packets whose notifications have not been received
yet and HeardOnce for packets it has overheard once. Both sets are initially
empty. When node i receives data packet p meant for itself (line 3), i is either
a relay or final destination for p. Node i checks whether a notification for p
has been received (line 4). If notification was positive (line 5), i forwards p
and if it is negative, node i drops p. If i has not received a notification for p
yet, it adds p to PendingNotification (line 10). On the other hand, if i receives
a notification (line 11), then it forwards or drops the corresponding packet in
the set PendingNotification, depending upon whether notification is positive
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or negative (lines 13-16). Finally, if i is not the packet’s destination (implying
i overheard p and may be a watchdog), if it has heard this packet before from
a different transmitter, it compares the two versions and sends a notification
accordingly by setting Is Bad to “0” or “1” (lines 18-23), otherwise i buffers
p in HeardOnce.
We now evaluate WD-TCP in a 4-node network of Figure 2.1 for a TCP
flow from S to D via R. There is no tampering. These settings help us com-
pare the compromise we make by adding a dependence of TCP on watchdogs.
We simulated this scenario in NS-2 and the results, averaged over several
runs, are shown in Figure 2.4. TCP packet size in these simulations was set
to 500 bytes. (Later, from Section 2.7 onward, we use a TCP packet size of
1000 bytes and we can see that a larger packet size also results in through-
put improvement.) Throughout this chapter, we use number of untampered
TCP packets received at the destination as an indicator of throughput. We
compare this metric for WD-TCP and basic TCP (TCP without watchdogs)
in top two curves in Figure 2.4. Not surprisingly, watchdog-based TCP per-
forms worse than unmodified TCP because of per-packet notification over-
head. However, this degradation came in the best case scenario, i.e., when
there was neither interference nor tampering/misbehavior in the network.
The lowest curve in Figure 2.4 shows WD-TCP’s disappointing performance
when there is interference at the watchdog. This interference was created by
introducing another two-hop flow in the network such that the source of that
flow was in the interference range of our watchdog. This resulted in failure
of the watchdog to observe some packets from the original flow. We had
expected that overhead of notifications will degrade TCP throughput but
as we now elaborate on, the effects of dependence upon watchdogs manifest
themselves in some other interesting ways too.
2.5 Watchdog-Induced Losses
Watchdogs notifications inject non-data traffic. Since WD-TCP is constrained
such that intermediate nodes can only forward packets after receiving WD
notifications, there arises a new problem. We call it the watchdog induced
loss (WD-induced loss) problem and explain it next.
Consider the 4-node network of Figure 2.1 and assume that WD-TCP with
12
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Figure 2.4: A comparison of TCP performance with and without watchdog
for 4-node network; TCP packet size = 500 bytes
per-packet notifications from watchdogs is used. In this scenario, a watchdog
induced loss can happen as follows:
1. Type-I WD-Induced Loss: This happens when W fails to overhear
S ’s packet either over the link SR or RD but not both. W will not
send a notification and D will not acknowledge the packet even after
receiving it. S will eventually retransmit giving W another chance to
overhear it.
2. Type-II WD-Induced Loss: This loss happens when W completely
misses out on overhearing some packet over both SR and RD. W will
realize this when it overhears a packet with a sequence number N2
while the last packet it overheard had a sequence number N1 such that
N2 > N1 + 1.
3. Type-III WD-Induced Loss: This loss happens when W fails to
send a notification in time because of channel contention and S times
out in the meanwhile.
The above scenarios indicate how watchdog dependent WD-TCP may create
artificial packet losses that can severely degrade throughput since they cause
retransmissions. The problem of WD-induced losses is further aggravated
when the network is heavily loaded and there is interference thus rendering
our simple scheme very inefficient. We now evaluate these effects and try to
quantify them to understand their severity.
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Notice that the WD-induced losses would all cause a retransmission of a
packet that may well have been received at the destination. We therefore
compare the total number of retransmissions in our TCP sessions with the
ones that were triggered by the WD-induced losses. The results are shown in
Figure 2.5 where we compare watchdog induced losses with the total num-
ber of retransmissions. For simulation duration of 100 seconds, the figure
shows how many of the retransmissions were caused by Type I and Type II
WD-induced losses for different transmission rates (assuming all links in the
network have the same rate). As can be seen, there are very few packets that
are completely missed by the watchdog and that the biggest contributor to
WD-induced losses were of Type I. As we can see, the number of retransmis-
sions is only slightly larger than the sum of Type I and Type II WD-induced
losses (darkest protion of the bars in Figure 2.5). Since throughput of WD-
TCP suffers badly because of increased notification overhead and watchdog
induced losses, we find it imperative to deal with these limitations.
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Figure 2.5: TCP retransmissions and watchdog induced losses for 4-node
network; the Y-axis represents the number of packets lost due to different
types of induced losses
Since throughput of WD-TCP suffers badly because of increased notifi-
cation overhead and watchdog induced losses, it is imperative to overcome
these limitations. This is our focus in Section 2.6.
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2.6 Coping with Watchdog Induced Losses and
Throughput Degradation
We wanted our watchdog-based protocols to be reliable, lightweight and that
their overhead must not outweigh the benefit. Therefore, in this section,
we propose measures to help ameliorate throughput degradation and the
watchdog induced loss problem in WD-TCP.
2.6.1 Decreasing Watchdog Notification Frequency
One way to reduce throughput degradation is by decreasing frequency of
watchdog notifications i.e. send cumulative notifications. Each notification
then identifies the set of packets that it carries information about. Instead
of a fixed notification interval, we propose a scheme similar to Additive In-
crease Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD). Let Ni be the notification interval.
Watchdogs start sending notifications with Ni = 1, i.e., sending notifica-
tion for every packet. With the goal of decreasing notification overhead, the
watchdogs increase notification interval additively upon overhearing in-order
packets. However, upon hearing retransmissions or out-of-order packets the
watchdog brings the notification interval down to 1 (i.e., sending per-packet
notifications) and starts over again (i.e., it starts increasing the interval again
upon overhearing in-order packets successfully). This essentially estimates
the congestion window size at the sender so that watchdogs can delay notifi-
cations for as long as the sender can keep releasing packets without receiving
an ACK. Figure 2.6 shows one instance of where the watchdog estimates
congestion window at the source. To make the figure viewable, we only show
the first 2000 TCP packets in a simulation (the x-axis shows packet num-
bers, and not TCP sequence numbers, therefore, retransmissions of the same
packet appear as different packets in the figure). For each packet number on
the x-axis, we show the size of the congestion window at the sender on the y-
axis as well as the notification interval variable maintained at the watchdog.
As an example, notice that the size of the congestion window at the sender
was 10 around packet number 440 (this is the actual size of the congestion
window at the sender, not known to the watchdog). This means that when
the 440th TCP data packet was being sent by the sender, at that time, the
size of the congestion window was 10. Then, this number went down to 1
15
after a timeout soon afterward. This is because when a timeout happens, the
TCP sender brings the size of congestion window to 1 and enters slow-start.
The watchdog was maintaining a notification interval of 8 around packet
440 (i.e., one notification per eight data packets overheard). However, after
the retransmission is seen at the watchdog, it brings the notification interval
down to 1 (i.e., it starts sending per packet notifications again).
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Figure 2.6: Interval adaptation with congestion window estimated at
watchdog; the Y-axis shows size of congestion window and notification
interval in units of packets; the X-axis shows TCP packet numbers for the
first 2000 packets in a 4-node network simulation
With adaptive notification interval algorithm running at node W, we again
evaluate WD-TCP from S to D (Figure 2.1) and show how WD-TCP out-
performs basic TCP in Figure 2.7. Notice that the “basic TCP Data” and
“Basic TCP ACK” curve overlap each other since the TCP model in NS-2
sends an acknowledgment for each packet. This is because cumulative noti-
fications lead to cumulative acknowledgments reducing ACK traffic (lowest
curve in Figure 2.7) and channel contention.
We also ran WD-TCP with adaptive notifications for a large network of
75 nodes spread randomly over a 1000 m × 1000 m area. The transmission
radius is fixed at 250 m. We set up 10 TCP flows between randomly cho-
sen source-destination pairs and repeat the simulation 10 times with random
seeds. There is interference between flows and also at watchdogs causing
WD-induced losses. There is no tampering. Any node can be a generalized
watchdog and multiple watchdogs may also be available for some packets.
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Figure 2.7: Throughput of WD-TCP with adaptive notification interval in
4-node network; simulation duration of 100 seconds and TCP packet size
500 bytes
At each hop, the packet is forwarded only after a notification for its correct-
ness has been received. Otherwise, it is dropped right there. For multiple
watchdogs, e.g., W1 and W2, suppose W1 sends notification first and W2
overhears it. Then, if W2 ’s own observation conflicts with that of W1, W2
sends a prompt notification, otherwise it sends the notification with some
probability (set to 0.5 in simulations). There are several advantages of this.
First, it reduces overhead in the case of multiple watchdogs. Second, if ob-
servations of W1 and W2 conflict, and W2 is malicious, then W1 can be
certain of this and does not trust W2 anymore. Third, as discussed in [15],
with notifications from multiple watchdogs, the receiver can find out which
node is actually malicious. For example, under a single failure model, noti-
fications from two watchdogs suffice to pinpoint the misbehaving node. We
use AODV for routing and when intermediate nodes drop packets because
of negative reports from watchdogs, AODV finds another route. We com-
pare unmodified TCP with WD-TCP for varying channel data rates. The
protocol’s performance in face of changing routes also gives ideas about its
performance with mobility. The results for aggregate throughput over all
flows in the network are shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 for the 4-node and
75-node network respectively. Surprisingly, WD-TCP seems to perform bet-
ter, i.e., closer to unmodified TCP, in the larger network (Figure 2.8) than
it did in the 4-node network with interference (Figure 2.4). This is because
17
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Figure 2.8: Aggregate throughput of WD-TCP with adaptive notification
interval in 75-node network with 10 flows; TCP packet size is 500 bytes
interference is no longer limited to the watchdog alone but traffic sources,
destinations and relays also experience interference which is more realistic.
Furthermore, it turned out that sometimes, the watchdog requirement lead
to use of routes that were better (with fewer interference) than those used
with basic TCP. However, fewer opportunities were available for accumulat-
ing several notifications in the larger network setting. This was because a
significant amount of time was spent waiting for channel access and watch-
dogs timed out in the meanwhile and sent notifications.
To sum up, in this section, we incorporated intelligence in watchdogs so
they can reduce overheads and still perform well. Next we look at the WD-
induced loss problem and a solution that works well in presence of interference
and packet tampering.
2.6.2 Increasing Watchdog Success Probability
One way to deal with WD-induced losses is by increasing the probability of a
watchdog successfully overhearing a given packet. We use a combination of
source coding and watchdog mechanism to design a scheme that ameliorates
the WD-induced loss problem as proposed in [15]. We add a coding layer
below the TCP layer at the sender and receiver. At the sender, the coding
layer uses an (n, k) online code to encode k data packets followed by n − k
coded packets calculated from the k uncoded packets just sent. It also adds
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a sub-sequence number to each packet. If the watchdog can then observe and
notify about any k of the n packets from one generation, the receiver can
decode the packets. The added redundancy increases watchdog success prob-
ability since it no more has to observe every packet. Therefore, even though
it may still fail to overhear some packets, WD-induced retransmissions can
be prevented to a great extent.
We now compare the following three different versions of TCP:
• TCP with Omniscient Sink : For this model, we assume an omniscient
TCP sink such that it can detect tampered packets without any over-
head and will reject them soliciting a retransmission.
• WD-TCP : This is our simple watchdog-based TCP protocol where
watchdogs send a notification for every packet.
• (6,5) Coded WD-TCP : This is WD-TCP with (6,5) source coding such
that if the watchdog can monitor any 5 out of 6 packets of the same
generation, it can help the receiver decode the whole generation.
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Figure 2.9: Aggregate throughput of TCP with omniscient sink and (6,5)
coded WD-TCP in 75-node network with 10 flows; wireless transmission
rate = 1 Mbps on all links in the network and TCP packet size is 500 bytes
For all three versions of TCP, our threat model is characterized by mali-
cious relays modifying contents of TCP packets with a probability p, before
forwarding them. For the 4-node network, only the single relay (node R)
is malicious. For the 75-node network, since routes are chosen by AODV,
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some flows might follow routes that have more than one malicious relay on
them. We first experiment with the 4-node network. A comparison for the
three variations of TCP is shown in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 with p = 0.1,
respectively for the 4-node and 75-node networks.
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Figure 2.10: A comparison of TCP with omniscient sink with uncoded
WD-TCP and (6,5) Coded WD-TCP in 4-node network; TCP packet size is
500 bytes
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Figure 2.11: A comparison of aggregate throughput of TCP with
omniscient sink, uncoded WD-TCP and (6,5) coded WD-TCP in 75-node
network with 10 flows; TCP packet size is 500 bytes
Comparing WD-TCP with coded WD-TCP, we see the improvement brought
about by source coding especially at higher rates. More surprisingly, despite
WD-induced losses and tampering, coded WD-TCP even outperforms TCP
20
with omniscient sink. This is a direct consequence of the fact that coding
saves many timeouts and retransmissions because tampered or missed pack-
ets can be extracted from added redundancy.
We also simulated coded WD-TCP protocol for the 75-node network. We
chose 20 nodes randomly to do packet tampering. These remain same across
all three versions of TCP. The results for aggregate throughput are shown
in Figure 2.11. It can be seen that coded WD-TCP outperforms other TCP
versions.
Next, in Figure 2.9, we show how throughput degrades when probability
of packet tampering is increased. More than a quarter (20/75) of the nodes
tamper packets with increasing probability. As can be seen, coded WD-TCP
performs much better than TCP with omniscient sink, especially for p ≥ 0.2.
With the modifications made to WD-TCP, we have now shown results
to support our claim that a combination of watchdogs and coding can pro-
vide strong protection against hostile channel conditions as well as malicious
network elements.
2.7 Protecting the Acknowledgments
So far, we have considered the problem of reliable communication between
a TCP source S and destination/sink D that are connected to each other
via a set of relays. Revisiting the 4-node network shown in Figure 2.1, we
have proposed and evaluated generalized watchdog-based schemes for provid-
ing reliability and misbehavior detection. In our generalized watchdog-based
schemes, when W overhears packets going over SR and RD, it sends a noti-
fication to the destination indicating whether the packet has been tampered
with or not. When a notification indicates no tampering, D accepts the cor-
responding packet, otherwise it discards the packet. TCP’s retransmission
mechanism then enables the source to retransmit the tampered packet owing
to the absence of an ACK for the first transmission.
However, the ACKs going to the source are still vulnerable to tampering.
An intelligent Byzantine node at R may choose to only tamper ACKs and
misguide the source. For example, it might change duplicate ACKs to new
ACKs and the sender will not know that a packet was lost in the network.
To prevent this, we propose a modification to our “WD-TCP”. In addition to
21
sending notifications for data, we now require the watchdog to also send no-
tifications for the ACKs going toward the source. The source then accepts an
ACK only after a notification is received indicating that it was not tampered
with. At this point, it is safe for the source to progress its sending window
and remove the acknowledged segments from its buffers. A watchdog-based
TCP, WD-TCP, with notifications for both data and ACK packets will be
the focus of the rest of this chapter. For all the discussion to follow, simula-
tions and results that we discuss in the rest of this chapter, we assume this
modified version of WD-TCP.
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Figure 2.12: Analyzing overhead of notifications; TCP packet size is 1000
bytes
We start by using the NS-2 simulator to simulate the 4-node network in
Figure 2.1. To evaluate WD-TCP with notifications for both data and ACKs,
we set up a TCP flow from source S to destination D with R as a wireless
relay. The watchdog at W overhears packets and sends notifications. TCP
packet size was set to 1000 bytes and lasts 100 seconds. The data trans-
mission rate on all the wireless links was assumed to be the same. For
several transmission rates, Figure 2.12 shows how the addition of notifica-
tions for data and acknowledgments adds overhead and reduces throughput.
The highest throughput is achieved when the TCP receiver simply accepts all
incoming packets without any verification from watchdogs and this is not un-
expected. This is shown by the curve labeled “TCP”. The next-lower curve
in the figure, labeled “Notifications for data only”, is the throughput when
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Table 2.1: Parameter values for bit rate 54 Mbps
SIFS 10 µsec
DIFS 28 µsec
Slot Time 9 µsec
Phy Preamble 16 µsec
Bit Rate 54 Mbps
CWmin 16
CWMax 1024
the watchdog sends a notification for each data packet it overhears twice:
first from the source to R and then from R to D. The destination, i.e., D,
buffers received TCP packets and only passes them to the higher layers after
a notification from the watchdog arrives indicating that the packet was not
tampered with. As can be seen from Figure 2.12, at higher rates, there is
a higher performance degradation. This is because the time taken by MAC
802.11 overheads including backoff-time slots become significant when wire-
less transmission rates are higher. Finally, the lowest throughput is obtained
when a separate notification is sent by the watchdog for each data packet
going in the forward direction and each ACK going to the source. The curve
is labeled “Notifications for both data and ACK” and this is the scheme we
focus on in this chapter. With a naive solution that we have discussed so
far, the simulation results in Figure 2.12 help us establish that there can be
significant performance degradation. Over the next few sections, we identify
possible ways for improving throughput and then propose and evaluate ap-
propriate solutions. We use default parameters from NS-2 when simulating
the wireless transmission rates of ≤ 6 Mbps. For simulating the rate of 54
Mbps, we used the parameters shown in Table 2.1 (taken from [20], [21]).
2.8 Watchdog Notifications with Adaptive Interval
One reason for the throughput degradation seen in Figure 2.12 is the over-
head of additional packets, i.e., notifications for data and acknowledgments.
As outlined in Section 2.6.1, we can reduce this degradation if we reduce the
frequency of sending the notifications and we proposed an interval adapta-
tion strategy where a watchdog mimics the opening of the congestion window
23
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Figure 2.13: Decreasing notification overhead; notifications for data and
ACK are sent independently; TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
happening at the sender and only sends notifications for packets when the
sender can no longer insert more packets in the network without receiving
an ACK. One simple fix could be to send the notifications for data at fixed
intervals, e.g., after every x packets overheard by the watchdog. We again
use NS-2 to simulate a TCP flow between S and D in the network of Fig-
ure 2.1. Figure 2.13 shows the improvement in throughput when x = 4,
i.e., the notifications from watchdog are sent every fourth packet overheard
(shown by curve labeled WD-TCP+D4+A). We also use our algorithm for
congestion window estimation outlined in Section 2.6.1 where the watchdog
uses an adaptive interval for sending data notifications but sends a new noti-
fication per ACK (TCP-WD+DAd+A). The fact that fewer notifications lead
to fewer ACKs, allows the algorithm to automatically decrease the frequency
of ACK notifications and therefore, we allow the watchdog to perform inter-
val adaptation only for data packets and continue to send a notification for
every ACK it monitors. The result of TCP-WD+DAd+A simulation appears
as the highest curve in Figure 2.13 and it can be seen that intelligent adapta-
tion of notification interval can be highly efficient and effective in improving
throughput.
As discussed in Section 2.5, the requirement for a watchdog to observe a
packet may lead to unnecessary retransmissions when there is interference on
the channel. We termed this as watchdog-induced losses and evaluated their
severity for data packets in Section 2.5. As we add notifications for ACK, we
24
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Figure 2.14: Effects of WD-induced loss of ACKs on TCP throughput;
TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
expected that watchdog induced losses would affect ACKs similarly. How-
ever, our simulations showed that watchdog induced losses, which resulted
in the watchdog failing to observe and hence notify the sender for a certain
ACK, did not cause a performance degradation commensurate with that for
a data packet. The reason, as it turned out, is quite simple: acknowledg-
ments are cumulative while data is not. Therefore, when a watchdog fails
to monitor a data packet, the sender must retransmit it. However, when a
watchdog fails to observe an ACK with sequence number k, as long as it
observes some ACK with sequence number > k coming afterward, the latter
ACK can serve as a cumulative ACK and also acknowledge sequence number
k. Therefore, as long as the watchdog can observe ACKs at a reasonable
interval, the throughput degradation caused by watchdog induced losses is
not significant. We show this in Figure 2.14. As can be seen, even when the
watchdog fails to overhear up to 20% of the ACKs, the throughput is not
affected significantly. However, when we increased the losses further (e.g.,
50% in Figure 2.14), sometimes the ACKs were lost in a long, continuous
burst and the sender timed out several times before the next ACK was over-
heard. By then, the sender gave up on the transmission and therefore, the
throughput was severely degraded.
The results from Figure 2.14 seemed to suggest that watchdog induced
losses for ACKs are not as severe as those for data packets. However, the
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results in Figure 2.14 are for the WD-TCP+D+A version implying that no-
tifications were being sent per-packet by the watchdog. We also wanted
to analyze whether watchdog induced losses affected throughput differently
when an adaptive interval was being used for notifications. The results are
shown in Figure 2.15. As we can see now, the effect of induced losses for
acknowledgments are significant now.
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Figure 2.15: Effects of WD-induced loss of ACKs on TCP throughput when
notifications are sent over an adaptive interval; TCP packet size is 1000
bytes
These simulations with watchdog induced losses for ACKs helped us iden-
tify a tradeoff. When notifications for data are sent per-packet (e.g., Fig-
ure 2.14), induced losses for ACKs do not significantly degrade throughput.
However, when the notifications for data are being sent at large intervals, as
a result, ACKs are generated sparingly. Therefore, if the watchdog fails to
overhear those few ACKs, the sender times out leading to retransmissions
and slow-start which then further degrades performance. In summary, while
sending notifications at large intervals directly improves throughput, it be-
comes more critical that the watchdog be able to overhear the corresponding
ACKs. We believe that when there is little interference on the channel, and
therefore a smaller probability of a watchdog failing to overhear an ACK, a
large notification interval may be used. However, when there is interference
on the channel, the watchdog should send notifications more often, so that
the destination can generate more ACKs giving the watchdog more oppor-
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tunities to overhear them.
2.8.1 Combined Notifications for Data and ACK
So far, we have assumed that a watchdog sends notifications for data and
ACKs separately. However, the broadcast nature of the wireless medium pro-
vides us with an opportunity to further decrease possible notification over-
heads. Notice that the watchdog can hear from both S and D. Since we
assume the links to be bidirectional, when the watchdog sends a notification
for data to D, the sender can also overhear it. Therefore, if the watchdog
includes information about ACKs that it has heard recently within the no-
tification packet, the sender can extract that information and this can serve
as an ACK notification. For example, suppose W observes packet sequence
number x being forwarded untampered by R. Before the watchdog may send
a notification for x, suppose W overhears an ACK sequence number y < x
being forwarded by R untampered to S. (For example, when using adaptive
notification interval, W may choose to delay notification for x and might
overhear ACK y < x during that time.) Now, when W decides to send a
notification, it may create one notification packet and add information about
watching data sequence number x and ACK sequence number y. When W
sends this combined notification, assuming both S and D receive it, D can
extract information about data and S can extract information about ACK.
Therefore, instead of sending two notifications, one for data x and one for
ACK y, the watchdog can send only one combined notification and the re-
ceivers can exploit wireless overhearing to extract information of interest to
them.
Figure 2.16 shows how sending the combined notifications scheme improves
throughput compared to when data and ACKs are verified separately. For the
simulations used to obtain the results in Figure 2.16, the watchdog did not use
any notification interval adaptation. Instead, for each packet it overheard, if
it had any pending data/ACK notifications, it combined them into one and
sent it out. For reference, we also show data from Figure 2.12 in Figure 2.16.
The next step was to analyze how combined notifications perform when
the watchdog uses adaptive notification intervals. Figure 2.17 shows how
changing the notification interval interacts with the scheme where watchdogs
27
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Figure 2.16: Comparison of sending separate data and ACK notifications
versus sending notifications for data and ACK combined; TCP packet size
is 1000 bytes
send a combined notification for data and ACK packets.
A counter-intuitive observation from the results in Figure 2.17 is that the
use of an adaptive notification interval actually performs much worse than
both the other options. We found that the reason for such a behavior is
that when the watchdog uses our interval adaptation algorithm that tries to
mimic the opening of the sender’s window, it sends very few notifications for
data packets. Since an ACK can only be generated after the notification has
been sent, the notification for the ACK actually happens when the watch-
dog sends the next data packet notification. To see how that may degrade
throughput, suppose the notification interval at the watchdog for data is x.
Now suppose the watchdog sends a notification about packet number s and
the destination generates an ACK for packet s. At this point, suppose the
watchdog overhears this ACK going to the sender and it was not tampered
with. However, the watchdog must wait for the next data packet notification,
which will happen at data packet number s+ x and if x is large, the sender
may have timed out by then leading to throughput degradation.
After figuring out the reason for why the watchdog scheme with adaptive
interval was performing poorly, we modified the scheme to overcome the
limitation. Since the main cause of throughput degradation was the delay
in receiving ACK notifications at the sender, we leverage the fact that the
28
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Figure 2.17: Comparison of changing notification interval when sending
combined notifications for data and ACK; TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
interval adaptation for data notification already reduces notification overhead
significantly. Therefore, for the few notifications that the watchdog does
send, we send an ACK notification for those so the sender can accept the ACK
right away, assuming there was no tampering. The result of this modification
appears as the curve with the highest throughput in Figure 2.17. To validate
our results, we compared the number of times the TCP sender timed out
waiting for an ACK (or a notification for an ACK), in both the schemes
(i.e., WD-TCP+(DAd+AAd) and WD-TCP+(DAd+A)). Figure 2.18 shows
the results. As is clear from the figure, when notifications for ACKs must be
sent along with that for data, the sender times out much more frequently than
when we allow the ACK notifications to proceed separately when notification
interval for data packets is large.
2.9 WD-TCP for Longer Flows
The simple 4-node network helped us validate our ideas, however, we were
also interested in evaluating how the schemes performed over flows that may
be longer than 2-hops. So we considered a network like that shown in Fig-
ure 2.19. The source S has a path to destination D that passes through
three relays R1, R2, R3. At each hop, a generalized watchdog Wi is available
to monitor the forwarding behavior of the relay Ri and notify relay Ri+1.
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Figure 2.18: Comparison of TCP timeouts
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Figure 2.19: 8-node network with watchdogs
We used NS-2 simulations for evaluations. Figure 2.20 shows some results
for the following different variations of TCP:
1. TCP (TCP): This represents TCP without any watchdogs. The
source sends packets and the destination simply accepts the packets
it receives from the relays.
2. Notifications-Data only (WD-TCP+D): In this version of our
watchdog-based TCP, the watchdogs only send notifications for data
packets and intermediate relays forward packets after receiving notifi-
cations. Similarly, the TCP sink accepts data packets and hands them
over to the application layer after receiving notifications from watch-
dogs.
3. Per Packet Notifications-Data and ACK (WD-TCP+D+A):
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In this version, we assume that watchdogs monitor both data and ACK
packets and send notifications for both of them on a per-packet basis.
4. Notifications-Data only, Adaptive Interval (WD-TCP+DAd):
Here we use our adaptive notification interval scheme to reduce the fre-
quency of sending data notifications. No notifications are sent for ACK
packets.
5. Combined Notifications- Data, ACK (WD-TCP+(DAd+A)):
Finally, in this scheme, we send notifications for both data and ACK
but we use interval adaptation only for data packets. ACK notifications
are sent on a per packet basis and when possible, a data notification is
combined with the ACK notification.
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Figure 2.20: Comparing TCP and various versions of WD-TCP for a 4-hop
flow; TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
For clarity, we also show only the results for lower rates in Figure 2.21.
These simulation results were obtained without any packet tampering in
the network and therefore can be used to calibrate the worst-case overhead of
reliability incurred by our watchdog-based schemes. TCP without watchdogs
still performs the best in terms of delivering the largest number of packets to
the destination. However, by using combined notifications for data and ACK,
along with using adaptive notification interval, as discussed in Section 2.8,
WD-TCP can also perform reasonably close to TCP without watchdogs. The
figure also provides a comparison of how the addition of ACK notifications
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Figure 2.21: Comparing TCP and various versions of WD-TCP for a 4-hop
flow (only lower rates shown)
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Figure 2.22: Comparing TCP and WD-TCP with coding for a 4-hop flow;
TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
lowers throughput due to the added overhead. We mention here that the
notification overhead is twofold: first, there is a packet transmission overhead
since notifications take channel time that could be used to send data instead.
Second, the requirement that a relay will only forward a packet, data or ACK,
after receiving a notification, adds an overhead in terms of delay in packet
transmission and reception.
To ameliorate throughput degradation that comes about as a result of
packet tampering and watchdog induced losses, we had proposed and eval-
uated the use of coding in Section 2.6.2. We now use the coding solution
again along with ACK protection. Figure 2.22 makes a comparison among
the following three versions of TCP:
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1. TCP with Omniscient Sink (TCP+OS): In this version, we use
TCP without any watchdogs, however, we assume the existence of an
omniscient sink: i.e., the sink can identify tampered packets and drop
them without any outside information. This version is supposed to
analyze the performance of an ideal, zero-overhead reliability scheme.
2. (6,5) coded TCP with Omniscient Sink (TCP+OS+(6,5)C ):
Here we assume that the TCP sender uses a (6, 5) MDS code for sending
packets and the packets arrive at an omniscient sink that can detect
tampered packets, discard them and use the redundancy in the code to
recover tampered packets, i.e., if the omniscient sink determines that
it has received any 5 of the 6 packets correctly, it can accept the data.
3. (6,5) coded WD-TCP (WD-TCP+(DAd+A)+(6,5)C ): This
last version uses our watchdog-based verifications and forwarding for
both TCP packets and TCP ACKs. The redundancy in the code en-
ables the TCP sink to receive packets correctly as long as at least 5 of
the 6 coded packets are received untampered.
For all three versions of TCP, we randomly chose one relay on the route and
20% packets were randomly tampered with by this relay.
As the results in Figure 2.22 show, both versions of TCP perform compara-
bly at lower rates, however, at the highest rate of 54 Mbps, coded WD-TCP
outperforms TCP without watchdogs by a significant margin. The major rea-
son for this is the fact that coded WD-TCP reduces the required number of
packet retransmissions because of the redundancy added by the code. On the
other hand, each tampered packet must be discarded by TCP with the omni-
scient sink and must be retransmitted by the source after either a timeout or
triple duplicate ACKs. However, it is not clear why TCP+OS+(6,5)C un-
derperforms compared to WD-TCP+(DAd+A)+(6,5)C. Since both of these
schemes use coding, it seems they should perform similarly. We provide more
insights into this in Figure 2.10 but we mention here that this has to do with
the fact that tampered packets are dropped early on when watchdogs are
used. We explain it with an example: Suppose the first relay on the route
tampers the packet. Suppose further that only one packet is tampered during
the simulation. Then, when using TCP+OS+(6,5)C, the packet continues
to traverse the network and will be discarded after arriving at the sink. Even
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if the redundancy from the code enables the omniscient sink to avoid re-
transmission of the packet, the tampered packet has consumed network time
already. However, when using WD-TCP+(DAd+A)+(6,5)C, the watchdog
detects tampering and informs the next-hop relay which discards the packet
right there. As a result, the packet does not consume any more resources
and channel time. This saved channel time may then be used for sending
additional packets. Therefore, with each instance of packet tampering WD-
TCP+(DAd+A)+(6,5)C saves some time compared to TCP+OS+(6,5)C
and this time may be used for transmission of additional packets. At higher
rates, such time may become very significant and this can be seen by the im-
provement in WD-TCP+(DAd+A)+(6,5)C compared to TCP+OS+(6,5)C
at 54 Mbps.
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Figure 2.23: Ratio of Retransmissions
TamperedPackets
for TCP and WD-TCP with coding for
a 4-hop flow
Figure 2.23 shows results that validate the conjecture that coded WD-
TCP actually reduces the required number of retransmissions when packets
are tampered in the network. The figure shows the ratio of the number
of retransmissions to the number of tampered packets. At all the rates we
simulated, TCP without watchdogs always ended up retransmitting more
packets than were actually tampered (the ratio always being larger than 1
in Figure 2.23). On the other hand, with coded WD-TCP, on average only
33% of tampered packets needed to be retransmitted. One reason for why
this might happen may be that tampered packets travel all the way to the
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destination when watchdogs are not used. As a result, compared to TCP with
watchdogs, the scheme without watchdogs loses more time before a tampered
packet is detected at the omniscient sink and dropped. This time may be
long enough to cause a retransmission at the sender following a timeout.
At a timeout, however, the sender retransmits all the packets present in
the current sending window, even the ones that could have possibly been
received untampered at the sink (following the reception of the tampered
packet). This results in a larger number of retransmissions than are actually
needed. TCP with watchdogs, however, provides early detection and dropping
of tampering. Therefore, packets following the tampered one arrive sooner
at the destination which can lead to DUPACKs followed by a fast retransmit
which sends only the tampered packet rather than all of the packets present
in the current sending window. This leads us to suspect that TCP without
watchdogs may experience a larger number of timeouts compared to TCP
with watchdogs. We verify this next.
TCP retransmissions that happen as a result of timeouts cause the most
serious degradation in throughput because they trigger slow-start. Therefore,
we expected that another reason for why throughput for TCP without watch-
dogs suffers may be the possible number of timeouts. Since the omniscient
sink discards all tampered packets, the sender must retransmit them. On the
other hand, when using coding, the reception of one tampered packet does
not necessarily mean that a retransmission will be needed. The redundancy
in the code may be used to recover the tampered packet therefore eliminat-
ing the need for a retransmission (and also eliminating the retransmission
response of TCP which degrades throughput). Figure 2.24 shows the ratio
of number of TCP timeouts with respect to the number of tampered pack-
ets. With coded WD-TCP, approximately 7% of tampered packets resulted
in a timeout compared to 19.5% for TCP without watchdogs. The data in
Figures 2.23 and 2.24 validates our intuition that fewer timeouts and fewer
retransmissions clearly play a vital role in improving throughput for coded
WD-TCP.
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2.10 Packet Tamperer Location
WD-TCP provides a hop-by-hop verification of packets and therefore tam-
pered packets are dropped by intermediate relays that receive notifications
containing indications for tampering. A direct consequence of this is that
tampered packets do not consume network resources by traveling all the way
to the sink. For flows that are longer, this may lead to significant through-
put improvement, especially if tampering happens in the beginning of a long
route.
To validate this, we ran simulations for the network of Figure 2.19 and
analyzed the performance of coded WD-TCP while changing the location of
the packet tamperer. Figure 2.25 shows some results. We again compare
coded WD-TCP with two versions of omniscient TCP: one, where the TCP
sink can detect tampered packets with zero overhead, and second where the
TCP sender uses coding to aid the omniscient sink in recovering tampered
packets. We mention here that the location of packet tamperer does not
matter for TCP+OS and TCP+OS+(6,5)C. This is because regardless of
where the packet is tampered, only the omniscient sink will detect it. This
means that a tampered packet will traverse the whole path from the source
to the sink so it does not matter where it was tampered. It will arrive at the
sink and will only be dropped or discarded there.
We notice in Figure 2.25 that coded WD-TCP performs the best when a
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Figure 2.25: WD-TCP performance as a function of packet tamperer
location in the network of Figure 2.19; TCP packet size is 1000 bytes
packet tamperer is located in the beginning of a flow’s route, e.g. R1. When
R1 tampers packets, the tampered packets are dropped at R2 and do not tra-
verse the links R2R3 and R3D, thereby making way for untampered packets.
When R2 is the packet tamperer, the performance is worse than when R1
is a packet tamperer. Finally, when R3 happens to be the packet tamperer,
tampered packets have already traversed the whole route and will only be
dropped at the sink and hence in this scenario, WD-TCP gives the lowest
throughput. We notice in Figure 2.25, that when R3 tampers the packets,
the performance of WD-TCP is very close to the performance of coded om-
niscient TCP. This is reasonable since in both cases, the tampered packets
are received by the sink and then dropped. However, this does indicate that
at higher rates, our notification interval adaptation is effective in reducing
the overhead and improving throughput which is why WD-TCP achieves
throughput close to a zero-overhead omniscient TCP.
2.11 Wireless, Multi-Channel Watchdogs and TCP
Recently, an increasing number of wireless networks are moving to a multi-
channel domain. Multi-channel networks allow a larger number of concur-
rent transmissions to be successfully carried out in the network over different
channels with little inter-channel interference. These features lead to reduced
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per-channel contention in the network and hence a direct improvement in
throughput performance. The potential for such improvement is what has
drawn much attention to the analysis of multichannel and multi-interface
networks with regard to their capacity [22], [23], routing protocols and chan-
nel/interface assignment [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. So far in this chapter, we
have explored wireless watchdogs with TCP traffic in single-channel envi-
ronments. Next, we briefly outline how a multichannel wireless environment
may be augmented with watchdogs and what may be some of the resulting
implications.
Consider the network in Figure 2.26. We assume that node A wishes to
set up a flow to node C and at the same time node D wishes to set up a flow
to node F . We assume that for a single-channel network, both solid lines
and dashed lines connect nodes that can communicate with each other. Due
to these neighbor relationships, at any one time, only one flow may proceed
to use the wireless channel. However, when the flow over A−B−C is using
the channel, node E may act as a watchdog and monitor node B. Similarly,
when the flow over D − E − F is sending packets, node B may act as a
watchdog for E. Notice that even if node B(D) was not used as a watchdog,
due to interference constraints, it will not be allowed to transmit when flow
D − E − F (A− B − C) is in progress. Therefore, using them as watchdogs
performing silent overhearing does not cause throughput compromise in this
scenario since the nodes being used as watchdogs cannot use the channel for
useful transmissions anyway and must be silent.
Now suppose a multichannel environment where two different channels
1 and 2 are available. Then, with the channel assignment shown in Fig-
ure 2.26 (channels shown over the links), both the flows may proceed to send
their packets simultaneously. Therefore, the availability of multiple channels
clearly offers a performance advantage over the single-channel environment.
However, notice that nodes B and E may not act as watchdogs anymore and
therefore, none of the two flows have a watchdog.
The example above shows that using wireless watchdogs in multichannel
environments would require careful planning in terms of channel assignment.
It also indicates that there will be a trade-off between increasing performance
and ensuring that packets are watched.
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Figure 2.26: Multichannel network with two flows A to C via B and D to
F via E
2.12 Discussion
We show results for simulations with small and large network sizes respec-
tively to understand the fundamental and generalizable behavior of our pro-
posed watchdog-based schemes. While TCP with omniscient sink (TCP+OS )
can detect packet tampering, it cannot localize faults unless there are watch-
dogs Therefore, when key-based logistics are expensive (in high mobility sce-
narios with high frequency of nodes joining and leaving the network), watch-
dogs provide an alternative. Watchdogs do not have to be specialized devices
and they serve as a deterrent for misbehaving nodes. By adapting notifica-
tion overhead and using source coding, our protocol achieved remarkable
improvement in TCP performance amidst packet tampering. If watchdogs
misbehave and accuse fault-free nodes, they lose their credibility and can
no longer cause further damage. We acknowledge weaknesses of watchdog-
based schemes in terms of security guarantee and overheads, however, there
is no “one-solution-fits-all” here and therefore exploring and comparing al-
ternative solutions can help applications decide which solution meets their
requirements best.
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CHAPTER 3
IPATH: INTELLIGENT, OPTIMAL
BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANT
RELIABLE COMMUNICATION
3.1 Introduction and Related Work
We consider the problem of Byzantine fault-tolerant, reliable communication
between a pair of nodes. A fault-free source s wants to send messages to a
fault-free destination z but there are Byzantine faulty nodes in the network.
While Byzantine nodes may behave arbitrarily and may modify or drop mes-
sages, we assume that a node can verify the immediate upstream transmitter
of the message. Given a parameter f , we assume that the network contains
at least 2f + 1 node-disjoint paths between the source s and the destination
z. Using these paths, we consider reliable communication between s and z
under two different constraints on the Byzantine faults: (i) at most f nodes
are faulty (referred below as bounded number of faulty nodes), or (ii) faulty
nodes are confined to at most f of the available node-disjoint paths (referred
below as bounded number of faulty paths). In both situations, two different
ways for s to send messages to z such that z can always decode the correct
message follow:
1. Message Replication: Replication being simple and intuitive has
been used in different contexts for Byzantine fault tolerance [29], [30], [31].
The idea is to send the same message over enough paths such that the
correct message always arrives at the destination over a majority of
paths. In our context, s replicates each message over 2f + 1 disjoint
paths and z accepts the message that arrives over at least f + 1 paths.
2. Coding: Source coding is another widely used solution to the Byzan-
tine fault tolerance problem [32], [33], [34]. The source may use a
distance 2f + 1 Reed-Solomon code for example, to encode k raw mes-
sages into n coded messages (n ≥ k + 2f). As long as the destination
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receives at least k out of the n coded messages correctly, it can decode
the original message correctly.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, for simplicity of discussion, we assume
that message replication is being used. However, it should be noted that the
algorithms we propose are applicable to both the above methods for reliable
delivery of messages using node-disjoint paths.
Conflict Graph: A Byzantine faulty node may misbehave in arbitrary ways
(including dropping or tampering packets). Such misbehavior can often be
detected, but it is not always immediately possible to determine which node
in the network has misbehaved. For instance, suppose that s−a−b−c−z is
one of the paths used to send messages in a wireless network. Suppose that
node a forwards the message to node b, and then overhears b forwarding a
tampered message. Then, a will realize that b must be faulty. Node a may
then inform node s that b is faulty. However, node s does not know whether
b is really faulty, or a is faulty and incorrectly accuses b of being faulty.1 In
such a situation, we say that a “conflict” exists between nodes a and b. Such
conflicts can be detected in many different ways in the networks (we discuss
some in Section 3.7).The source node keeps track of all such conflicts it has
learned in the form of a conflict graph [35], [36], [37], G = (Ng, Eg), where Ng
is the set of all nodes having a known conflict with at least one other node.
An edge eij exists in Eg if nodes i and j have a conflict.
Conflict graphs have found application in the areas of system diagnosis and
system testing [38], [39], [40], [41], [42], Byzantine agreement [32]. However,
the goal there is to identify faulty nodes whereas we want to use conflict
graphs to reduce overheads even if faulty nodes can not be identified.
Mizrahi et al. [35] apply the notion of conflict graphs to the problem of
continuous consensus in the presence of failures. To make their algorithm
efficient, they use the conflict graph to identify a subset of nodes that is
guaranteed to contain a certain number of faulty nodes. Instead of the con-
struction of a similar subset presented in this dissertation, the construction
from Lemma 4 in [35] can also be used. We believe that the construction we
present is somewhat more intuitive. As such, any other construction of the
1In this example, if node a does not have a direct link to node s, then node a will have
to use 2f + 1 disjoint paths to deliver the accusation reliably to node s. Otherwise, the
accusation could itself be tampered.
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desired subset can also suffice for our purpose. Information from a conflict
graph (alternatively called diagnosis graph) to maximize the throughput of
Byzantine agreement when communication links have a finite capacity is used
in [36].
By definition of the conflict relationship considered here, if nodes i and
j are known to be in conflict, then at least one of the two must be faulty.
Thus, two fault-free nodes are never found in conflict.2 Node s may learn the
conflict in many different ways. We described one such possibility earlier in
the wireless context. We defer the discussion of how conflicts may possibly
be discovered to Section 3.7. The design and correctness depend only on the
knowledge of correct conflict relationships, but does not depend on how the
conflicts manifested themselves.
3.1.1 Reductions to the Conflict Graph
We perform two simplifications (or reductions) to the conflict graph:
• Reduction 1: Any node found to be in conflict with itself – that is, a
node that either self-diagnoses itself as faulty must be faulty, and can
be removed from the network. Such conflicts can be represented by
self-loops in the conflict graphs. If there are k such nodes, we remove
them and obtain a smaller network that may contain at most f − k
failures and its conflict graph is free of self-loops.
• Reduction 2: In general, the source node s and destination node z
may be in the conflict graph as well. However, in our model, these
nodes are assumed to be fault-free. Thus, any nodes in conflict with s
or z are necessarily faulty. If there are k such nodes, we remove these k
nodes from the network altogether, and work with the smaller network,
which may now have at most f − k faulty nodes.
• Reduction 3: When some node is discovered as faulty with certainty,
we discard that node from the network. The resulting network may
have one fewer fault than the network before removing this node. The
conflict graph is updated to reflect the modified network (thus, param-
eter δ may change as well).
2In practice, it may suffice if two fault-free nodes are not found in conflict with a high
enough probability.
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Since the above reductions can be performed whenever there are nodes in
conflict with source or destination, or with themselves, or whenever a node
is discovered as faulty with certainty, hereafter, we only focus on the case
when the conflict graph does not contain the source and destination, or any
self-loops, or nodes that have been discovered as faulty with certainty.
3.2 Conflict Graphs Help Reduce Overhead
We now refer to Figure 3.1 to motivate our solution. Suppose that f = 2.
The figure shows a network with five node-disjoint paths between s and
z. The solid edges belong to the communication network. Clearly, reliable
communication can be achieved by sending one copy of each message along
the five node-disjoint paths from s to z, and requiring node z to apply a
majority vote to the five message copies thus received. At most two copies
may be tampered, since f = 2.
Now suppose that node s knows the conflict graph shown with dotted
lines in the figure: specifically, the conflict graph is G = (Ng, Eg) where
Ng = {a, b, c} and Eg = {(a, b), (a, c)}.
Recall that at least one endpoint of each edge in the conflict graph must
be faulty. Thus, the conflict graph in Figure 3.1 tells node s that either (i)
node a is faulty, or (ii) nodes b and c are both faulty. Note that when a is
faulty, it is possible that b or c is also faulty (since f = 2), but that is not
necessarily true. However, if a is not faulty, then b and c both must be faulty
to be able to “explain” the presence of edges (a, b) and (a, c) in the conflict
graph.
The question now is whether s can use the knowledge of the conflict graph
to deliver messages reliably to z without using all the five node disjoint paths.
The answer is “yes”, which motivates the algorithms in this dissertation to
identify the minimal set of routes. In particular, in Figure 3.1, it suffices to
use the three routes via nodes c, d and e respectively. To see this, recall that
either node a is faulty, or nodes b, c both are faulty. Consider each of the two
cases:
• If a is faulty, then at most one other node may be faulty (because
f = 1). Thus, it suffices to use three paths that exclude node a.
43
• If a is fault-free, but b, c are both faulty: Since f = 2, no nodes besides
b, c can be faulty. In particular, nodes d, e are fault-free. Thus, on the
three chosen routes (i.e., via c, d, e), only one route has a faulty node
(node c), whereas the other two routes are certainly fault-free. Again,
the three chosen routes suffice to tolerate the single fault (i.e., c).
The above example motivates iPath. Our work answers the following ques-
tion: Given a conflict graph, and a set of disjoint paths, how can we identify
the smallest subset of the disjoint paths that suffices to achieve reliable com-
munication?
s	   z	  
b
a
d
c
e
Figure 3.1: Example 2-hop network
We first argue that the bounded number of faulty paths model may be
reduced to a simpler bounded number of faulty nodes equivalent. Then, for
the common fault model, we make two main contributions:
• Given a set of paths between a source-destination pair, and a conflict
graph, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for a subset of
these paths to be able to guarantee Byzantine fault-tolerant communi-
cation.
• We present suitable algorithms, and prove that the algorithms always
find the optimal set of paths that suffices for reliable communication,
for a given conflict graph.
We assume these algorithms are run each time a new conflict is discovered and
the optimal solution is found considering the newly learned conflict. There-
fore, the algorithms reduce overhead dynamically as and when Byzantine
nodes misbehave.
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3.3 Conflict-Graph Based Intelligent Path Selection
(iPath)
When s and z are directly connected by a communication link, they can
communicate reliably with each other, without having to route messages
through other nodes. In our discussion that follows, we omit this simple
case, and consider the case when routes containing other nodes must be used
between s and z.
We propose a provably optimal path selection algorithm: iPath. iPath
uses information contained in the conflict graph to find the optimal set of
node-disjoint paths that can be used for reliable communication between a
source-destination pair.
3.4 iPath: Terminology and Preliminaries
We first define additional notations. We use lowercase letters to denote
nodes, as well as quantities such as the number of paths. We use uppercase
letters for sets (e.g., set of nodes or edges). We use \ and |.| to represent set
subtraction and set size respectively. Let N denote the set of all the nodes in
the network excluding the source and destination. Recall that G = (Ng, Eg)
denotes the conflict graph. Also, due to the reduction discussed previously,
we can assume that s and z are not in the conflict graph, and that there are
no self-loops in the conflict graph.
Let P denote the given set of node-disjoint paths between source s and
destination z. Define p = |P |. We assume that p ≥ 2f + 1. For a set of
nodes X, we use PX to denote the paths in P (i.e., PX ⊆ P ) such that each
path in PX contains at least one node in X. We say that the paths in PX
“go through” the nodes in X. The paths in P \ PX are said to be “outside”
the nodes in X. We use pX = |PX | to denote the number of paths in PX .
Let O = N \Ng. Note that pO = p− pNg , where, using the notation above,
pNg = |PNg | is the total number of paths that go through nodes in Ng.
We use the notation X ./ G to denote that X is a vertex cover for conflict
graph G = (Ng, Eg). Since conflicts cannot occur between fault-free nodes,
there exists one vertex cover of the conflict graph such that the nodes in that
cover are faulty.
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Let us define C to be the set of all possible vertex covers of the conflict
graph G, that is,
C = {X : X ./ G}
Define δ = minX∈C |X|, the size of a minimum cover set. Let Vmin be a
minimum cover set thus, |Vmin| = δ. For example, for the conflict graph in
Figure 3.1, {a} is a minimum cover, and δ = 1. The minimum vertex cover
for a conflict graph G = (Ng, Eg) indicates that at least |Vmin| = δ nodes
must be faulty in Ng in order to explain all the edges in Eg.
For Y ⊆ N , define γY as the smallest number of nodes that need to be
added to Y to obtain a cover set of the conflict graph. Thus, for Z ⊂ Ng,
γY = min{|Z| : Z ⊆ Ng,∃W ∈ C s.t. W ⊆ Y ∪ Z}
It should be easy to see that, γO = δ.
Claim 1 For A ⊆ B ⊆ N , γA ≥ γB.
Claim 1 follows by observing that for Z ⊂ Ng, if A ∪ Z ./ G, then
B ∪ Z ./ G, i.e., if set A can explain all conflicts in G by addition of nodes
in Z to A, then B ⊇ A should also be able to explain all conflicts in G with
the addition of nodes in Z to B.
Claim 2 For any A ⊆ Ng, γA ≤ δ.
Claim 2 follows by observing that adding the nodes from a minimum vertex
cover (which has size δ, by definition of δ) to set A will yield a vertex cover.
3.5 Bounded Number of Faulty Paths Model
Our iPath formulation for the “bounded number of faulty paths” model
assumes a path-level abstraction for Byzantine faults where the unit of fault
is a “path” in the communication network. A path is faulty if one or more
faulty nodes lie on it. Each of the paths may be arbitrarily long and may
have any number of faulty nodes on it. As a result, the total number of faulty
“physical nodes” in the network can be much larger than f but we assume
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that total number of faulty paths is no more than f . We may then capture
conflict behavior between “paths” using a conflict graph G = (Ng, Eg) where
“nodes” n ∈ Ng represent “paths” in the physical network. Therefore, an
edge between “nodes”, i, j ∈ Ng, in the conflict graph, indicates that one
or more physical nodes on path i conflict with one or more physical nodes
on path j. Similar to node-level conflict graphs, two non-faulty paths can
not have a conflict between them in a path-level conflict graph. With this
translation of network variables, iPath for “bounded number of faulty paths”
model becomes the same as the “bounded number of faulty nodes” model
with 2-hop paths between s and z and the same solution may be applied
to both models (a 2-hop path has one relay node). Therefore, starting from
Section 3.6, we only consider the “bounded number of faulty nodes” model
with 2-hop paths. Generalization of the results for the “bounded number of
faulty nodes” model with more than one node on each path is straightforward,
and omitted here.
3.6 2-Hop iPath
We begin with a simplified version of the problem wherein each of the paths
in P contains two hops (i.e., one intermediate node), similar to the example
in Figure 3.1.
We now present some results that are useful in proving the optimality of
our algorithm. For any C ⊆ Ng, Lemma 1 provides a necessary condition
that must be true to be able to achieve reliable communication using only
the paths through C and O.
Necessary condition
Lemma 1 Given the conflict graph G = (Ng, Eg), C ⊆ Ng, and O ⊆ O,
reliable communication is possible using just the paths through C ∪ O (i.e.,
paths in PC ∪ PO), only if
pC + pO ≥ 2(f − γC) + 1
Proof: Recall that O = N \ (Ng ∪ {s, z}). The lemma only allows us
to use the paths that go through the nodes in C and the nodes in O. The
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proof is by contradiction. Suppose that pC + pO < 2(f − γC) + 1.
By definition of γC , there exists a set X ⊆ Ng such that |X| = γC and
C ∪X ∈ C (i.e., C ∪X is a vertex cover for the conflict graph). Let the set
of nodes in C ∪X be faulty – these faulty nodes explain all the conflicts in
the conflict graph. Suppose that all the remaining faults may occur on the
paths in PC ∪ PO. Thus, since |X| = γC , there may be up to f − γC faults
in the nodes in C ∪O. If pC + pO < 2(f − γC) + 1, then these f − γC faults
cannot be tolerated using just the paths in PC ∪PO. This is a contradiction.
Lemma 2 establishes a lower bound on the minimum number of paths from
P necessary for reliable communication, for a given conflict graph.
Lemma 2 Given the conflict graph G = (Ng, Eg), at least 2(f − δ) + 1 paths
are necessary for reliable communication between s and z.
Proof: Suppose that the optimal set of paths goes through some C ⊆ Ng
and some O ⊆ O, and this set is adequate for reliable communication. By
Lemma 1, pC + pO ≥ 2(f − γC) + 1. By Claim 2, γC ≤ δ. Therefore,
pC + pO ≥ 2(f − γC) + 1 ≥ 2(f − δ) + 1.
As seen in the next two subsections, it turns out that the lower bound in
Lemma 2 is tight – that is, there exists a set of 2(f − δ) + 1 paths that can
have at most f − δ faults, and hence suffices for reliable communication.
3.6.1 2-Hop iPath : A Construction of an Optimal
Solution
Based on the necessary condition from Lemma 2, we now propose a con-
struction used by 2-hop iPath to obtain the optimal set of paths that can
support reliable communication, i.e., we show that it is possible to construct
sets C ⊂ Ng, and O ⊆ O, where γC = δ and pC + pO = 2(f − γC) + 1.
Set C is obtained as follows. Let Vmin be a minimum cover of the conflict
graph. Define an edge coloring scheme (ECS) that colors some of the edges
between the nodes in Vmin and the rest of the nodes in the conflict graph G.
ECS identifies a maximum matching between Vmin and Ng\Vmin. Specifically,
ECS colors the edges between nodes in Vmin and Ng \ Vmin such that (i)
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each node in Ng is incident on at most one colored edge, and (ii) the number
of colored edges is maximized. Nodes connected by colored edges are said to
be ECS neighbors.
Let V1 be the set of nodes in Ng \ Vmin incident on colored edges. Thus,
|V1| ≤ |Vmin| = δ.
Lemma 3 The minimum vertex cover set, Vmin, is always a strict subset of
Ng, i.e., Vmin ⊂ Ng.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that Vmin = Ng, i.e., the minimum
vertex cover contains all the nodes in the conflict graph. Consider x ∈ Ng.
The lemma assumes that Vmin = Ng, and therefore, x ∈ Vmin. Since Vmin
contains all the nodes in the conflict graph, therefore, Vmin must contain all
the nodes that conflict with x. As a result, if we remove x from Vmin, the
remaining set, i.e., Vmin \ x, must still be a vertex cover (because it contains
a vertex for all the edges of x) and will have a size of |Vmin| − 1. This is a
contradiction because Vmin is a minimum vertex cover. Therefore, Vmin ⊂ Ng.
Lemma 4 The set V1 contains at least one node x, such that x 6∈ Vmin.
Proof: From Lemma 3, we know that Ng \ Vmin cannot be empty.
Without loss of generality, let x be one node such that x ∈ Ng \ Vmin. Since
x ∈ Ng is part of the conflict graph, x must have an edge with some node
in Vmin, by definition of a minimum vertex cover. Let y ∈ Vmin be one such
node so that x and y conflict with each other. Since ECS maximizes the
number of colored edges, therefore, it will either color edge exy, or another
edge on y, or another edge from x to some node in Ng − Vmin. Therefore, V1
will contain at least one node.
Lemma 5 Given a conflict graph G = (Ng, Eg), its minimum vertex cover
Vmin of size δ, it is possible to construct a set of nodes C ⊂ Ng, such that
γC = δ and pC ≥ |Ng| − 2δ.
Proof: Note that since Vmin is a cover for the conflict graph, nodes in
Ng \ Vmin cannot have conflicts with each other. Thus, nodes in Ng \ Vmin
form an independent set.
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Figure 3.2: Relationship between Ng, Vmin and V1
We start by using ECS to return a set S∗ = Vmin ∪ V1. We then obtain
C = Ng \ S∗ and,
pC = |Ng| − δ − |V1|
≥ |Ng| − 2δ
By construction, C ∩ Vmin = ∅, C ∩ V1 = ∅ and C is an independent set.
We now prove that γC = δ for the C thus constructed. The proof is by
contradiction. Suppose, γC < δ. Then, there exists set X ⊂ Ng \ C, such
that |X| < δ and C ∪ X ./ G (C ∪ X is a vertex cover). The relationship
between some of these sets is shown in Figure 3.2.
Since C = Ng \ Vmin \ V1, X can take on nodes from Ng \ C = Vmin ∪ V1.
Since C covers the links incident on nodes in C, for C ∪ X to be a cover
for the conflict graph, X only need cover all the conflicts among nodes in
Vmin ∪ V1, in other words, X must be a vertex cover for S∗ = Vmin ∪ V1.
Since |Vmin| = δ and ECS colors at most one node for each node in Vmin,
therefore, |V1| ≤ δ.
Then, using Lemma 4, we know that |V1 ∪ Vmin| ≥ δ + 1. Therefore, we
must have X ⊂ V1 ∪ Vmin, because if not, |X| > δ which is a contradiction.
Since |Vmin| = δ, Vmin \X must be non-empty (if |X| < δ as claimed). |V1|
cannot be larger than δ by definition of ECS coloring. There can be two
cases:
• |V1| = δ: Since Vmin = δ and by definition of V1, each node in Vmin
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has a colored edge with exactly one node in V1, therefore there are δ
disjoint edges between V1 and Vmin. These disjoint edges need δ nodes
to cover them. As a result, |X| = δ which is a contradiction.
• |V1| < δ: Suppose X = V ∗1 ∪ V ∗min, where V ∗1 ⊆ V1 and V ∗min ⊂ Vmin.
Then:
|X| = |V ∗min|+ |V ∗1 | (3.1)
Since |X| < δ and |V ∗1 | ≥ 0, there must exist a set Y = Vmin \ V ∗min,
such that |Y | ≥ 1 and Y ∩X = ∅. Let Q = V1 \ V ∗1 . Now we make a
few observations:
– Observation 1: Since X ∩ (Y ∪ Q) = ∅, the nodes in Y must not
have any conflicts with nodes in Q; otherwise C ∪X cannot be a
vertex cover for the conflict graph, which is a contradiction.
– Observation 2: For similar reasons, the nodes in Y cannot have
conflicts with each other.
– Observation 3: This implies that nodes in Y may only have conflict
with nodes in X ∪ C = X ∪ (Ng \ Vmin \ V1).
– Observation 4: Also, since Ng \ Vmin is an independent set, Q ⊆
Ng \Vmin, and (by Observation 1) nodes in Q do not have conflicts
with nodes in Y , nodes in Q only have conflicts with nodes in V ∗min.
Some of these sets are depicted in Figure 3.3. Define an alternating path
as a path consisting of an even number of edges, of which alternate
edges are colored, and the remaining edges are not colored and has
every alternate node in V1 and other node in Vmin. Our notion of
an alternating path is similar to the augmenting path concept used in
reference to maximum matching in bipartite graphs [43], [44].
Let us partition nodes in Y into two parts, Y1 and Y2. Y2 = Y \ Y1,
with Y1 defined as follows: For each node v ∈ Y that is not incident
on any colored edge, (i) v is in Y1, and (ii) any node w ∈ Y that is
reachable from v with an alternating path is also in Y1. Observe that
the edge incident on v in the alternating path will be uncolored, and
the edge incident on w in the alternating path will be colored. Recall
that an alternating path has an even length, by definition above.
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Figure 3.3: The scenario for V ∗1 ⊆ V1 and V ∗min ⊂ Vmin, X = V ∗1 ∪ V ∗min
Let Z1 denote the nodes that have colored edges to nodes in Y1. Note
that not all nodes in Y1 have colored edges. Let Z2 denote the nodes
that have colored edges to nodes in Y2. Since nodes in Y do not conflict
with nodes in Q = V1 \ V ∗1 , it follows that Z1 ∪ Z2 ∈ V ∗1 .
– Observation 5: Any node in Y1 may not have conflict with any
node in C = Ng \ Vmin \ V1. Consider node v ∈ Y1. There are two
possibilities for node v. Let us consider each separately.
∗ v is not incident on a colored edge: If v has a conflict with
some node in C, then the corresponding edge should have
been colored by ECS, increasing the number of colored edges
by 1. This contradicts that ECS colors the maximum possible
number of edges.
∗ v is incident on a colored edge, and there exists w ∈ Y such
that w is not incident on a colored edge, and w has an alter-
nating path to node v: By definition of an alternating path,
the edge on the path incident on w must be uncolored, and
the edge on the path incident on v must be colored. If node
v has a conflict with some node in C = Ng \ Vmin \ V1, then
the corresponding edge is left uncolored by ECS. However, we
can color that edge, and switch the colored-uncolored status
of the edges on the above alternating path between v and w,
to obtain a new edge coloring with one more colored edge.
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This again contradicts that ECS chooses the largest number
of colored edges.
– |Z2| = |Y2|: This is true by definition of Y2 and ECS, because each
node in Y2 is incident on a colored edge, and the colored edges are
disjoint.
– Since the colored edges are disjoint, Z1 and Z2 are disjoint.
– Observation 6: Nodes in Y1 do not have an edge to any node in
Z2: If such an edge were to exist between w ∈ Y1 and x ∈ Z2,
it must be uncolored, since x already has a colored edge to some
node in y ∈ Y2. There are two possibilities for w ∈ Y1: (i) w has
no colored edge: then, there exists an alternating path w− x− y,
implying that y should be in Y1. This is a contradiction since
Y1 ∩ Y2 = ∅. (ii) w is reachable by an alternating path from some
node v ∈ Y that has no colored edge. The alternating path from v
to w, augmented by uncolored edge w−x and colored edge x− y,
is also an alternating path. Again, this results in the contradiction
with the assumption that y ∈ Y2.
– By definition of Z1, |Z1| ≤ |Y1|. Define a set
W = V ∗min ∪ (V ∗1 \ Z2) ∪ Y2 = Ng \ C \ Y1 \ Z2 \Q
Thus, Z1 ⊆ W .
Since |Z2| = |Y2|, |W | = |X| < δ. We now argue thatW is a vertex
cover for the entire conflict graph, by considering the nodes that
are not included in W .
∗ C = Ng \ Vmin \ V1: Set Ng \ Vmin is an independent set.
Thus, nodes in C may only have conflicts with the nodes in
Vmin. However, we showed above that nodes in C do not
have conflicts with nodes in Y1 (Observation 5). Thus, the
nodes in C may have conflicts only with nodes in Vmin \ Y1 =
V ∗min ∪ Y2 ⊆ W .
∗ Q = V1\V ∗1 : Q ⊆ Ng\Vmin is an independent set. Thus, nodes
in Q may only have conflicts with the nodes in Vmin. However,
we showed above that nodes in Q do not have conflicts with
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nodes in Y = Y1 ∪ Y2 (Observation 1). Thus, the nodes in Q
may have conflicts only with nodes in Vmin \ Y = V ∗min ⊆ W .
∗ Now consider Z2. Since Z2 ⊆ Ng \ Vmin, nodes in Z2 may
have conflicts only with nodes in Vmin. However, due to Ob-
servation 6, nodes in Z2 do not have conflicts with nodes in
Y1. Thus, nodes in Z2 may have conflicts only with nodes in
Vmin \ Y1 = V ∗min ∪ Y2 ⊆ W . Hence the conflicts of nodes in
Z2 are covered by W .
∗ Set Y1: Nodes in Y1 do not have any conflicts with each other
(Observation 2), with nodes in Z2 (Observation 6), with nodes
in Q (Observation 1), and with nodes in C (Observation 5).
Thus, nodes in Y1 may only have conflicts with nodes in W .
Thus, their conflicts are covered by W .
The above argument shows that nodes in W cover conflicts of
nodes in Ng \W = C ∪ Y1 ∪ Z2 ∪ Q. Of course, they also cover
the conflicts of nodes in W . Hence W is a cover for the conflict
graph, and its size is < δ. This is a contradiction.
Claim 3 Given p ≥ 2f + 1 node-disjoint paths and a conflict graph G =
(Ng, Eg), it is always possible to find a set of paths going through C ∪O that
can have at most f − δ faults on it, and pC + pO = 2(f − δ) + 1.
Proof: Given a conflict graph, using the construction from Lemma 5,
iPath first obtains C ⊂ Ng such that γC = δ. Recall from Lemma 5 that
C = Ng \ (Vmin ∪ V1) with |V1| ≤ δ. Therefore,
pC = |Ng| − δ − |V1|
≥ |Ng| − 2δ
Since γC = δ, at most f − δ faults can occur on the PC ∪ PO paths.
pC + pO = pC + (p− |Ng|)
≥ |Ng| − 2δ + (2f + 1)− |Ng|
≥ 2(f − δ) + 1
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Figure 3.4: Network with f = 5, dashed lines indicate conflicts,
Vmin = {a, b, g} or {a, b, h}and δ = 3
Hence, Lemma 1 is satisfied. To satisfy Lemma 2, a subset C∗ ⊂ C maybe
used. From Claim 1, γC
∗
= δ and therefore pC
∗
+ pO = 2(f − δ) + 1 can be
achieved.
We refer to the network of Figure 3.4 to explain the key ideas for con-
structing a set C with γC = δ. Here, f = 5. Dashed lines represent con-
flicts, therefore O = {P 8, P 9, P 10, P 11}, δ = 3 and from Lemma 2, iPath
should find an optimal solution with 2(f − δ) + 1 = 5 paths and achieve
reliable communication. Using the construction discussed above, we ob-
tain Ng \ Vmin = {c, d, e, h} and use ECS to obtain V1 = {d, h}. Then,
C = Ng \ (Vmin ∪ Vc), e.g., in Figure 3.4, C = {c, e}. Notice now that C
can only be made a vertex cover if we either add Vmin to it or add at least δ
nodes (e.g., {d, h, a, b} or {d, g, b}). Therefore, γC = δ which completes the
construction. iPath will then choose a subset C∗ ⊂ C = c(e) and only use,
C∗ ∪ O and achieve reliable communication.
3.6.2 2-Hop iPath Simplification
We propose an intelligent optimization that iPath uses when constructing
the optimal solution. For a conflict graph where δ ≥ |Ng |
2
, iPath chooses
C = ∅. Below, we show that this approach obtains the optimal solution and
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bypasses the overhead of constructing the optimal solution.
It is clear that if C = ∅, γC = δ. As a result, paths going through set
of nodes in C ∪ O can have at most f − δ faults on them and can support
reliable communication as shown below:
pO + pC = p− |Ng|+ 0
≥ 2f + 1− |Ng|
≥ 2f + 1− 2δ
≥ 2(f − δ) + 1
Hence Lemma 1 is satisfied. For the optimal solution, we choose any O ⊂ O
such that pO = 2(f − δ) + 1 and Lemma 2 is satisfied.
3.6.3 Paths Chosen by 2-Hop iPath Are Sufficient and
Optimal
By definition of δ, the set Ng must contain at least δ faulty nodes. For any
set C ⊂ Ng, by definition of γC , at least γC faulty nodes lie in Ng \C. Thus,
at most f − γC faulty nodes can possibly remain in the paths that do not
go through the nodes in Ng \C, i.e., the paths that go through the nodes in
C ∪O. Choosing 2(f − γC) + 1 paths is therefore sufficient to tolerate these
f − γC faults.
From Claim 3, we can see that when choosing the set of paths PC ∪ PO
for routing, iPath only considers C such that γC = δ. Thus, from the above
discussion, it follows that 2(f − δ) + 1 paths chosen in Claim 3 are sufficient
for reliable communication between s and z.
By Lemma 2, 2(f − δ) + 1 paths are necessary for reliable communication.
Since the construction in Claim 3 chooses 2(f−δ)+1 paths, it is also optimal.
We conclude with a brief argument on how the above results hold for the
case when conflicts may lie among nodes that are not on paths between the
actual source s and its desired destination z. We know that in a conflict
between two nodes, at least one of them must be faulty. If a conflict is such
that both endpoints lie outside the paths between s and z, the results hold
because essentially, the total number of faults among the paths of interest are
now f−1 and we still have |P | ≥ 2f+1 paths. If one endpoint of the conflict
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lies over the paths between s and z, and the other endpoint lies outside, then
the results hold because we can remove both the endpoints of the conflict,
as a result of which, there remain at least 2f paths between s and z, with at
most f − 1 faults on them and therefore reliable communication is possible.
In summary, the case we considered, i.e., when a faulty node always results
in a path between s and z being faulty, is the worst-case scenario for which
our results hold, but they also hold in other cases.
3.6.4 Dispute Control vs. iPath
The dispute control algorithm proposed in [45] is related to iPath since it
also addresses the problem of choosing suitable paths/nodes for a communi-
cation network by exploiting a graph in which “disputes” between nodes are
represented as edges. It works by choosing a pair of nodes in dispute with
each other and then removes these nodes along with all the edges incident on
them from the communication graph. It recursively removes as many pairs
as possible. This algorithm is greedy and oblivious to the existence of an
optimal solution.
b c	  a d
Figure 3.5: Conflict graph shown in dashed lines, Ng = {a, b, c, d},
Vmin = {b, c} or Vmin = {a, d} and δ = 2
Consider, for example, the network shown in Figure 3.5. The dispute
control algorithm may remove nodes b, c and their incident edges, leaving be-
hind nodes a, d. Alternatively, it may pick nodes a, b first followed by picking
nodes c, d thus removing all four nodes. However, as is, the algorithm does
not distinguish between the two cases. We now outline how the distinction
between these two cases is critical for the optimal path selection problem
being solved by iPath.
Consider now the network of Figure 3.6. The solid lines show the avail-
able paths (between source s and destination z not shown in the figure)
while dashed lines represent conflicts or disputes. As discussed above, dis-
pute control might remove nodes b, c from the network along with all their
incident edges and deem paths containing nodes a, d as useful. It may then
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Figure 3.6: Network with f = 2 and 2f + 1 available paths; the conflict
graph is shown in dashed lines, Ng = {a, b, c, d}, Vmin = {b, c} or
Vmin = {a, d} and δ = 2
use paths P 1, P 4, P 5. However, Lemma 2 indicates that the optimal solution
should only use one path and therefore, dispute control may cause unneces-
sary overhead.
iPath on the other hand will remove all four nodes in the conflict graph
of Figure 3.6. This is because iPath will first remove Vmin = {b, c} and then
also remove Vc = {a, d} from the network. It would then leave only P 5 as
a usable path and will not use any redundant paths and guarantee reliable
delivery with the optimal number of paths and zero overhead.
In the example of Figure 3.6, it was possible that dispute control might
choose the optimal solution if it removed the maximum possible number of
nodes. However, we now present an example which shows that there might
be scenarios where dispute control will not return the optimal solution even
if it removes the largest possible number of node pairs in dispute. Consider
now the network of Figure 3.4. In the best case, dispute control can remove
four nodes (e.g., nods a, d, g, h) and still leave behind seven paths that will
be considered usable. However, Lemma 2 indicates that the optimal solution
should use only five paths and as discussed earlier, iPath constructs a solution
that in fact uses only five paths.
Consider now the network of Figure 3.7. Dispute control can remove at
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Figure 3.7: Network with f = 4 and 2f + 1 available paths; the conflict
graph is shown in dashed lines, Ng = {a, b, c, d, e}, Vmin = {b, e, d} or
Vmin = {a, c, e} and δ = 3
most four nodes from this conflict graph (e.g., it may remove eae followed by
ecd leaving behind node b). However, notice that no matter which four nodes
are removed from this graph, it can never be guaranteed that at least δ = 3
faulty nodes have been removed.
In contrast, iPath would use ECS and remove all five nodes which would
guarantee that at least δ = 3 faulty nodes/paths have been removed from
consideration. Furthermore, using the simplification from Section 3.6.2, iPath
intelligently decides to use C = ∅ because δ > |Ng |
2
. Therefore, it does not
even have to perform ECS and it still provides the optimal solution by using
only three paths that do not go through nodes in conflict graph.
Therefore, the tradeoff between iPath and dispute control is essentially
a tradeoff between simplicity and optimality. While dispute control may
use a simple greedy algorithm to find a quick solution, it is not guaranteed
that the optimal solution will even exist in the possible solution space that
dispute control explores. iPath on the other hand requires computation of
a minimum vertex cover set Vmin which may become increasingly costly as
the conflict graph grows larger, but then iPath always guarantees an optimal
solution.
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3.6.5 Discussion on Feasibility of iPath
We envision iPath to be used in conjunction with a conflict discovery pro-
tocol. Therefore, we wanted to analyze how the discovery of new conflicts
enables iPath to reduce message replication overhead. We know that the
misbehavior of Byzantine nodes can lead to two scenarios: (a) the discovery
of a fault, (b) the discovery of a conflict. In the former case, adapting the
overhead of sending messages is simpler because a fault has been isolated. If
the Byzantine behavior is characterized by malicious nodes rather than faulty
nodes, then these nodes will prefer to misbehave while remaining undetected.
Therefore, it is in the interest of Byzantine nodes to misbehave in ways such
that non-faulty nodes can only discover conflicts with them but they may
not be identified as faulty with certainty. To understand how long Byzan-
tine nodes can cause throughput degradation by doing so, we performed a
simulation in MATLAB. The idea was to see how long the Byzantine nodes
can stay undiscovered while causing only conflicts in the network. For the
simulation, we allow exactly one new conflict to be discovered in each round
of message delivery and then record δ = |Vmin| for the resulting conflict
graph. Since iPath uses 2(f − δ) + 1 paths, increase in δ reduces replication
overhead. We further account for an intelligent adversary by making the
following assumptions:
• Byzantine nodes collude with each other so that they never indicate
conflicts with other Byzantine nodes, i.e., faulty nodes never accuse
each other.
• Byzantine faulty nodes do not cause conflicts with more than f non-
faulty nodes (because if they do, then they will be identified as faulty
themselves).
For several values of f , we assume that 2f+1 paths are available. We then
randomly generate conflicts between a non-faulty and faulty path, subject
to the two constraints mentioned above and repeated the simulation 10000
times for each value of f . After each new conflict is added, we compute
Vmin for the updated conflict graph. We keep adding newer conflicts until
|Vmin| = δ = f . With these settings, Figure 3.8 shows a CDF of the number
of “conflicts” it takes for δ to reach f . To understand the figure, consider the
CDF for f = 7. The CDF shows that in 50% of the simulations, when ≈ 14
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Figure 3.8: CDF of the number of edges that needed to be added to the
conflict graph until δ = f
edges were added the conflict graph at random, size of Vmin for the conflict
graph, i.e., δ reached f . Similarly, in 90% of the simulations, δ reached f
when ≈ 21 edges were added to the conflict graph. In terms of the network,
the figure tells us that if each Byzantine behavior results in discovery of a
new conflict as per our simulation model above, then in approximately 90%
of the simulations, after 21 instances of misbehavior, iPath will reduce the
overhead of message replication to zero and will use only one path (when
f = 7). These simulations were done on a dual-core Dell Inspiron 580s with
an Intel Pentium CPU G6960 @2.93 GHz and 4 GB RAM, and each minimum
vertex computation took less than a second using MATLAB’s graph theory
toolbox.
3.7 Learning Conflicts
Our formulation for iPath has assumed that conflict graphs were available.
This is reasonable since there are several simple ways to generate conflict
graphs and we present some examples below. More may be found in litera-
ture.
During Network Discovery: Network discovery is usually characterized
by some form of flooding of information regarding network neighborhoods
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etc. An example is the “Explorer” algorithm [46, 47]. It assumes 2f +
1 connectivity and each node i floods the network with its neighborhood
information. Relays add their id to messages before forwarding. Node j
accepts i’s neighborhood when it has received at least f + 1 matching copies
over node-disjoint paths as indicated by list of forwarders in messages. Let
N be set of all nodes in the network and let Rs be the set of neighbors of
node s. We propose a way to use results of topology discovery to build a
conflict graph in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Generate Conflict Graph G = (Ng, Eg) Based on Topology
Discovery
for all i ∈ N , j ∈ N , i 6= j :
if i ∈ Rj ∧ j /∈ Ri then
Eg = Eg ∪ eij
Ng = Ng ∪ {i, j}
return G = (Ng, Eg)
Assuming links are bidirectional, if node j claims i is its neighbor whereas
i does not make a similar claim about j (line 2 Algorithm 2), then we have
found a conflict and we add i and j to the conflict graph and add an edge be-
tween them. We mention here that the correctness of the algorithm depends
on bidirectionality of links. Therefore, if link discovery is not symmetric,
then Algorithm 2 may erroneously add some conflicts.
During Data Transfer: A “challenge-response” method can be used
where nodes periodically request their neighbors to solve a challenge and
whenever a node receives a faulty response, it can indicate a conflict with
the sender of the response.
3.8 Coding and iPath
iPath used in conjunction with message replication provides reliability guar-
antees, however, replication has high overhead. An alternative could be to
use error detection/correction coding at the source and destination in com-
bination with iPath. This will be the focus of the next few subTable We
formulate the problem for arbitrary path rates and then establish the prop-
erties of the schemes for when path rates are chosen from the set {0, 1}.
The sender node encodes the input message consisting of a certain number
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of symbols (of a suitable size) into a codeword using an MDS (maximum
distance separable) code into multiple encoded symbols. The symbols of the
codeword are then transmitted along the chosen paths. When the rates are
restricted to be {0, 1}, one symbol is sent on each selected path. In general,
multiple symbols may be sent on each path. The receiver uses all the re-
ceived packets and decodes them appropriately (as per the error detection
or correction code used by the sender). The work of Kim et al. [33, 34] and
Liang and Vaidya (e.g., [36, 48]) is relevant to this dissertation. Liang and
Vaidya consider the use of conflict graphs to improve capacity of consensus
and broadcast. Kim et al. consider reliable communication on disjoint paths,
and also general graphs. Their work formulates expressions for achievable ca-
pacity when using parallel paths of different individual capacities. According
to this work, with N parallel links between the source and the destination,
the capacity is equal to the sum of N −2f smallest capacity paths (Theorem
1 from [33, 34]). We generalize this result to the case when a conflict graph
is available and therefore some information about possible faulty paths may
be obtained.
3.8.1 Notation
Recall that N represents the set of all nodes excluding s and z. As before,
we use P to represent the set of all available paths, then with the 2-hop
abstraction, |P | = |N | = n ≥ 2f + 1. When δ = 0, the conflict graph is
empty. For δ > 0, define
w(X) =
∑
i∈X
ri (3.2)
where ri is the rate at which messages may be carried over path i. For
convenience, we assume that ri is an integer in the units of symbols/unit
time. We propose two schemes in Sections 3.9.1 and 3.9.2 and discuss how
they interact with coding for both error detection and correction. We use
τ(X) to represent the throughput with error detection when using strategy
X and Γ(X) to represent the throughput with error correction when using
strategy X. Similarly, we use α(X) to represent the coding rate with error
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Table 3.1: Coding notation
Scheme X
Throughput With Error Detection τ(X)
With Error Correction Γ(X)
Coding Rate With Error Detection α(X)
With Error Correction β(X)
detection when using strategy X and β(X) to represent the coding rate with
error correction when using strategy X. This notation is also summarized in
Table 3.1.
3.9 Path Selection with Coding
We consider the following two schemes for path selection.
3.9.1 Using All Available Paths (AAP)
In this scheme, a sender uses all the available paths regardless of whether
they have conflicts or not.
3.9.2 Using iPath-Based Path Selection (iPS)
Here, a sender uses an iPath-based path selection for sending coded messages.
iPS finds a set S defined as a smallest size set that is guaranteed to contain
at least δ faults, for the given conflict graph. Vmin∪V1 defined earlier has the
property that it contains at least δ faults, but smaller such sets may exist as
well. Not all the results that we present in this dissertation require that the
set be smallest, but generally, iPS performs better when the set is smaller.
Paths in N \ S are used for sending messages with iPS.
3.10 Throughput with Error Detection Codes
As we discussed in Section 3.8, the results from the work of Kim et al.
are applicable when there is no conflict graph or in other words, when the
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conflict graph is empty. The throughput then is w(N )− w(K), where K =
arg maxL⊆N ,|L|=f w(L) (i.e., L is a set of f paths with the largest total rate).
However, for non-empty conflict graphs, the feasible fault sets must also cover
the conflict graph, i.e., the set K must also be a cover for the conflict graph.
We adopt this generalization in our results that follow.
3.10.1 Throughput with Error Detection Achieved by iPS
iPS does not use paths going through nodes in set S ⊂ Ng for sending data,
and it exploits the knowledge that S is guaranteed to contain at least δ faults.
The remaining nodes inN\S may contain up to f−δ faults. Generalizing the
work from [33, 34] as discussed above, the maximum throughput achievable
for iPS (using the notation from Table 3.1) is given by:
τ(iPS) = w(N \ S)− max
F⊆N\S,|F |=f−δ
w(F )
= w(N )− w(S)− max
F⊆N\S,|F |=f−δ
w(F )
Kim et al. [34] do not consider the possibility of using conflict graphs (or,
equivalently, the conflict graphs are empty in their model). But their re-
sults can be easily extended to the case when a non-empty conflict graph is
available. Define
I = arg maxF⊆N\S, |F |=f−δ w(F ) (3.3)
Then the maximum throughput of iPS is given by
τ(iPS) = w(N )− w(S)− w(I) (3.4)
3.10.2 Throughput with Error Detection Achieved by AAP
We know that there may be up to f faulty paths in the available set. There-
fore, AAP, which uses all available paths, must account for f faults in the
worst case. Since the paths have arbitrary rates, in the worst case, faulty
paths may be turn out to be f highest-weight paths in the set of available
paths. Therefore, in the worst case, the n− f lowest-rate paths may have to
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be used for carrying useful information. When δ = 0, i.e., the conflict graph
is empty, the worst-case scenario of the highest rate f paths being faulty is
always feasible and therefore, any throughput calculation must account for
this. However, for a non-empty conflict graph, all “acceptable” fault sets
must cover the conflict graph, including the fault set for the worst case sce-
nario. Thus, it can be shown that the throughput achievable for AAP is
given by
τ(AAP ) = w(N )− max
F⊆N ,|F |=f,F./G
w(F )
Define
A = arg maxF⊆N ,|F |=f,F./G w(F ) (3.5)
Then the maximum throughput of AAP is given by (proof is similar to that
sketched in Section 3.11.2 for AAP ’s throughput with error correction)
τ(AAP ) = w(N )− w(A) (3.6)
For deriving the results below, we assume that the reductions 1, 2 and 3
described earlier (Section 3.1.1) have already been applied to the conflict
graph. Thus, these results apply to such reduced conflict graphs.
Lemma 6 For error detection, with δ > 0, AAP achieves higher throughput
than iPS.
Proof: The set S must contain at least δ nodes by definition. If S
contains exactly δ nodes, then all of them must be faulty, again by the
definition of S. Then, by Reduction 3 discussed earlier (Section 3.1.1), these
nodes should have been removed from the graph already. Thus, we now
assume that |S| ≥ δ+1. Since the S is guaranteed to contain δ faults, and A
covers the entire conflict graph, we have that |S∩A| ≥ δ and |A− (S∩A)| ≤
f − δ. Also, |I| = f − δ. Therefore, due to the definition of I,
w(A− (S ∩ A)) ≤ w(I) (3.7)
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Recall that I contains the largest weight f−δ nodes inN−S andA−(S∩A) ⊆
N − S. Now consider two cases:
• |S ∩ A| = δ: Since |S| > δ, therefore, S ∩ A ⊂ S, and
w(S ∩ A) < w(S)
The last inequality and Eq. (3.7) together imply that
w(A) = w(S ∩ A) + w(A− (S ∩ A)) < w(S) + w(I)
By Eqs. (3.4) and (3.6), then, τ(AAP ) > τ(iPS).
• |S ∩ A| > δ: In this case, by definition
w(S) ≥ w(S ∩ A)
Also, |A− (S ∩ A)| < f − δ. Thus, w(A− (S ∩ A)) < w(I).
The last two inequalities together imply that
w(A) = w(S ∩ A) + w(A− (S ∩ A)) < w(S) + w(I)
By Eqs. (3.4) and (3.6), then τ(AAP ) > τ(iPS).
3.11 Throughput with Error Correction Codes
3.11.1 Throughput with Error Correction Achieved by iPS
Again, by generalizing the results in [33, 34] to the case when a conflict graph
is available, it can be shown that the maximum throughput achievable for
iPS is given by
Γ(iPS) = w(N \ S)− max
F⊆N\S
|F |=2(f−δ)
w(F )
= w(N )− w(S)− max
F⊆N\S
|F |=2(f−δ)
w(F ) (3.8)
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Define
J = arg max F⊆N\S,
|F |=2(f−δ)
w(F ) (3.9)
Then the maximum throughput of iPS is given by
Γ(iPS) = w(N )− w(S)− w(J) (3.10)
3.11.2 Throughput with Error Correction Achieved by AAP
As discussed in Section 3.10.2, the presence of a non-empty conflict graph
has some implications for allowable fault sets. More specifically, all accept-
able fault sets must be vertex covers of the conflict graph. We claim that
throughput achievable for AAP is given by:
Γ(AAP ) = w(N )− max
F1,F2⊆N , |F1|=|F2|=f,
F1./G,F2./G
w(F1 ∪ F2)
Define
(F ∗1 , F
∗
2 ) = arg max F1,F2⊆N ,
|F1|=|F2|=f,
F1,F2./G
w(F1 ∪ F2) (3.11)
Then the maximum throughput of AAP is given by
Γ(AAP ) = w(N )− w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) (3.12)
where F ∗1 and F
∗
2 are such that
w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) = max F1,F2⊆N ,
|F1|=|F2|=f,
F1,F2./G
w(F1 ∪ F2)
We now argue that the throughput with error correction for AAP can not be
higher than that in Eq. (3.12). For simplicity, we assume that path rates ri
are represented in units of symbols/unit time (for some suitable symbol size).
Now consider two acceptable fault sets, F ∗1 and F
∗
2 according to Eq. (3.11),
and two codewords X and Y that differ from each other in the first w(F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 )
symbols. Consider the following two cases:
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• F ∗1 is faulty: The source sends codeword X and faulty nodes in F ∗1
modify the first w(F ∗1 ) symbols of the codeword (including w(F
∗
1 ∩F ∗2 )
symbols also if F ∗1 ∩F ∗2 is not empty) such that the first w(F ∗1 ) symbols
of X become the same as those for Y . Let X ′ be the received codeword.
Then the first w(F1)
∗ symbols of X ′ are the same as codeword Y (The
last w(N )− w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) symbols of X and Y are already the same by
assumption).
• F ∗2 is faulty: The source sends Y and nodes in F ∗2 modify only w(F ∗2 )−
w(F ∗2 ∩F ∗1 ) symbols of Y starting from symbol w(F ∗1 ) + 1, so that they
become the same as X. Let the received codeword be Y ′.
A depiction for these two case is shown in Figure 3.9. The length of bars
w(N) 
w(F1*) 
w(F2*) 
X 
Y 
X’ 
Y’ 
symbols 
Figure 3.9: Explaining throughput of AAP with error correction
in the figure represents the weight of the corresponding set. The colors
for the two codewords, X and Y represent their contents and therefore,
their corresponding bars are have different colors in the first w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 )
symbols. For the two cases mentioned above, the destination receives X ′
and Y ′, however, as depicted in Figure 3.9, the two are exactly the same
and as a result, the destination can not distinguish between the two cases
and can not decode the original codeword. Therefore, the distance between
any two codewords for error correction must be at least w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) + 1
thus validating the maximum throughput expression from Eq. (3.12). AAP
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achieves this maximum throughput by using an appropriate (n, k) MDS code
where n = w(N ) and k = w(N )−w(F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 ). The distance between any two
valid codewords is n− k + 1 = w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) + 1 thus achieving the maximum
throughput from Eq. (3.12) while providing error correction.
Lemma 7 For error correction, iPS cannot achieve higher throughput than
AAP, i.e., Γ(iPS) ≤ Γ(AAP ).
Proof: Recall that S = Vmin ∪ V1. Let B = F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 . Since S contains
at least δ nodes from any cover of the conflict graph, and F ∗1 and F
∗
2 each
covers the entire conflict graph, we have that |S ∩F ∗1 | ≥ δ, and |S ∩F ∗2 | ≥ δ.
Thus, |F ∗1 − (S ∩ F ∗1 )| ≤ f − δ and |F ∗2 − (S ∩ F ∗2 )| ≤ f − δ. Thus,
|(F ∗1 − (S ∩ F ∗1 )) ∪ (F ∗2 − (S ∩ F ∗2 )) ≤ 2(f − δ)
Due to the definition of J , where |J | = 2(f − δ), it follows that
w(F ∗1 − (S ∩ F ∗1 )) ∪ (F ∗2 − (S ∩ F ∗2 ))) ≤ w(J)
Also, trivially,
w((S ∩ F ∗1 ) ∪ (S ∩ F ∗2 )) ≤ w(S)
Then:
w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) = w((S ∩ F ∗1 ) ∪ (S ∩ F ∗2 )) + w(F ∗1 − (S ∩ F ∗1 )) ∪ (F ∗2 − (S ∩ F ∗2 )))
≤ w(S) + w(J)
By Eqs. (3.10) and (3.12), we then have
Γ(iPS) ≤ Γ(AAP )
3.12 Rate with Error Detection Codes
Coding rate is defined as the ratio of the amount of useful information and
the total coded information, i.e., for an (n, k) code that generates n units of
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coded information for every k units of useful information, the coding rate is
expressed as:
Rate =
k
n
(3.13)
3.12.1 Coding Rate with Error Detection Achieved by iPS
Using the definition from Eq. (3.13), the coding rate for iPS, i.e., α(iPS)
(following notation from Table 3.1) is
α(iPS) =
w(N )− w(S)− w(I)
w(N )− w(S) (3.14)
Lemma 8 When n ≥ 2f + 1, the highest coding rate with error detection
achievable by iPS is obtained when all paths in use have equal rates.
Proof: With arbitrary path rates, all the paths used by iPS may be
made to have the same rate r, when r = mini∈N\S(ri). Let Z = N \ S with
|Z| = z. Then, with all rates made equal, the coding rate for iPS with error
detection is
α(iPS)equal =
z − (f − δ)
z
(3.15)
Now consider any other weight assignment for the paths going through
nodes in Z = N \S. Since the algorithm provides fault detection, it may use
a code rate as follows:
α(iPS)∗ =
(z − (f − δ))x¯
(z − (f − δ))x¯+ (f − δ)y¯ (3.16)
where y¯ is the average weight of the f−δ highest weight paths going through
the nodes in set Z = N \S and x¯ is the average weight of all remaining paths.
We simplify the above expression as follows:
α(iPS)∗ =
(z − (f − δ))
(z − (f − δ)) + y¯
x¯
(f − δ) (3.17)
Since y¯ ≥ x¯, y¯
x¯
(f − δ) ≥ (f − δ) and (z− (f − δ)) + y¯
x¯
(f − δ) ≥ z, therefore:
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z − (f − δ)
z
≥ (z − (f − δ))
(z − (f − δ)) + y¯
x¯
(f − δ)
α(iPS)equal ≥ α(iPS)∗
This completes the proof that iPS achieves its highest coding rate with error
detection when all the paths have the same rate.
3.12.2 Coding Rate with Error Detection Achieved by AAP
Let A be as defined in Eq. (3.5), then the coding rate is
α(AAP ) =
w(N )− w(A)
w(N ) (3.18)
Lemma 9 When path rates are chosen from the set {0, 1}, if n ≥ 2f + 1,
iPS always achieves a higher coding rate with error detection than AAP, i.e.,
α(iPS) > α(AAP ).
Proof: With path rates chosen from {0, 1}, w(N \S) = n−|S|, w(I) =
f − δ and w(A) = f . Suppose in contradiction that iPS achieves a coding
rate that is less than or equal to that for AAP, i.e.,
n− |S| − (f − δ)
n− |S| ≤
n− f
n
⇒ n ≤ f |S|
δ
Since |S| ≤ 2δ, then n ≤ f |S|
δ
implies that n ≤ 2f , which is a contradiction
because the lemma assumes that n ≥ 2f + 1. Therefore, for error detection,
α(iPS) > α(AAP ).
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3.13 Rate with Error Correction Codes
3.13.1 Coding Rate with Error Correction Achieved by iPS
iPS uses the paths in N \ S which may contain up to f − δ faulty nodes.
The coding rate β(iPS) is
β(iPS) =
w(N )− w(S)− w(J)
w(N )− w(S) (3.19)
Lemma 10 The highest coding rate with error correction achievable by iPS
is obtained when all paths in use have equal rates.
Proof: The proof is similar to that for Lemma 8. With arbitrary path
rates, all the paths used by iPS may be made to have the same rate r, when
r = mini∈N\S(ri). Let Z = N \ S with |Z| = z. Then, with all rates made
equal, the coding rate for iPS with error correction is
β(iPS)equal =
z − 2(f − δ)
z
(3.20)
Now consider any other weight assignment for the paths going through
nodes in Z = N \ S. Since the algorithm provides error correction, it may
use a code rate as follows:
β(iPS)∗ =
(z − 2(f − δ))x¯
(z − 2(f − δ))x¯+ 2(f − δ)y¯ (3.21)
where y¯ is the average weight of the 2(f − δ) highest weight paths going
through the nodes in set Z = N \ S and x¯ is the average weight of all
remaining paths. We simplify the expression in Eq. (3.21) as follows:
β(iPS)∗ =
z − 2(f − δ)
(z − 2(f − δ)) + y¯
x¯
2(f − δ) (3.22)
Since y¯ ≥ x¯, y¯
x¯
2(f − δ) ≥ 2(f − δ) and z − 2(f − δ) + y¯
x¯
2(f − δ) ≥ z,
therefore:
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z − 2(f − δ)
z
≥ z − 2(f − δ)
z − 2(f − δ) + y¯
x¯
2(f − δ)
β(iPS)equal ≥ β(iPS)∗
This completes the proof that iPS achieves its highest coding rate with error
correction when all the paths have the same rate.
3.13.2 Coding Rate with Error Correction Achieved by AAP
Let F ∗1 , F
∗
2 be as defined earlier in Eq. (3.11), then the coding rate is
β(AAP ) =
w(N )− w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 )
w(N ) (3.23)
Lemma 11 Let path rates be chosen from the set {0, 1}. Then, for large n
and δ > 0, iPS achieves a higher coding rate with error correction than AAP
when δ > 0.
Proof: Let us define M = w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ). With path rates chosen from
{0, 1}, we know that iPS sets ri = 0, ∀ i ∈ S. Since AAP uses all available
paths, this is equivalent to AAP setting ri = 1,∀ i ∈ N . Then, we have
β(iPS) =
n− |S| − 2(f − δ)
n− |S|
and β(AAP ) = n−M
n
, therefore, the lemma holds, i.e., β(iPS) > β(AAP ),
only if:
n− |S| − 2(f − δ)
n− |S| >
n−M
n
M(n− S) > 2n(f − δ)
⇒ M > 2n(f − δ)
n− |S| (3.24)
Note that f , δ and S are independent of n for a given conflict graph. There-
fore, for large enough n, the RHS in the above expression approaches 2(f−δ)
making the inequality true. (Clarification: It is possible to find two feasible
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fault sets whose union has size at least δ+2(f−δ), by including Vmin in each
fault set, and f − δ disjoint nodes outside S in the two fault sets. Thus, M
must be at least δ + 2(f − δ) in size with δ > 0.)
Therefore, when n is large, iPS achieves a higher coding rate than AAP
when δ > 0.
Lemma 12 When δ = 1, and path rates are chosen from the set {0, 1}, iPS
achieves a higher coding rate with error correction than AAP.
Proof: Since δ + 1 ≤ |S| ≤ 2δ, we know that |S| = 2 for δ = 1.
Therefore, the coding rate with error correction for iPS simply becomes
β(iPS) =
n− |S| − 2(f − δ)
n− |S| =
n− 2f
n− 2
The conflict graph with δ = 1 can only be a single link or a star network.
Then there exist two feasible fault sets F1 and F2 such that |F1| = |F2| = f
and F1∩F2 = ∅. Recall from the reductions in Section 3.1.1, that we assume
that no node is known to be certainly fault-free, otherwise the reductions
we discussed in Section 3.1.1 would remove those nodes and update f ac-
cordingly. Therefore, AAP achieves the following coding rate with error
correction:
β(AAP ) =
n− 2f
n
For the claim to be true, β(iPS) > β(AAP ), i.e.,
n− 2f
n− 2 >
n− 2f
n
n > n− 2 (3.25)
This is always true.
Lemma 13 When δ = f and path rates are chosen from the set {0, 1}, iPS
achieves a higher coding rate than AAP.
Proof: When δ = f , iPS will use only one path that is guaranteed to
be fault-free and hence achieve a coding rate of 1. Since AAP uses all the
available paths, it must add redundancy, and therefore, β(AAP ) < 1.
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Lemma 14 When f = 1 and path rates are chosen from the set {0, 1}, iPS
achieves a higher coding rate than AAP if δ > 0.
Proof: Since the lemma assumes δ > 0, the proof follows from Lemma 13.
When δ > 0 for f = 1, trivially, δ = f and from Lemma 13, β(iPS) = 1 >
β(AAP ).
We conclude this section with an example to show that when δ ≥ 2,
neither of iPS or AAP is always optimal. Consider the conflict graph shown
in Figure 3.10. Suppose the conflict graph is for a network with f = 6 and
there are a total of 2f + 1 = 13 available paths. Let all path rates be equal
to 1.
a	   b	  
c	   d	  
g	  
h
Figure 3.10: Conflict graph for network with f = 6, dashed lines indicate
conflicts, Vmin = {a, b, g}, δ = 3
iPS will obtain S = {a, b, g, c, d, h} and therefore, using Lemma 10, iPS
achieves the highest coding rate when it sets ri = 1 for the 13− 6 = 7 paths
through N \ S. The coding rate with error correction then is
β(iPS) =
13− 6− 6
13− 6 =
1
7
(3.26)
Now consider AAP. Since there are a total of 2f + 1 = 13 available paths,
and the conflict graph only contains six paths, there are 2f + 1 − 6 = 7
paths that do not have any known conflicts (not shown in Figure 3.10). To
obtain AAP ’s throughput, we want to choose two feasible fault sets F1 and
F2 (a fault set is feasible if its size is f and it covers the conflict graph),
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such that |F1| = |F2| = 6 and |F1 ∪ F2| is maximized. Clearly, |F1 ∪ F2|
would be maximum if F1 ∩ F2 = ∅ and since f = 6, the highest possible
value for |F1 ∪ F2| is 12. This value is achieved if we can find two disjoint
vertex covers for the conflict graph and then add one of them to F1 and the
other to F2. However, due to the presence of a clique between a, b and g
in the conflict graph, it is not possible to find two disjoint vertex covers of
the conflict graph. Therefore, any feasible fault sets F1 and F2 will be such
that |F1 ∩ F2| ≥ 1. In other words, w(F1 ∪ F2) ≤ 11 for any feasible F1,
F2. Therefore, for AAP, let F
∗
1 ∩ Ng = {a, b, h} and F ∗2 ∩ Ng = {a, g, d} so
that F ∗1 ./ G and F ∗2 ./ G (both F ∗1 and F ∗2 are vertex covers for the conflict
graph). In addition, F ∗1 and F
∗
2 each contains f − δ = 3 disjoint nodes from
the set N \Ng (the conflict-free paths not shown in Figure 3.10). Then, the
coding rate for AAP is
β(AAP ) =
13− 11
13
=
2
13
(3.27)
Therefore, for the case of Figure 3.10, we can see, β(AAP ) > β(iPS).
Now consider the network of Figure 3.11. Similar to Figure 3.10, we assume
f = 6 and there are a total of 2f + 1 = 13 available paths (δ = 3).
a	   b	  
c	   d	  
g	  
Figure 3.11: Conflict graph for network with f = 6, dashed lines indicate
conflicts, Vmin = {a, b, d}, δ = 3
iPS will obtain S = {a, b, c, d, g} and therefore, using Lemma 10, iPS
achieves the highest coding rate when it sets ri = 1 for the 13− 5 = 8 paths
through N \ S. The coding rate with error correction then is
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β(iPS) =
13− 5− 6
13− 5 =
2
8
(3.28)
Observe, once again, that w(F1 ∪ F2) ≤ 11 for any feasible F1, F2, for
instance, consider F ∗1 ∩Ng = {a, b, c} and F ∗2 ∩Ng = {g, a, d} so that F ∗1 ./ G
and F ∗2 ./ G (both F ∗1 and F ∗2 are vertex covers for the conflict graph). In
addition, F ∗1 and F
∗
2 each contains f − δ = 3 nodes from the set N \ Ng.
These nodes are disjoint. Then, the coding rate for AAP is
β(AAP ) =
13− 11
13
=
2
13
(3.29)
Therefore, for the case of Figure 3.11, we can see, β(AAP ) < β(iPS). The
two examples just considered validate the claim that in general, neither of
the schemes is always better than the other.
3.14 General Weights
Consider the scenario when the path rates can be arbitrary rather than from
the set {1, 0}.
Lemma 15 When a conflict graph consists of δ disjoint edges, with δ > 0
and |N | = n ≥ 2f+1, iPS achieves a higher coding rate with error correction
than AAP for arbitrary path rates.
Proof:
For a conflict graph consisting of δ disjoint edges, there exist N1 ⊂ Ng and
N2 ⊂ Ng such that |N1| = |N2|, N1 ∩ N2 = ∅ and N1 ∪ N2 = Ng and the
only conflicts in the graph are between nodes in N1 and N2. Then, N1 and
N2 are both disjoint minimum vertex covers for the conflict graph making
|N1| = |N2| = δ. iPS will obtain S = N1 ∪N2 and achieve a coding rate of
β(iPS) =
w(N )− w(N1 ∪N2)− w(J)
w(N )− w(N1 ∪N2)
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where J is as defined in Eq. (3.9). Then, from Lemma 10,
β(iPS)max =
n− 2δ − 2(f − δ)
w(N )− 2δ
=
n− 2f
n− 2δ (3.30)
We now consider AAP. Since N1 and N2 are disjoint and each of them
covers the conflict graph, from the definition of F ∗1 and F
∗
2 from Eq. (3.11), it
is clear that N1∪N2 ⊆ F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 . Also, |F ∗1 ∩S| = δ and |F ∗2 ∩S| = δ, therefore,
(F ∗1−(F ∗1 ∩S))∪(F ∗2−(F ∗2 ∩S)) = J . Therefore, F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 = S∪J = N1∪N2∪J
and the coding rate achieved by AAP is
β(AAP ) =
w(N )− w(N1 ∪N2)− w(J)
w(N )
Since w(N ) > w(N )− w(N1 ∪N2), β(iPS) > β(AAP ).
Lemma 16 For arbitrary path rates, if f = 2, n = 2f + 1 = 5 and δ > 0,
iPS achieves a higher coding rate with error correction than AAP.
Proof: Let n = 2f + 1 be the number of available paths. Then, with
f = 2, if δ = 2, from Lemma 13, iPS achieves a coding rate of 1 which is the
highest achievable coding rate. Therefore, the only interesting case is when
δ < f or in other words, δ = 1. Since f = 2 and δ = 1, 2 ≤ |Ng| ≤ 3. There
are the following two possibilities:
1. If |Ng| = 2, the conflict graph is a single link and from Lemma 15, each
of the nodes in the conflict graph is a minimum vertex cover. Therefore,
from Lemma 15, β(iPS) > β(AAP ).
2. If |Ng| = 3, then the conflict graph consists of three nodes, two of
which have a conflict with the third node but not with each other. Then
S ⊂ Ng and |S| = 2δ = 2. From Lemma 10, coding rate achievable by
iPS is
β(iPS)max =
n− |S| − |J |
n− |S|
=
n− 4
n− 2
≥ 1
3
(3.31)
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where in the last expression above, i.e., Eq. (3.31), we used the fact
that n = 2f + 1 = 5.
Now we consider AAP and show that β(AAP ) < 1
3
. From the re-
ductions from Section 3.1.1, we know that none of the nodes in the
conflict graph are certainly faulty. Therefore, when δ = 1, both Vmin
and Ng \ Vmin must be vertex covers for the conflict graph. Let x be
the path with the largest rate in N \Ng. Define F ∗1 = {Vmin, x}. Let y
be the path with the largest rate in N \Ng \ x. Since n = 2f + 1, we
have
w(N ) = w(Ng) + w(x) + w(y)
We have two cases:
• If w(Ng \ Vmin) ≥ w(y), then F ∗2 = Ng \ Vmin such that F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 =
Ng ∪ x and w(F ∗1 ∪ F ∗2 ) is maximized. By definition of J and x,
x ∈ J must be true. The coding rate for AAP is
β(AAP ) =
w(N )− w(Ng)− w(x)
w(N )
=
w(y)
w(Ng) + w(x) + w(y)
(3.32)
Since the case being considered is when w(Ng \ Vmin) ≥ w(y),
therefore w(Ng) = w(Vmin) + w(Ng \ Vmin) > w(y), also w(x) ≥
w(y). As a result, w(Ng) + w(x) + w(y) > 3w(y) and therefore,
β(iPS) = 1
3
> β(AAP ).
• If w(Ng \ Vmin) < w(y), then F ∗2 = w(Vmin) + w(y) such that
F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 = Vmin ∪x∪ y and w(F ∗1 ∪F ∗2 ) is maximized. The coding
rate for AAP is:
β(AAP ) =
w(N )− w(Vmin)− w(x)− w(y)
w(N )
=
w(Ng \ Vmin)
w(Ng) + w(x) + w(y)
(3.33)
The case being considered is when w(y) > w(Ng \ Vmin), and
by definition w(x) ≥ w(y). Also, trivially w(Ng) > w(Ng \ Vmin)
therefore, w(Ng)+w(x)+w(y) > 3w(Ng \Vmin) and β(AAP ) < 13 .
As a result, β(iPS) > β(AAP ).
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The results for coding rate with error correction are summarized in Ta-
ble 3.2.
Table 3.2: Results for coding rate with error correction - (× represents
“arbitrary”)
Path Rates f δ Coding Rate Refer to
{0, 1} f << n δ << n β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 11
{0, 1} × 1 β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 12
{0, 1} f = δ δ = f β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 13
{0, 1} f = 1 δ > 0 β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 14
× × δ > 0 β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 15
if G has δ disjoint edges
× f = 2, n = 5 δ > 0 β(iPS) > β(AAP ) Lemma 16
3.15 A Hash-Based Approach to Byzantine Fault
Tolerance
So far we have considered replication and coding based solutions to reliable
communication and identified how the presence of conflict graphs, albeit
incomplete, may potentially improve performance in certain scenarios. We
now consider a cryptographic hashing based solution to the same problem
of of reliable communication between a fault-free source s and a fault-free
destination z. The communication is assumed to take place over periods
of time that are long enough that Byzantine nodes do actually misbehave
in some way and therefore, it is possible to discover newer conflicts and
faults. Our goal is to first outline protocols that would dynamically adapt
both the messages they send and the incurred overhead as newer faults and
conflicts are discovered. A cryptographic hash function computation over a
messageM returns a fixed-length hash of the message (hash length is much
smaller compared to the actual message length). The hash function is unique,
collision-resistant with high probability and computationally infeasible to
reverse. We assume that the source s sends message packets M of size R
units. Let the capacity of the paths be R and let H(M) represent the almost
universal hash of M and size of H(M) is R
k
.
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We now propose and analyze two approaches to using cryptographic hashes
to ensure Byzantine fault tolerant reliable communication between the source
and the destination. As before, we assume the total number of available paths
is n ≥ 2f + 1.
3.15.1 Conflict Graph Independent BFT: (CGI)
Since it is possible that the information in the conflict graph is insufficient to
isolate faulty paths, they do not provide a direct solution to the Byzantine
fault tolerance problem. Therefore, we consider one approach that does not
incorporate information from conflict graphs. We call it a Conflict Graph
Independent (CGI) Byzantine fault tolerance scheme. This approach sends
a different message on each of the available paths. Moreover, it sends a
hash for each of the messages, on any 2f of the paths except for the one
on which the actual message is being sent. This scheme can deliver up to n
messages in each round and send H = (2f)n hashes per round and provide
fault detection as follows: The destination receives message k on one path i
and computes a hash for message k. It then receives 2f hashes for message k
on paths other than i. Therefore, for each message, the destination obtains
2f + 1 hashes over disjoint paths and can use them to detect if the message
has been tampered with.
When a path is discovered as faulty, the protocol discards it completely.
We use the reduction from Section 3.1.1 so that at any time f is the number
of possible faults in the system and n is the total number of paths (after
discarding faulty paths). Now let MCGI and PCGI be the number of paths
used to carry messages and hash digests, respectively. With this notation,
the CGI scheme sends MCGI = n messages in each round. It also uses
PCGI = 2f paths to send the hashes. The actual number of hashes sent on
each of the PCGI paths are HCGI = MCGI , resulting in a total of PCGI ∗HCGI
hashes being sent over all the paths. Here, we have assumed that the scheme
is intelligent enough to stop sending hashes when all the faults have been
discovered in the system and f = 0.
To see how the protocol works, consider the network in Figure 3.12. Since
the protocol does not use information in the conflict graph, it sends a new
message on the paths P 1, P 2, . . . , P 7. In addition, it computes a crypto-
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Figure 3.12: Conflict graph, source s, destination z; f = 3 and δ = 3
graphic hash of each message sent, and composes a digest of message hashes
with seven hashes in it: one for each message. This digest is then sent over
PCGI = 2f = 6 paths out of P
1, P 2, . . . , P 7. To see how well the protocol
adapts the overhead of message hashes, consider the same network as in Fig-
ure 3.12, however, suppose P 6 has been discovered as certainly faulty and
removed from the system. Therefore, using the reductions from Section 3.1.1,
n = 6 and at most f = 2 faults may be possible in the system. Therefore,
the CGI protocol sends MCGI = 6 messages and a hash for each of these
messages on any 2f = 4 of the paths excluding the faulty ones, for a total of
6 messages and 6× 4 = 24 hashes.
3.15.2 iPath Based BFT: (iPBFT)
Even with a conflict graph that does not provide sufficient information to
identify faults, iPath can choose the optimal number of paths required for
reliable communication. We propose an iPath based Byzantine fault toler-
ance scheme (iPBFT ) which delivers hashes reliably to ensure fault detection
for the messages being sent. A sender using iPBFT sends a different mes-
sage on each of the available paths but sends the digests carrying message
hashes only on the paths deemed necessary by iPath. Therefore, it can de-
liver |N | = n messages in each round and send H = 2(f − δ)n hashes per
round. The protocol can dynamically adjust the overhead of reliable commu-
nication (i.e., (a) required number of hashes and (b) number of paths used
to carry hashes) as new faults are discovered. A high-level modular design is
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shown in Figure 3.13. The conflict discovery module works to continuously
monitor and discover newer conflicts arising in the network. Adaptive iPath
takes this information as input and dynamically updates the optimal number
of paths necessary for reliability. It then uses results of the conflict and fault
discovery modules to drive the actual data communication. Based on the
ACKs received from the destination, new faults may be discovered in the
network and that can also update results of iPath for the next stage of data
communication.
Discover	  
Conﬂicts	   Adap2ve	  iPath	  
Discover	  Faults	  
ACK	  
Processing	  
Data Transfer 
Figure 3.13: System modular diagram
Using the notation from Section 3.4, let G = (Ng, Eg) be the conflict
graph. Let S be the set returned by the construction from iPath (Recall
that S = V1 ∪ Vmin). We know that S must contain at least δ faults and
Ng \ S may contain at most f − δ faults.
As before, we assume that the reductions from Section 3.1.1 are used and
at any time, the total number of usable paths is n ≥ 2f + 1, containing
up to f faults, and δ of those faults are guaranteed to be contained in S.
Then, at any point, a total of MiPBFT = n messages are carried. Then,
for the network of Figure 3.12, MiPBFT = MCGI = 7 before fault discovery
and MiPBFT = MCGI = 6 after fault discovery. Therefore, both the BFT
protocols, i.e., CGI and iPBFT send the same number of messages. Next,
we use iPath to send message hashes over the smallest set of paths that would
guarantee reliable communication. Let PiPBFT be the number of paths that
are used to send message hashes. According to Lemma 2, Byzantine fault
tolerant reliable communication may be achieved if PiPBFT = 2(f − δ) + 1
paths are used to carry message hashes. However, the destination can use
the message itself to compute one hash. Therefore, only PiPBFT = 2(f − δ)
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hashes suffice when they are sent over paths not including the path used to
send the message itself. Therefore,
PiPBFT =

2(f − δ) : δ < f
1 : δ = f
0 : f = 0
The second part of the expression above indicates that when f = δ faults
have been found in Ng \ S, the remaining paths in Ng \ S must be fault-
free. Therefore, only one of these paths may be used for carrying hashes
reliably. For example, suppose P 6 is discovered as faulty in Figure 3.12. We
use reductions from Section 3.1.1 to update f to 2 and n to 6. However,
now we know that P 5 and P 7 are guaranteed to be fault-free, therefore, we
only use one of these paths to send hashes only for messages being sent over
P 1, P 2, P 3, P 4, for a total of four hashes. This is where the second factor
from the expression for PiPBFT helps. Notice that the CGI protocol uses
four paths for sending hashes for the n = 6 messages being sent after P 6 is
discovered as faulty.
Our next step is to develop an expression for the actual number of mes-
sage hashes, i.e., HiPBFT that must be carried on each of the PiPBFT paths.
We know that a hash must be carried for each of the messages being sent,
therefore:
HiPBFT =

MiPBFT : δ < f
MiPBFT − |Ng \ S| δ = f
0 f = 0
where the second term in the above expression makes use of the fact that
when f = δ faults have been discovered in Ng \ S, the remaining paths must
be fault-free. Therefore, messages using these paths are reliable and do not
need hashes.
3.16 Conflict Graphs and System Diagnosis
We have discussed several conflict graph-based algorithms for reliability in
the previous sections. Since the notion of conflict graphs has roots in system
diagnosis literature, as noticed earlier, we now consider if some of the ideas
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we have explored with respect to conflict graphs may be extended to the
general system diagnosis realm.
Conflict graphs are populated with the help of tests between pairs of nodes.
Each node tests a subset of the other nodes and the test relationships are
represented as edges in a graph. An outcome of a test is 1 is at least one of
the nodes in the test pair is faulty. The set of outcomes of the tests is called
a syndrome.
For all the discussion that follows, we use the notation S to represent the
system as well as the set of nodes in the system. We represent a test as tijk...
and its outcome as ai,j,k,... respectively, where {i, j, k, . . .} is the set of nodes
involved in the test. A test outcome is a binary variable and Definitions 3
and 4 discuss how the test outcomes may be interpreted. Before we proceed
further, the following definitions are useful.
Definition 2 A system S is tp-diagnosable if, given a syndrome, all faulty
units in S can be correctly identified, provided the number of faulty units does
not exceed tp [49].
Definition 3 A subset F ⊆ S is an allowable faulty set of a syndrome of S
if and only if:
c1: i ∈ S − F and aijk = 0 imply j, k ∈ S − F and
c2: i ∈ S − F and aijk = 1 imply either j ∈ F or uk ∈ F or both
uj, uk ∈ F .
In system diagnosis literature, test outcomes are represented as weights for
edges in the conflict graph. The assumption that an outcome of a test among
a pair of nodes, at least one of which is faulty will always be 1 holds under
the permanent fault model, however, and needs to be modified for Byzantine
fault model (or intermittent fault model) where faulty nodes may or may not
manifest faulty behavior each time they are tested. The conflict graphs we
have focused on in the previous sections have been based on the intermittent
fault model. The problem we considered was that of reliable communication
between a pair of fault-free source and destination using multiple parallel
paths. When a path was discovered as faulty, we discarded it altogether
without regard to whether one or more nodes on the path were faulty. A
situation like this may be considered as a case where multiple nodes on a
path have a conflict with each other. This motivated us to define a general
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test which may be thought of as a test between a set of nodes rather than
a pair. We start by defining a test abstraction for a set of three nodes and
develop necessary and sufficient conditions for tp-diagnosability. However,
the results extend easily to tests consisting of arbitrary set sizes, which do
not have to be uniform (different tests may be different size). We define a
test as follows.
Definition 4 A test tijk, with an outcome aijk, is defined to be carried out
over a set of nodes {i, j, k} such that the following hold:
1. A test outcome of “1” indicates that at least one of the three members
of the test is faulty.
2. A test outcome of “0” is inconclusive since it may occur in the following
two cases: (a) all the three members of the test are fault-free, or (b) all
three members are faulty.
3. If one member of the test is known to be fault-free, then a test outcome
of “0” implies that all of them are certainly fault-free.
4. If the number of faults in the system can be at most 2, then a test
outcome of “0” implies that all members of the test are fault-free.
With this definition of a diagnostic test, we present necessary and sufficient
conditions for tp-diagnosability in a system. Let the set of units in the system,
i.e., S contain n units in total, i.e., |S| = n. Consider two allowable fault
sets F1 and F2 such that F1 ∈ S and F2 ∈ S and |F1| ≤ tp and |F2| ≤ tp.
Also consider Z = S − F1 − F2. A Venn diagram showing one possible
representation for S, F1 and F2 is shown in Figure 3.14.
For pairwise tests, for tp diagnosability, it is both necessary and sufficient
to have at least one test from Z to (F1 ∪ F2)− (F1 ∩ F2).
However, when we consider our test abstraction from Definition 4, the
condition above may not ensure tp-diagnosability. To see how that may
happen, consider Figure 3.15. Suppose the shaded circles in the figure show
nodes in the set over which the test is being carried. This test does satisfy
the requirement mentioned above for tp-diagnosability with pairwise tests,
but it can be seen clearly that even if this test outcome indicates a fault, it
would be inconclusive as to which of F1 or F2 is actually faulty.
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Figure 3.15: One possible test that does not ensure diagnosability
Therefore, we need some modification to the classical necessary and suffi-
cient condition. The following lemma is a generalization of the result in [49].
Lemma 17 A system S, with tests as defined in Definition 4, is tp-diagnosable
if and only if, for each pair F1, F2 ⊂ S, such that |F1|, |F2| ≤ tp and F1 6= F2
and F1 and F2 are allowable fault sets according to Definition 3, there is at
least one test T such that T ∩ Z 6= ∅ (where Z = S − F1 − F2), and exactly
one of the following conditions is true:
• tc1 T ∩ (F1 − (F1 ∩ F2)) 6= ∅, or
• tc2 T ∩ (F2 − (F1 ∩ F2)) 6= ∅.
Proof:
Necessity: The proof is by contradiction. Suppose S is tp-diagnosable,
but there are no tests that satisfy the condition in the Lemma Let F1 and F2
be two allowable fault sets such that |F1|, |F2| ≤ tp. Now suppose that F1 is
the set of faulty units in S. Since the condition in the lemma is not satisfied,
one of the two following cases holds for every test T :
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• T ∩ (F1 − (F1 ∩ F2)) = T ∩ (F2 − (F1 ∩ F2)) = ∅:
In this case, T will yield identical outcome for F1 and F2 both. The
outcome may be 1 if T intersects with F1 ∩F2, else 0. Therefore, there
is no way to distinguish between fault sets F1 and F2, and diagnosis
cannot be performed correctly. This is a contradiction.
• T ∩ (F1 − (F1 ∩ F2)) 6= ∅ and T ∩ (F2 − (F1 ∩ F2)) 6= ∅:
In this case, T will yield identical outcome of 1 for both F1 and F2,
therefore, it is not possible to uniquely identify any of the two allowable
fault sets F1 and F2 as faulty with certainty and diagnosis cannot be
performed correctly. This is a contradiction.
Therefore, none of the tests allows us to differentiate between F1 and F2, and
hence diagnosis can not be performed correctly.
Sufficiency: The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the conditions
hold, but the system is not tp-diagnosable. This would mean that there exists
a syndrome for which at least two distinct subsets of cardinality at most tp,
say F1 and F2 are allowable fault sets. According to the lemma, there exists
a test T on the set {i, j, k} such that T ∩ Z 6= ∅ holds and exactly one of
tc1 or tc2 is true. Without loss of generality, suppose tc1 is true and tc2
is false, i.e., T ∩ (F1 − (F1 ∩ F2)) 6= ∅ and T ∩ (F2 − (F1 ∩ F2)) = ∅. Then,
if tijk = 1 in the syndrome, then assuming that F2 is the set of faulty units
violates condition c2 of Definition 3 contradicting the assumption that F2 is
an allowable fault set. If tijk = 0 in the syndrome, then assuming that F1
is the set of faulty units violates condition c1 of Definition 3 (since i ∈ Z,
therefore i is fault-free) contradicting the assumption that F1 is an allowable
fault set.
3.17 System Diagnosis with Intermittent Faults
Lemma 17 identifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the permanent
fault model. In that case, if there is a test T that contains both faulty and
non-faulty nodes, the test outcome will always be 1. However, this assump-
tion does not hold for intermittent fault model. Consider Byzantine faults,
for example, since the faulty nodes may behave arbitrarily, it is possible that
the fault may not manifest itself during a certain test even if the node is
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faulty. In such a case, we can use information from test outcomes to obtain
a subset of the conflict graph, that may be guaranteed to contain a certain
number of faulty node.
Building on the dispute control [45] framework can be one possibility. Al-
gorithm 3 shows how we may emulate dispute control to obtain a set S such
that S is guaranteed to contain γ faults.
Algorithm 3 Dispute Control for Intermittent Fault Model with a Gener-
alized Test
S = {}, γ = 0
for tijk ∈ T do
if (S ∩ {i, j, k} == ∅)AND(tijk == 1) then
S = S ∪ {i, j, k}
γ = γ + 1
return S, γ
Once we have obtained the set S using Algorithm 3, we can use either
AAP or iPS depending on the metric of interest.
3.18 Discussion
In this chapter, we propose iPath: a suite of algorithms that use informa-
tion in conflict graphs for choosing the minimum number of paths required
to achieve reliable communication between a source-destination pair under
the assumption of the strongest fault model, i.e., Byzantine fault model. We
formulated the problem and established tight bounds on the solutions. iPath
uses information from incomplete conflict graphs (where no nodes can be
identified as faulty with certainty) to find the optimal number of paths re-
quired to support reliable communication. The algorithms we propose are
dynamic, since they can continue to reduce the overhead as new conflicts
are learned in the network. We discussed that it is possible that the iPath
algorithms may reduce the overhead to zero (when δ = f), even if the con-
flict graph is incomplete and cannot identify any faulty nodes with certainty.
As we outline in the previous sections, there are several ways to learn con-
flict information but the existing work only utilizes information from conflict
graphs if they are complete, i.e., they can be used to identify some nodes as
faulty with certainty.
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CHAPTER 4
SOURCE LOCATION PRIVACY IN
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction and Related Work
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have found applications in a large vari-
ety of scenarios. Examples include, but are not limited to, target tracking,
vehicular networks, military surveillance and habitat monitoring. Applica-
tions carrying sensitive data over WSNs are highly concerned about security.
While there is a huge body of work on protecting content privacy through
sophisticated cryptographic mechanisms, preservation of contextual privacy
has not been addressed as thoroughly. By eavesdropping on network com-
munications, even though an adversary may not be able to “understand” a
message, it can still gather contextual information. For example, in a mili-
tary environment, an adversary that can overhear messages on the wireless
channel can infer that there is a military base in the neighborhood. Contex-
tual privacy entails protection of such information and is clearly critical to
overall security.
Preserving source location privacy becomes important in several scenarios
but the most common example used for reference in literature is the “Panda-
Hunter” problem [50],[51], where a monitoring network composed of wireless
sensors is deployed to track presence of pandas and report it to a sink. The
adversary’s objective is to indirectly track the panda’s location by locating
source of messages received by the sink. This problem has been looked at
from several perspectives and with varying assumptions on capabilities of the
adversary. On a broader level, however, all existing approaches fall into one
of two categories: those that consider the adversary to have local monitoring
capabilities and those that assume the adversary has global eavesdropping
capabilities.
Phantom routing [50] was one of the earliest works belonging to first cate-
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gory. It presented two approaches: The first involves flooding (deterministic
and probabilistic) along with fake/dummy traffic to deliver messages to the
sink. The second approach is a two-stage routing technique. In the two-stage
routing technique, the message from the source is unicasted using a directed
walk for a certain hwalk hops. After hwalk hops, the packet is flooded all the
way to the sink. They refer to this as Phantom Flooding. This work consid-
ers a static panda that appears at a random point and stays there until it is
captured or simulation ends.
The adversary’s strategy is as follows: Since all event messages are bound
to arrive at the sink, and the location of the sink is well known, a mobile
adversary starts waiting for event messages at the sink. When a packet is
received at the sink, the broadcast nature of wireless medium allows the ad-
versary (located close to the sink) to also hear the packet. The adversary
uses RF localization to deduce the location of the transmitter of the packet
and moves to its location. This step brings the adversary one step closer to
the source of the event message (and hence closer to the object of interest
being observed by the source). The adversary then waits at this location.
Since by assumption, event notifiers send messages periodically to the sink,
the transmitter localized by the adversary is likely to receive another event
message soon afterward and since the adversary is close to it, the adversary
also hears this new message. It then uses the same localization process as be-
fore to infer the location of this new sender and moves to its location thereby
getting one more hop closer to the message source. The adversary continues
to repeat this process, moving hop by hop toward the actual message source.
The local adversary model was later adopted by several other approaches.
A greedy random walk from both source and sink was proposed in [52] but
suffers from higher message delivery latency. A two-stage message forwarding
idea was used in [53] where an event message first travels via MAC layer
broadcasts and is later routed by some intermediate node directly to the
sink. The issue with all these is that despite incurring significant overhead in
terms of redundant traffic, their privacy protection degrades as adversary’s
overhearing range or its level of eavesdropping increases.
A very strong adversary model has been assumed in [54], [55], [51]. Here,
the adversary is considered capable of global eavesdropping and therefore
the only way to protect source location is via cover traffic which these ap-
proaches study in various ways to understand tradeoffs between privacy and
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communication/energy cost.
In this chapter, we provide a different perspective to the source location
privacy problem. We argue that while the adversary may be resourceful,
target network can still make it difficult for the adversary to achieve global
eavesdropping thus reducing or eliminating need for redundant cover traffic.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose use of directional antennas in the WSN since they reduce
probability of a message being overheard by reducing the area in which
signal energy is present. They also increase the cost of achieving global
overhearing by the adversary. With an add-on for directional antennas
in NS2, we provide results of simulations to understand how their use
can improve location privacy, message latencies, delivery ratios and
decrease energy consumption.
• We identify redundancy in existing model for sending event messages
to the sink and propose simple information prediction where only new
information is reported to the sink.
• We propose and evaluate strategies for using wireless overhearing to
suppress transmissions that may create areas of high activity in the
network (called hot-spots). Such areas may be easy to observe by the
adversary and therefore must be avoided.
• We propose and evaluate mobility and location prediction schemes with
the goal of reducing the amount of observable traffic in the network.
This reduction has several advantages: First, it directly reduces the
number of opportunities that the adversary gets of hearing messages
in the network. Second, it reduces the amount of cover/dummy traffic
needed to hide traffic patterns for real event traffic. Finally, a smaller
number of messages results in energy savings that can prolong network
lifetime.
4.1.1 Adversary Model
We start by specifying our adversary model. As mentioned in Section 4.1,
two popular models exist in literature: locally eavesdropping adversary and
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globally eavesdropping adversary. We term the sensor network monitoring
the objects (e.g., pandas) as target network and the adversary as the adver-
sary network. Now, let Ng and Nadv denote the set of nodes in the target
network and adversary’s network respectively.
1. Overhearing Capabilities: We assume that the adversary is not per-
fectly global. The most practical approach for an adversary to eaves-
drop on a target network is that of deploying its own sensor network for
monitoring the target network’s communications [54], [51]. However,
if the adversary’s network requires a very large number of monitoring
nodes and other collection, synchronization and analysis infrastructure
to achieve global eavesdropping, then it may just be more feasible and
cost-efficient to monitor the objects of interest directly. We therefore
assume that the adversary deploys a sensor network of its own which is
no denser than target network and that sensor nodes of both networks
are comparable in terms of their computational power and overhearing
range.
2. Mobility Capabilities: We also assume that while the adversary can
move around, it can only do so with realistic constraints on its velocity.
Suppose an event is detected by a sensor node n ∈ Ng at a distance
of h hops from the sink and this event lasts for te seconds. Suppose
further that the communication range of the sensors in target network
is r meters. Then, if the adversary starts at sink, and backtracks the
messages in a hop-by-hop fashion, it will travel a distance of r
2
meters
on average per hop. If there are at least mt = h messages from the
source, then the adversary must travel with a velocity Vadv ≥ hr2.tem/s in
order to reach the source. Two observations are in order here: First, a
source at h hops from the sink must send at least mt = h messages for
the single mobile adversary to be able to reach it by following message
relays hop-by-hop. Second, if the event lasts for a small duration, the
adversary must move very fast in order to reach the source.
3. Localization Capabilities: Existing approaches assume that when
the adversary overhears a message, it can determine the sender’s lo-
cation. This assumption is also optimistic. Even if the adversary em-
ploys RF localization techniques, these techniques require making ob-
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servations over at least some non-zero time interval before localization.
They also have requirements about time synchronization, knowledge of
sender’s transmit power, number of signal receivers, etc.
In summary, we assume that while the adversary does deploy a network
of its own to monitor target network, it can only do so within certain con-
straints. Therefore, we assume that while an adversarial network may achieve
a high level of overhearing, perfect global overhearing is still unlikely.
4.1.2 Antenna Model
The use of directional antennas in wireless sensor networks has been con-
sidered infeasible due to size and cost-related constraints. However, with
advances in technology, switched beam antennas can be made small, inex-
pensive and feasible for use in sensors operating at higher bands [56]. We
assume that sensors in target network may either use omni-directional trans-
missions and reception or they may use antennas for directional transmission
and omni-directional reception (DTOR) [57]. Directional antennas offer sev-
eral advantages: they can provide an increase in throughput capacity and
reduction in delays [58]. They also require lesser transmit power compared
to omni-directional antennas for the same transmission range. In source lo-
cation privacy context, however, the biggest motivation is that for a given
|Nadv|, directional antennas can substantially lower probability of a trans-
mission in target network being overheard by some n ∈ Nadv.
An ideal directional antenna concentrates all its energy in a beam of width
θ giving a gain of 1 in this direction and a gain of 0 in all other directions.
While this model is simple, it is hardly realistic because actual directional
antennas do have non-zero signal radiation in directions other than the main-
lobe. We incorporate this in our implementation of steerable directional an-
tennas in NS-2 by using the idea from [59]. Our directional antenna has a
higher gain in the desired direction but also has non-zero gain in all other
directions. The magnitude of this gain is controlled by a parameter we term
as main to sidelobe ratio. The mainlobe gain for a particular beamwidth θ
is calculated as gdir =
4
tan2( θ
2
)
for −pi
2
< θ < pi
2
. For simplicity, the side-
lobe (beamwidth 2pi − θ) gain is then approximated to be a fraction of the
mainlobe gain according to the main to sidelobe ratio.
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4.1.3 Network Model
Our network model comprises a wireless sensor network composed of nodes
n ∈ Ng deployed to monitor a number of objects in the field. Whenever
a sensor node senses the presence of the object, it reports this event (the
presence of object) to a single special node called the sink. We discuss several
variations on how these events are reported to the sink in Section 4.2. The
adversary’s network is comprised of a set of nodes i ∈ Nadv and we evaluate
our schemes with varying densities of the adversary’s network relative to the
monitoring sensor network.
4.2 Information Prediction and Directional
Transmissions for Source Location Privacy
In this section, we identify ways to improve source location privacy. Our idea
is to enhance protocol-based source location privacy schemes such that they
can exploit advancement in device-level capabilities of wireless sensor nodes
to provide stronger location privacy. For further discussions in this section,
we assume a target network consisting of a set of sensor nodes n ∈ Ng
monitoring a set of objects as described in Section 4.1.3.
4.2.1 Periodic Message Generation with Omni-Directional
Antennas (P-OA)
The first scheme we evaluate is the popular model explored in literature. In
this scenario, when a sensor node n ∈ Ng can sense an object, it sends out
periodic messages to the sink using an omni-directional antenna for as long
as it can sense the object. The messages are sent over the shortest path to
the sink and all the event messages follow the same path.
• Periodic Message Generation with Omni-Directional Antenna
and Adversary with Probabilistic Overhearing (Prob-OA) We
also consider a special case of overhearing which encompasses effects of
all shortcomings in the adversary’s ability to eavesdrop (Section 4.1.1).
We model those with an adversary that can overhear each message in
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the network (making it a global eavesdropper), but only with a prob-
ability poverhear. For simplification, this probability is assumed to be
independent for all packets and over all links in the network. Even
when an adversary has invested in deploying a monitoring network of
its own, it cannot guarantee perfect overhearing and localization. This
may be due to several factors including unpredictability of channel con-
ditions, inaccuracy in localization schemes, delays in accumulation of
information at the adversary’s central processing and decision-making
unit, to name a few. It can also be used to model directional trans-
missions. For example, if a sensor node has a directional antenna of
beamwidth pi
2
, and this node has an equal probability of transmitting in
any direction, then if the adversary randomly circles around this node,
it can overhear every message with probability 0.25.
4.2.2 Periodic Message Generation with Directional Antennas
(P-DA)
This scenario is same as P-OA, except that sensors use directional antennas
with steerable beams to send event messages to the sink. The messages are
sent over the shortest path to the sink and all the event messages follow
the same path. The transmit power Pt is reduced to maintain the same
communication range as that for P-OA.
4.2.3 Information Compression with Directional Antennas
(IC-DA)
We propose a simple scheme which incorporates information compression to
improve source location privacy while ensuring that the sink still receives
the same information. Our idea is that if the sink only needs to know the
presence of an object, this information need not be sent periodically. In the
past literature, these messages are sent periodically for as long as the object
remains in the sender’s sensing range. If the object remains in the range
of some node ni from time t1 to t2, and if ni sends k messages m1, . . . ,mk
in this duration, then after m1, messages from m2 . . .mk−1 are unnecessary,
therefore, we eliminate these messages. In our scheme, m1 is meant to indi-
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cate that the object has been located in sensing range of source node ni and
that unless a new message is received from ni, the object may be implicitly
assumed to be nearby. When ni can no longer sense the object, it sends
another message mk to the sink, informing that the object has now moved
away. The main advantages of this scheme follow:
1. A smaller number of messages implies lower energy consumption at the
sensors.
2. With only two messages, we defeat an adversary that starts at the sink
and follows a message hop by hop toward the source, except when the
source is at two-hops or less from the sink. We overcome the latter
problem simply by making all nodes at two-hops or less from the sink
send out two dummy messages with a small probability (set to p = 0.05)
in the NS-2 simulations (two messages are sent to mimic a real event
sender).
3. It is reasonable to assume that a monitored object will often be in
sensing range of more than one sensors in a neighborhood. Without our
scheme, the convention in existing literature is that all the sensor nodes
that observe the object will simultaneously send periodic messages to
the sink. Such a scenario can result in a phenomenon termed as a “hot-
spot” [60] in literature. A hot-spot marks regions of high activity in the
network, for example, rate of transmission within a hot-spot is much
larger than the average rate over the whole network (indicating that
many event notifiers lie within the hot-spot). With lesser traffic in the
network, we avoid formation of a hot-spot and reduce message delivery
latency and channel contention resulting in better packet delivery ratio.
In later sections of this chapter, we propose additional strategies for
avoiding the occurrence of hot-spots.
While simple, this scheme raises concerns about message reliability. Using
only one message to provide critical information to the sink requires a delivery
guarantee for that message. This concern can be addressed in several ways
and we have chosen to do it by ensuring hop-by-hop reliability.
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4.3 Evaluation
We used NS-2 simulations for studying location privacy with and without
directional antennas. We simulated a 1000 m × 1000 m area and experi-
mented with several network sizes and densities from 300 nodes (communi-
cation range 100 m) to 1200 nodes (communication range 50 m). NS-2 does
not support directional antennas so we added our own simulation model for
directional antennas with steerable beams according to the model in Sec-
tion 4.1.2. We experimented with several beamwidths and several main-
to-side lobes gain ratios (M/S = {10, 100, 1000}) but show results only for
M/S = 100. All sensor nodes in the target network are static and know their
own location as well as that of their 1-hop neighbors. Monitored objects (e.g.,
pandas) are mobile nodes that move around throughout simulation at ve-
locities ≤ 1m/sec.
To start with, we evaluate feasibility of global eavesdropping when an
adversary deploys its own monitoring network. We consider this an important
metric since we assume that location of a source node is compromised if one
the following happens:
1. Condition 1: For n0 ∈ Ng sending an event message at time t0:
• Its messages are overheard by the adversary on each hop before
they reach the sink, and
• n0 has not received a message from another node from time τ =
t0− tmin to t0 where tmin can be some application-dependent con-
straint on tolerable message delays.
To see how location privacy is compromised when the condition above
is true, consider the case where the adversary successfully overhears
the event message at each hop from n0 to the sink. Then, if the second
condition above is also true, the adversary realizes that the node n0
must be an event source since n0 has been observed to be sending
messages even though it did not receive any message from another
node earlier (therefore, n0 cannot be a relay). These two observations
may be used by the adversary to conclude that n0 must be a message
originator.
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Figure 4.1: The Panda-Hunter scenario
2. Condition 2: With periodic message sending, the event lasts for so
long that even a single adversary can follow messages hop-by-hop to the
sender. This is harder with directional antennas because the adversary
has to not only be in communication range of the sender but also in
the right direction.
We now elaborate on how the above two constraints represent different
scenarios. Consider Figure 4.1. Suppose node 1 observes the event and sends
this message to the sink via nodes 2, 3 and 4. If the adversary has a node
monitoring each of these, it can conclude with certainty that it just detected
an event message originating at node 1. This is the scenario captured by
the first condition above. In this case, it does not matter whether the event
lasts for a long time or not, the adversary will be able to expose the actual
message source. However, suppose the adversary only had one monitoring
node located near node 4 in the target network. The adversary will then have
to travel hop-by-hop back to node 1. In this scenario, unless the source sends
at least three messages, the adversary will not be able to trace it. Therefore,
the duration of the event becomes important here since the event must last
long enough for the source to generate three messages. This is the scenario
captured by condition 2 above.
Figure 4.2 relates the adversary’s overhearing capability with its density
relative to the target network. We vary density of the adversary’s network
from |Nadv| = 0.2|Ng| to |Nadv| = 1.5|Ng|. The Y-axis shows the ratio NheardNfwd .
Here, Nheard is the number of times a packet was overheard by some node
ni ∈ Nadv for i = 1, 2, . . . , |Nadv| and Nfwd is the number of times it was
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Figure 4.2: Tradeoff between density of the adversary’s network and
overhearing capability
forwarded in the network. This was averaged over all packets sent during
the simulation. A value of Y = 0.5 means that all packets were overheard on
an average of ≥ 50% of the hops they traversed. As can be seen, with omni-
directional antennas (P-OA), the adversary can achieve close to global over-
hearing even with very few nodes (|Nadv| ≥ 0.5|Ng|). This validates claims
in [54] that global overhearing can be achieved with |Nadv| much smaller
than |Ng|. The power of directional antennas against defeating global over-
hearing also manifests itself in the figure. Even with |Nadv| = 1.5|Ng|, the
adversary was only able to monitor packets over less than 60% and 80% of
their route for beamwidths of 30o and 60o (blue and green bars in Figure 4.2)
respectively.
We also look at per-flow privacy for the above scenarios. The longest
flow in the simulations was 14 hops long. Figure 4.3 shows the CDF of the
percentage of total flows which were observed over a certain fraction of their
route. For example, a value of X = 40 for Y = 0.5 in this figure means
that 40% of all the flows were overheard by the adversary ≥ 50% of their
route. Then, as the figure shows, more than 90% of all flows sent omni-
directionally (the curve for P-OA in Figure 4.3) were completely monitored
by the adversary (notice X = 100 for Y ≥ 0.1 for CDF of P-OA). This
measure drops to 9% and 2% when event messages are sent using directional
antennas with a beamwidth of 60o and 30o (the curves for P-DA: BW 60
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Figure 4.3: CDF of percentage of route over which a flow’s packets were
overheard by adversary (|Nadv| = |Ng| for P-OA and P-DA)
and P-DA: BW 60 in Figure 4.3) respectively. This number is a measure of
location privacy and shows potential of directional antennas at thwarting an
adversary’s attempts to invade location privacy.
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Figure 4.4: CDF of percentage of route over which a flow’s packets were
overheard by adversary (|Nadv| = |Ng| for P-OA and P-DA and Prob-OA)
Curves for probabilistic adversary (Prob-OA), shown in Figure 4.4 give
some interesting insights. Here we assume that the degradation in the ad-
versary’s overhearing probability is due to both physical constraints as well
as some intelligent traffic hiding mechanisms by the nodes in the target net-
work. An example of such traffic hiding can be the sending of some jamming
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signals that cause collisions at the adversary’s overhearing nodes. However,
even if the target network can degrade the adversary’s overhearing so badly
that it can only hear every message with probability p = 0.5, as the cyan
curve in Figure 4.3 shows, it can only provide as much protection as that of
directional transmissions with a 60o wide main lobe.
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So far, we have shown how directional transmissions can provide better
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message hiding capabilities for protecting location privacy, but now we show
how they can also improve other network characteristics including message
delivery rate, end-to-end message delivery latency and finally how they can
prolong network lifetime by conserving battery usage. We vary the message
sending rate at the sensor nodes to analyze how the delivery rate and la-
tency are affected. Since the sensor nodes send event messages to the sink
periodically, the message sending rate defines how often these messages are
generated and therefore indicate how up-to-date the sink remains about ob-
ject locations.
Figure 4.5 compares message delivery ratio with respect to frequency of
periodic messaging for schemes mentioned in Sections 4.2.1-4.2.3. We note
here that with respect to the message delivery ratio and message latency
metrics, the P-OA scheme may be seen as an upperbound on the perfor-
mance of all the existing schemes since it uses ideal parameters including no
dummy messages and no non-shortest path routing. Therefore, intuitively,
none of the existing schemes can do any better (i.e., provide higher message
delivery ratios and lower delivery latency) than the P-OA scheme presented
in these results. This is because all the schemes in the literature use either
non-shortest path routing or dummy traffic or both. The drop in the message
delivery ratio comes from situations when an intermediate node drops mes-
sages because of queue overflows or because its MAC retry limit is reached.
Increasing the queue size and MAC retry limit parameters might improve the
message delivery ratio but it will degrade message latency as older messages
will remain in the network longer while waiting to be transmitted. This has
also been verified in earlier work [54].
For message delivery latency, Figure 4.6 shows that when only new infor-
mation is sent (IC-DA), message latency remains low which is not surprising.
However, it was counter-intuitive to observe that with periodic messaging,
use of directional antennas (P-DA) does not improve message latency signif-
icantly in comparison to omni-directional (P-OA) ones. We found that this
was because we maintained the same communication range in both cases
by reducing transmit power for directional antennas. As a result, while di-
rectional antennas allow more simultaneous transmissions, the fact that our
reception is omni-directional caused collisions at some receivers resulting in
slightly longer delays. This helped us identify another trade-off: The trans-
mit power variation we use allows better protection against an adversary that
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Figure 4.7: End-to-end message latency; the unit for Y-axis is seconds
uses RSS (Received Signal Strength) based localization techniques. However,
when we lower the transmit power for directional transmissions, the number
of hops to the sink remains the same as that for omni-directional transmis-
sions and therefore, it takes about the same time for event messages to arrive
at the sink.
Next, in Figure 4.7, we see how message latency varies as number of
monitored objects increases. Here again, the wide gap between P-OA and IC-
DA shows potential for improvement possible with directional transmissions
and intelligent information compression and/or prediction.
We also analyze energy consumption since it is a concern for sensor net-
works. We perform energy calculation as follows: Let there be NT event
messages each of size M bits. Let the number of times each message was
forwarded before reaching the sink be FT and the data rate be R bits/sec.
Total energy consumed solely for packet transmissions can then be expressed
as Etotal = Pt
M×NT×FT
R
Joules. Table 4.1 shows transmit energy consump-
tion for P-DA (BW = 30o, 60o) and for IC-DA (BW = 60o). The table also
shows the transmit power used by these schemes in NS-2. The energy val-
ues are normalized by the corresponding consumption of P-OA. Once again,
the potential for energy savings is evident from the numbers. The energy
consumption for IC-DA is more than 105 times smaller than that for P-OA.
These two values can be considered as opposite ends of the spectrum. With
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Table 4.1: Transmit energy consumption normalized w.r.t P-OA,
Pt = 0.28183815W for P-OA
Message P-DA P-DA IC-DA
Sending BW = 60o BW = 30o BW = 60o
Rate /sec Pt = 0.023486512W Pt = 0.005059023W Pt = 0.023486512W
0.5 0.07723 0.01598 0.00002527
1.0 0.08545 0.02352 0.000007739
2.0 0.08756 0.02546 0.000001798
careful compression of information and highly directional antennas, a range
of performance objectives can be met.
4.4 “Trajectory” Protection for Source Location
Privacy
So far, we have discussed two aspects of source location privacy: The first re-
garding use of directional transmissions so that the physical area occupied by
a transmission is decreased thus lowering the probability of an unintended
reception by a node in the adversary’s network. Second, we discussed in-
formation compression as another approach which reduces the frequency of
wireless channel usage, which directly reduces the overhearing opportunities
that an adversary gets. These approaches focus on reducing the possibility
of a packet being overheard over its route from the transmitting source that
observes the object of interest to the sink. We now discuss another aspect
of location privacy that may be used in conjunction with our earlier schemes
and can improve source location privacy further.
Recall that the underlying objective of source location privacy is to hide the
location of the object being observed or monitored in the network. Therefore,
if the object of interest follows a path such that it is observed by sensors
a, b, c, d, in that order, the adversary might capture the object if it can follow
this path. We explain this with a simple example.
Consider the scenario in Figure 4.8. The nodes labeled a to e represent
sensors in the target network that monitor the object (a panda in the ex-
ample), and report this to the sink node. Therefore, if the panda were to
follow the path from a to d as shown by the arrow, each of nodes a to d
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Figure 4.8: Source location privacy problem
will observe the panda one after the other and report it to the sink. We call
these reports event notifications. The focus of schemes in previous sections
was to reduce the probability of the adversary’s network from hearing event
notifications over the path from each of the nodes a, b, c, d to the sink (shown
by dashed lines in Figure 4.8). However, unless constant-rate cover traffic
is being sent continuously, it was still possible for the adversary to observe
event notifications originating at a, b, c, d one after the other which would
have revealed the object’s trajectory. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter,
we will discuss solutions to reduce the possibility of the adversary overhear-
ing event notifications over the path a− b− c− d, which is the actual path
followed by the object of interest.
4.4.1 Exploiting Wireless Broadcast to Reduce Observable
Traffic
We start with a simple solution that exploits wireless broadcast to suppress
event notifications from neighbors of a sensor in the target network. For ex-
ample, consider the scenario in Figure 4.8, if b overhears an event notification
from a to the sink happening at time t, b may expect to observe the panda
in some time interval t ± τ , where τ may be chosen based on the object’s
average speed. As a result, when b does observe the object, it may suppress
its own event notification. Later, when c observes the object, it will send an
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event notification to the sink and this may be used by d to suppress its own
notification when d indeed observes the object. A direct consequence of this
suppression is that even if the adversary has its own sensors close to each of
a, b, c, d, assuming that the adversary has no other source of knowledge about
the object’s trajectory, it can only monitor 50% of the path followed by the
panda. Another way in which this suppression helps is in the formation of
hot-spots, which are defined as areas of high activity in the network. Hot
spots are formed when several sensors in the target network can observe the
object of interest at the same time. Without any suppression, they would all
send event notifications to the sink resulting in a high activity level around
the object. The adversary may then use this as an indicator that the object
is present within the hot-spot.
4.4.2 Simulation Setup
We evaluated this simple scheme using NS-2 simulator. A network of 175
target sensor nodes and 175 adversarial nodes was laid out in a 1000 m× 1000
m area. The transmission range of each sensor was set to 100 m. Five mobile
objects were used to simulate the pandas. All simulations are repeated 25
times and each simulation lasts 500 seconds. Sensor nodes that observe the
object and notify the sink are termed as event notifiers. All event notifiers
send event messages to the sink at a rate of 1 msg/sec for as long as they can
observe the object. All event messages are sent to the sink over the shortest
path. We evaluated the following two scenarios:
• For the first scheme, we assumed that each sensor that observed the
panda sent periodic event notifications to the sink for as long as it
could observe the panda. This is what we call event notification without
suppression.
• For the second scheme, we assumed that whenever a sensor observed
a panda at time t, it sent periodic notifications to the sink only if it
had not overheard another event notification from any of its neighbors
within time interval t − τ . We term this as event notification with
suppression.
For the simulation setting as described in Section 4.4.2, Figure 4.9 shows
the CDF of the percentage of flows that are overheard by the adversary over
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Figure 4.9: CDF of percentage of route over which a flow’s notifications
were overheard by the adversary
Table 4.2: Analyzing event suppression
No Suppression With Suppression
Number of event notifiers 72 22
Average latency 87 msec 29 msec
a certain fraction of their path to the sink. With reference to our example
network of Figure 4.8, this CDF represents the fraction of route from each of
the event notifiers (like nodes a, b, c, d in Figure 4.8) to the sink over which
the adversary overheard the event notifications. We notice in the Figure 4.9
that the CDF for both the scenarios is quite close to each other. This is
not unexpected, since both schemes are evaluated for the same network and
therefore, the adversary can overhear the same packets. However, the fact
that some flows are not even set up in the scheme with suppression, there-
fore, the opportunity to overhear them does not even present itself to the
adversary. We verified it with our simulation results, some of the statistics
of which are given in Table 4.2.
There are two metrics used in Table 4.2. The first is the number of event
notifiers which shows the total number of sensors nodes that not only ob-
served the object during the course of the simulation, but also sent explicit
messages to the sink about their observations. The second metric is the aver-
age latency which shows the average time it took an event message to arrive
at the sink.
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Figure 4.10: The fraction of an object’s trajectory observed by the
adversary
We see from Table 4.2 that the scheme without any event suppression sets
up 72 flows on average, which indicates that during the course of the simu-
lation, 72 sensors observed one of the pandas and informed the sink. On the
other hand, with suppression, only 22 flows were set up on average, indicating
that even though 72 sensors observed one of the pandas, 50 of these sensors
suppressed their own event notifications toward the sink. The reduced num-
ber of event notifiers results in a smaller number of event messages therefore
the messages can reach the sink with lesser contention on the channel. This
is indicated by the average message latency statistic shown in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.10 shows how event notification suppression is effective in obscur-
ing the trajectory of the object of interest. For each of the objects simulated,
we show the fraction of object’s trajectory that would be known to the adver-
sary. For example, for pandas 2 to 5, the adversary was able to overhear the
event notification sent by each event notifier. Notice that this metric is dif-
ferent from the route fraction overheard metric evaluated in Figure 4.9. The
route fraction overheard metric captures what percentage of route from an
event notifier to the sink was overheard by the adversary nodes. The trajec-
tory fraction metric indicates how well the adversary can follow the object’s
motion in the network. The smaller the value of this metric, the fewer the
samples that the adversary may obtain of the object’s motion path. When
event suppression is used, the adversary could only discover 53% of the ob-
ject’s trajectory on average.
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Figure 4.11: Hot-spot avoidance: comparing the number of event notifiers
Finally, Figure 4.11 shows how event suppression avoids the formation of
activity hot-spots [60] that might be more vulnerable to being discovered
by the adversary. For each object of interest, we compare the number of
unique event notifiers with and without event suppression. Had there been
no hot-spots, the scheme without suppression may have at most twice as
many notifiers as the scheme with suppression. However, we notice that the
ratio is almost always higher than that. For example, consider the data for
panda 3. With event suppression, 6 sensors notify the sink about panda 3.
However, without suppression, 21 sensors notify the sink about the object.
This indicates the presence of a hot-spot at some point in the trajectory of
panda 3 where several sensors could observe the panda simultaneously and
they all started reporting this to the sink at the same time.
We mention here that our scheme with suppression may be thought of as
one where every alternate sensor node that observes the object sends peri-
odic event messages to the sink. It may seem that this may also be achieved
if each sensor node that observes the object becomes an event notifier with
probability p = 0.5 and with probability 1 − p = 0.5, it suppresses its no-
tifications. While this may lead to the same amount of suppression over a
long period of time, however, over shorter durations, this may significantly
increase the uncertainty of the object’s location at the sink. This may hap-
pen if several event notifiers choose to remain silent one after the other. As
a result, the object may move far from its last known location at the sink.
Therefore, our scheme with suppression keeps the sink more up-to-date on
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the object’s current location while achieving the same level of privacy for the
object’s trajectory.
4.5 Motion Prediction for Source Location Privacy
The event suppression scheme we presented in Section 4.4.1 reduces hot-
spot formation as well as the observable traffic for the adversary, however,
the sink receives lesser information about the objects being monitored and
therefore, there is a higher uncertainty at the sink about object location.
While this uncertainty may be acceptable in some scenarios, we need another
way to reduce observable traffic on the channel while providing the sink with
accurate and up-to-date information about the object’s location. This is the
goal in the next few subsections.
We propose and explore another idea that has potential to help improve
source location privacy. Our assumption so far has been that the sensors
in the target network constantly and independently monitor the objects of
interest and report their activity and location to the sink. Therefore, ex-
isting schemes for protection of location privacy focus solely on obscuring
traffic patterns and decreasing the possibility that a hop-by-hop traceback
through messages will lead to a message source. However, keeping in view
the fact that the goal of the sensor networks is object monitoring over a long
term, possibly ranging over months at a stretch, it should be possible for the
network elements to learn the behavior of the object being monitored and
incorporate this learning into improving location privacy. We explain it with
an example. Suppose a sensor node a has observed the object of interest for
a total of K times over time period t. Sensor node a has reported this event
to the sink each time. When the object moved out of a’s sensing range, some
other sensor node may observe it. Suppose that once the object moved out
of a’s range, Kb times it was observed by sensor node b, and Kc times by
sensor node c. The sensor nodes, as well as the sink can use this history
of the object’s movement to build a model for the object’s motion and this
may be used to predict the trajectory of the object in the future. For ex-
ample, the next time sensor node a observes the object, if Kb
K
> Kc
K
, node
a may predict that the object is more likely to be observed by node b next.
This may then be used to reduce the amount of explicit communication and
112
reporting between the observer and the sink. For example, suppose node a
had used the object’s movement model and predicted node b to be the next
observer. Then, if the prediction turns out to be correct and node b does in
fact observe the object next, the sink does not need to be informed about it
because the same prediction could be performed at the sink. Therefore, the
predictions set up implicit reporting between an object’s observer and the
sink such that the sink obtains information about the object’s location even
without explicitly receiving an event notification.
We now propose and evaluate a location privacy scheme that exploits such
prediction to reduce explicit communication between the sensor nodes and
the sink, thereby reducing the possible overhearing and tracking opportu-
nities for the adversary. We use NS2 to simulate a target network consist-
ing of 200 nodes and an adversary’s network of 200 nodes spread over a
1000 m × 1000 m area. The sensor nodes and the adversary’s nodes have
the same overhearing range. We then simulate and compare three location
privacy schemes in Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. (For the NS-2 simulations,
the sensors send reports with a period of 1 sec in each of the schemes.)
4.5.1 No Motion Prediction
When simulating this scheme, we assume that the sensor nodes in the target
network do not employ any motion prediction. Therefore, whenever any
sensor in the target network observes an event, it starts sending periodic
reports to the sink for as long as it can observe the object. For the NS-2
simulations, the sensors send reports with a period of 1 sec.
4.5.2 With Motion Prediction
Here, we assume that the sensor nodes and the sink maintain a history of
the object’s motion over time and use to to predict the object’s position in
the future. Taking into consideration the concern that sensor nodes have
limited memory and computation capabilities, we further assume that the
sink performs all the modeling and prediction and informs the sensor nodes
accordingly. Suppose that a node a uses the prediction model provided by
the sink to infer that the object of interest may next move in the sensing
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range of node b and informs node b of this. If node b does observe the
object, it will not send an event message to the sink and the absence of a
message at the sink will provide information that the object moved just as
predicted. However, it is still possible that objects may deviate from the
predicted positions. Therefore, it may happen that b was predicted to be the
next observer, but in reality, the object moves in the sensing range of some
other node c. In such a situation, we assume that node c sends an event
notification to the sink and uses the model present at c to predict the next
expected observer for the object. In our simulations, we model the success or
failure of a prediction with parameters p and (1−p) respectively. We provide
more details about the simulation parameters later. When the sink receives
an event notification from c, it updates its prediction model to incorporate
this deviation and updates the sensor nodes accordingly.
Movement prediction, in general, is not a novel problem and several ap-
proaches already exist for it [61], [62]. However, in the context of object
tracking specifically for habitat monitoring, the requirements, goals and even
penalties due to failure of motion prediction algorithms are different.
In general, the location prediction problem as considered in existing lit-
erature differs, from our scenario because our objective is not to build very
accurate prediction models. Our objective is to exploit location prediction
to achieve compression of the amount of data that needs to be explicitly
communicated to the sink. On the other hand, in most of the existing lit-
erature, the goal is extrapolation, e.g., [63], prediction is needed whenever
a moving object fails to report its location due to rare circumstances like
power shortage, battery failure, signal obstruction etc. In that case, there is
no motivation to hide the message source and therefore, prediction may only
be needed when other forms of communication fail or become unavailable.
For the purposes of simulation, we assume that the sensor node first ob-
serving the object periodically sends an event notification to the sink. It then
uses its model to predict the next observer for the object and notifies this
node to expect to sense the object. If the predicted node does observe the
object, it suppresses its own event notification to the sink and only informs
its own next predicted observer. We characterize the prediction by a param-
eter p which is the probability that the motion prediction is correct and so
with probability p, notifications from an event notifier will be suppressed.
Therefore, with probability 1 − p, the prediction fails and the sensor node
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observing the object must send periodic event notifications to the sink. For
the NS-2 simulations, the sensors send reports with a period of 1 sec.
With these settings, Figure 4.12 compares the number of event notifiers
for the two location privacy schemes outlined in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2.
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Figure 4.12: Reduction in event notifiers
We can clearly see that without any motion prediction, the number of
event notifiers is always the highest. This indicates that the object’s trajec-
tory in the network was always explicitly communicated to the sink. This
explicit communication provides increased opportunities to nodes from the
adversary’s network to overhear event messages and follow them toward the
sender. On the other hand, when using prediction, only a small fraction
of the object’s real trajectory is explicitly communicated to the sink. As
a result, for a large fraction of the object’s trajectory, the opportunity to
overhear it does not even present itself to the adversary. Another effect of
the motion prediction is that the messages experience smaller delays in the
network due to reduced traffic. This is seen in Figure 4.13 which shows a sig-
nificant reduction in message delays indicating that the sink receives newer
information sooner when motion prediction is employed compared to when
all observers send notifications right away.
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Figure 4.13: Reduction in message latency
4.5.3 Range Prediction
The location privacy scheme mentioned in Section 4.5.2 uses motion predic-
tion to come up with a single predicted observer in the network. However,
the sensor networks are usually dense enough that frequently, more than one
sensor node may observe the object of interest at the same time. Therefore,
if motion prediction only delegates a single sensor node as the next poten-
tial observer of the object, other sensor nodes that observe it simultaneously
may not suppress their event messages. Therefore, we propose a modification
to the motion prediction such that instead of predicting a single observer,
it may use network topology to infer that at certain points in the network,
more than one sensor node will observe the object. It can then assign a
range of sensor nodes as the possible next-observer of the object. When a
group of sensor nodes are informed that they are expected to observe the
object, they all suppress their event notifications to the sink in the case that
they do observe the object. This results in a greater decrease in the overall
observable traffic in the network reducing the overhearing opportunities of
the adversary even further.
With this modification, we performed NS-2 simulations to compare how
much further reduction in explicit communication between sensor nodes and
the sink may be obtained. In the simulations, we predicted range as follows:
When an object moves from sensing range of node a to b, a sends a message
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Figure 4.14: Reduction in event notifiers with range prediction
to b predicting that b might observe the object. Any node that can overhear
this prediction, and is at a distance < r
2
(where r is transmission range, set to
100 m in the simulations) from b considers itself to be within the prediction
range. Figure 4.14 shows that when a range prediction is exploited wherever
possible, the number of event notifiers is decreased even further. The differ-
ence in the heights of the bars in the figure have a direct correlation with
the vulnerability of the source location. The higher the bars, the higher the
probability that the adversary will be able to find some event notifier where
it can successfully trace back to the actual source (and therefore the object
of interest). A further improvement in message latency was also observed
when we used range prediction. This is shown in Figure 4.15.
We use Figure 4.16 to further elaborate the underlying details of the
schemes from Sections 4.5.1, 4.5.2 and Section 4.5.3. For one of the sim-
ulations, this figure shows the path followed by the object of interest when
it was the only object in the network, i.e., NumObjects = 1. The solid
line shows the path of the object and the numbers in boxes in the figure
show identities of the sensor nodes from the target network that can sense
the object. When no motion prediction is used, each of the sensor nodes in
Figure 4.16 acts as an event notifier when it observes the object. Therefore,
during the course of the simulation, a total of 16 event notifiers periodically
notify the sink.
On the other hand, when motion prediction is used, and p = 0.75, only five
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Figure 4.15: Reduction in message latency with range prediction
sensor nodes explicitly notify the sink about the object’s location. These are
shown as darkened boxes in Figure 4.16. As a result, even in the worst case,
when the adversary happens to overhear all the messages, only 31% of the
object’s path is theoretically exposed to the adversary. Therefore, the back-
tracking opportunities for the adversary fall by 69%. We remark here that
the drop in back-tracking opportunities is not necessarily a direct solution
for location privacy because even if there are smaller opportunities, if the
adversary can back track to the object of interest even once, the location pri-
vacy is compromised. However, this reduction in opportunities can directly
reduce the cost or overhead of location privacy. Suppose the back-tracking
opportunities for the adversary fall by 69%, as discussed above, and the sen-
sor network uses cover traffic for location privacy protection. Then, instead
of having to provide cover traffic for 100 event paths, the sensor network only
has to provide cover traffic for 31% of the event paths.
We notice in Figure 4.16 that there are times when the object of interest
falls in the sensing range of more than one sensor node. Some possibilities
in Figure 4.16 include sensor nodes 74, 152 and nodes 76, 88 (grouped in Fig-
ure 4.16 by surrounding them with an oval). This motivates the need for our
range prediction scheme from Section 4.5.3. When the object arrives in the
sensing range of node 102 for example, instead of predicting a single next-
observer, node 102 may predict that the object is expected to be observed
by a group (e.g., nodes 74, 152). As a result, there is a higher probability of
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Figure 4.16: Object trajectory with NumObjects = 1
event suppression and therefore trajectory protection. This is exactly what
we saw with our simulations for range prediction which resulted in only three
event notifiers during the whole simulation. To summarize, we have shown
Num Objects = 1 Num Objects = 5 Num Objects = 200
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
M
sg
s W
ith
ou
t P
re
di
ct
io
n/
 W
ith
 P
re
di
ct
io
n
 
 
With Motion Prediction p=0.5
With Motion Prediction: p = 0.75
With Range Prediction: p = 0.5
With Range Prediction: p = 0.75
Figure 4.17: Estimating network lifetime
that motion prediction has the potential to increase the source location pri-
vacy significantly. The assumption for building a prediction model is also
reasonable since the sink nodes are generally considered to possess higher
computation capabilities. Therefore, as the sensor network continues to op-
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erate, the model for prediction should continue to become accurate and result
in lowering the need for explicit communication between the sensor nodes and
the sink. We reiterate that such prediction has manifold positive implications
for the network. First, the location privacy is improved since the adversary is
provided fewer opportunities to overhear and hence localize message senders.
Second, with a reduced amount of traffic, message delivery ratio increases
and message latency decreases. Third, with range prediction, a direct conse-
quence is hot-spot suppression, since multiple simultaneous observers of the
object do not all notify the sink simultaneously. This is important since the
amount of activity in the network (relative message sending rates) has been
used as clear indicators of object presence in existing literature [60]. There-
fore, with range prediction, we reduce the possibility of formation of an area
of high activity in the network. Finally, a smaller number of event notifiers
means smaller energy consumption and longer network lifetime, a critical
requirement for wireless sensor networks. This can be seen in Figure 4.17.
Here, we show the ratio of the number of event messages sent when the no
prediction scheme from Section 4.5.1 is used with respect to the prediction
schemes of Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3. The statistics in the figure can also be
related to network lifetime because the smaller the number of messages sent,
the longer the expected lifetime of the sensor.
The results in Figure 4.17 may be interpreted in another way. A popular
location privacy strategy is to generate dummy traffic in the network to mis-
lead the adversary [54, 55, 64]. Therefore, the fact that motion prediction
schemes from Sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 and save many event message trans-
missions in the network, these saved messages may be considered as a credit
that the nodes may build over time. This credit may then be used to generate
dummy messages in the network that the adversary may follow. For example,
consider the data for range prediction with p = 0.75 and NumObjects = 5 in
Figure 4.17. The results tell us that the scheme has earned a message credit
of approximately 7
8
times the messages sent without any motion prediction.
Therefore, all this earned credit may be used to send dummy messages in
the network at some time in the future to mislead the adversary. As a result,
the strategy would use the same number of messages as a scheme with no
prediction and will provide higher location privacy without a higher message
cost.
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4.5.4 Safety Period
The safety period, defined in [50], is a popular metric used for characteriz-
ing source location privacy in wireless sensor networks. It is defined as the
number of messages that the sender may transmit before the adversary can
use hop-by-hop traceback to reach the sender. However, this definition as-
sumes that once the adversary overhears a message on the wireless channel,
it can localize the sender instantly and also move to the sender’s location
instantly. We consider the safety period under the constraint that once the
adversary localizes a transmitter, the adversary moves to the transmitter’s
location with velocity Vadv.
We now compare the safety period for the schemes we proposed in Sec-
tions 4.5.1-4.5.3. In all these schemes, we assume that the sensor nodes use
the shortest path to the sink to route their event messages. Let p be the
probability that the object moves to the predicted location and therefore,
with probability 1− p, the object moves to an unpredicted location. Let the
total number of sensor nodes that observe the object be N . Let Hi represent
the number of hops on the shortest path from sensor node i to the sink. Let
Vadv be the adversary node’s velocity and let r be the communication range
of the sensor nodes. Then, the time taken by the adversary to reach the event
notifier, or the source of event messages is given by rHi
2Vadv
. Let Ti represent
the time the event lasts at node i, i.e., this is the time that node i continues
to observe the object. Then, the object of interest is safe if the following is
true:
Ti − rHi
2Vadv
≤ 0, ∀i ∈ N (4.1)
Therefore, when no location prediction is employed and each sensor node
observing the object sends a message to the sink, the total safety period is
defined to be the total accumulated time the object may spend in the network
without being caught. This in turn is composed by accumulating the time the
object may safely spend in the sensing range of each node x that it passes by
without the adversary reaching x by back-tracking, i.e., the object remains
safe while being sensed by each of its observers. This accumulated safety
period is given as
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Tsafe(NP ) =
r
2Vadv
N∑
i=1
Hi (4.2)
On the other hand, with location prediction, an average of pN sensor nodes
suppress their own notifications and only communicate with the sink implic-
itly through their silence. Let Q be the set of these nodes (|Q| = pN). Due
to the fact that sensor nodes i ∈ Q do not send any messages to the sink,
the time that the object spends at these sensors is considered safe regardless
of how long it is. Let K be the set of (1 − p)N sensor nodes that do send
the event notifications. Then, the constraint from Eq. (4.1) must be satisfied
only for nodes j ∈ K. As a result, with location prediction, the total safety
period is as follows:
Tsafe(WP ) =
∑
i∈Q
Ti +
r
2Vadv
∑
j∈K
Hj (4.3)
From Eqs. (4.2) and (4.3), we can see that Tsafe(WP ) ≥ Tsafe(NP ). How-
ever, Tsafe(WP ) may be arbitrarily larger than Tsafe(NP ) since the implicit
communication of the pN nodes in set Q that suppress their notifications
may last for an arbitrarily long time (e.g., if the object pauses).
The expression for safety period can also be used to obtain some other in-
teresting insights. For example, consider the expression in Eq. (4.3). When
the sensor nodes have information about parameter Hj, and a realistic esti-
mate of Vadv, they may determine the safety period for each path they use
to send their event information to the sink. Depending on the actual dura-
tion of the event, the sensors may then intelligently switch paths rather than
randomly choosing a different path for each packet. This can potentially im-
prove the message delivery latency significantly because event messages will
be routed to the sink via shortest path unless it is no longer safer to do that.
We explain this path switching protocol below.
Consider sensor node i that observes the object and must become an event
notifier now. We can assume the network topology is static (a reasonable
assumption for habitat monitoring sensor networks which are deployed for
long term). This topology may then be provided to the sensors by the sink.
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With this information, let SP (i) represent the safety period with respect to
using a certain path P from sensor node i to the sink. Then, each sensor
node may use the following heuristic to determine the window of time for
which use of path P is safe.
SP (i) =
r(Hi(P )− )
2Vadv
(4.4)
where Hi(P ) is the number of hops to the sink when using path P from node
i. Here, 1 <  < Hi(p) is a control parameter which determines how far
the adversary must be from the source before it is no more safe to transmit
because the adversary might localize the source. For example, if we must en-
sure that the adversary may traceback to the source in a hop-by-hop manner
but never come closer to within two hops of the source,  = 2. Therefore,
when it is expected that the adversary will arrive within two hops of the
source, the source discards the path P and starts using another one. In gen-
eral, whenever Ti > SP (i), i.e., the event duration Ti at a sensor node i is
larger than SP (i), the source will have to use multiple paths to route its event
messages to the sink while protecting its location privacy. The advantage of
this scheme is that it will do away with the requirement of deciding a differ-
ent path for each event message which may increase routing overhead, result
in non-shortest path routing, and also lead to a high variation in message
delivery latency at the sink. By appropriately choosing the parameters in
Eq. (4.4), the sensor nodes may achieve location privacy while simultaneously
reducing the overhead of frequent, per-packet random-walk.
4.6 Learning for Motion Prediction
When evaluating the motion prediction schemes in previous sections, we
assumed that a model for the object’s motion was available to the sensors.
Since that may not always be the case, we now evaluate strategies for location
prediction that also learn or build a model for the object’s motion as time
passes and an increasing number of observations about the object’s motion
become available.
In general, it is possible that when an object of interest is present at a
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specific location in the sensor network, it may be observed by more than
one sensors simultaneously. However, in previous sections, we have discussed
how simultaneous notifications sent from all the sensors observing the object
are unnecessary and make the network more vulnerable to location privacy
compromise. This is why we presented and analyzed several schemes that
can suppress unnecessary notifications from multiple sensors. Therefore, for
simplicity, in the following discussion of learning an object’s mobility pattern,
we assume that only one sensor is observing the object at any given time.
We start by assuming that the object’s motion follows a Markov model.
The object is said to be in state a for the Markov model when it is at a
location where it can be observed by sensor node a. The probability of the
object moving in a direction such that it is next observed by sensor node
b is represented by state transition probability Pab. Since the goal of the
wireless sensor networks under consideration is a long-term monitoring of
the objects of interest, it may be possible to use observations from the field
to learn patterns of the object’s motion. In other words, over a sufficiently
large number of observations, it may be possible to estimate the transition
probabilities with reasonable accuracy. We explain this with an example.
Consider the network in Figure 4.18. Suppose the sensors a, b and c represent
states in the Markov chain. The object is said to be in state x when node
x can observe it. Pxy represents the transition probability. In other words,
when the object is observed by sensor x, Pxy represents the probability that
the object is next observed by y. Algorithm 4 describes our algorithm to
c	  b	  a	  
Pac 
Pab Pbc 
Pca 
Pcb Pba 
Figure 4.18: A Markov chain
estimate transition probabilities for the object’s motion (or state changes).
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Algorithm 4 Estimating Transition Probabilities
At each sensor node i
timesSeen[i] = 0
For each neighbor j of i
timesMovedTo[i][j] = 0
if i observes the object then
timesSeen[i]++
if object moves to j then
timesMovedTo[i][j]++
return For each neighbor j of i, Pij =
timesMovedTo[i][j]
timesSeen[i]
So far, we have proposed schemes that can help suppress sending of multi-
ple event messages about the same object when it is observed by more than
one sensor at any particular time. Therefore, in this section, we assume that
only one sensor node observes the object at any time.
We now propose and evaluate two schemes that use observations of the
object’s motion to learn and estimate the transition probabilities using Algo-
rithm 4 and then incorporate them in different ways.
4.6.1 Probabilistic Location Prediction (PLP)
In this scheme, we assume that the sensor nodes estimate the transition
probabilities and predict the object’s next expected location based on those.
However, the prediction is done probabilistically. For example, referring to
Figure 4.18, when sensor node a has estimates of Pab and Pac available to
it, the next time it observes the object, with probability Pab(Pac), sensor a
predicts that the object will next be observed by node b(c).
4.6.2 Deterministic Location Prediction (DLP)
In this scheme also, we assume that the sensor nodes estimate the transition
probabilities, i.e., the probability of the object moving from sensing range of
one sensor to another. However, once these probabilities are made available,
the sensor nodes always make a deterministic location prediction by assuming
that the object will move to the location that has the highest transition
probability. With reference to Figure 4.18, when sensor node a observes the
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Table 4.3: Transition probabilities for object following Markov model from
Figure 4.18
P12 = 0.8 P13 = 0.2
P23 = 0.8 P21 = 0.2
P31 = 0.8 P32 = 0.2
object, it deterministically predicts that the object’s next expected observer
will be node b if Pab > Pac and vice versa if Pab ≤ Pac.
4.6.3 Evaluation
We now present some simulation results to understand how the two location
prediction schemes outlined in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 perform. Our metric
of interest is the amount of explicit communication between the sensor nodes
and the sink, or in other words, we measure how well these schemes reduce
the amount of observable traffic in the network. We use NS-2 simulator. The
object of interest follows the mobility model from Figure 4.18. The transition
probabilities are as in Table 4.3.
The network starts off with no information about this mobility model
and the transition probabilities. As more observations about the object are
made, the sensors learn and estimate the transition probabilities according to
Algorithm 4 and use them to make predictions of the next observer according
to the schemes from Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2. Each simulation lasts long
enough for the object to make 15000 transitions. A sensor node that observes
the object becomes an event notifier (i.e., sends a notification to the sink)
only if the prediction from the previous observer was wrong. Otherwise, the
current observer suppresses its notification. At any given time, only one
sensor node observes the object.
To understand the reduction in explicit communication, Figures 4.19 and
4.20 show the number of event notifiers for the PLP and DLP strategies.
For making the data viewable, we show the total number of event notifiers
over intervals of 100 event observations. We also show a running average
number of event notifiers over all the observations. As can be seen, when
the simulation starts, the sensors have no estimates for the transition prob-
abilities and therefore, they only observe and do not predict. With a small
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Figure 4.19: Number of event notifiers with probabilistic prediction (PLP)
number of samples, they start making predictions, however, the estimates of
transition probabilities are still unstable. This results in a higher number
of incorrect predictions and hence a large number of event notifiers. How-
ever, as more samples of the object’s motion become available, the sensors
continuously update their estimate of the transition probabilities resulting
in decreasing number of incorrect predictions, hence a decrease in number
of event notifiers. We can also see that using the deterministic prediction
(DLP) leads to a higher number of correct predictions (and smaller number
of event notifiers) for the given transition probabilities.
Since the object is observed a total of 100 times in each interval, in the ab-
sence of our location prediction schemes, there would be a 100 event notifiers
in each interval. However, as we can see, our location prediction schemes
reduce the number of event notifiers.
We notice that learning with PLP scheme results in a larger decrease (com-
pared to DLP as seen in Figure 4.20) in the average number of event notifiers
with time (the average starts from > 50 event notifiers per 100 observations
but settles at < 40 after approximately 50 intervals or 5000 observations).
On the other hand, learning the transition probabilities only reduces the av-
erage number of event notifiers from > 25 to < 20 for DLP. But the absolute
number of event notifiers at which the schemes stabilize is lower for DLP
which indicates that over sufficiently long intervals, DLP will result in larger
suppression for the given transition probabilities.
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Figure 4.20: Number of event notifiers with deterministic prediction (DLP)
To see how the estimates of transition probabilities evolve at the sensors,
Figure 4.21 shows the error in estimation, i.e., it shows the difference between
the estimated transition probability at the sensor and the actual transition
probability as indicated in Table 4.3. (We also show a smaller subset of the
same results in Figure 4.22 for an improved view of the data). The estimation
error we show was computed as below:
Error in Pxy = Estimated(Pxy)− Actual(Pxy)
As expected, the error in estimation starts off being large but settles down
to zero as more observations of the object’s motion become available. Recall
that the two schemes from Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2 differ only in how they
use the estimates of transition probability but their estimates are the same
(according to Algorithm 4).
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Figure 4.21: Error in estimated transition probabilities based on Table 4.3
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Figure 4.22: Error in estimated transition probabilities based on Table 4.3
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Table 4.4: Transition probabilities for object following Markov model from
Figure 4.18
P12 = 0.6 P13 = 0.4
P23 = 0.6 P21 = 0.4
P31 = 0.6 P32 = 0.4
Since the transition probabilities from Table 4.3 are such that one state has
much higher probability than the other (P12 > P13), we also evaluated the
schemes for a model where this was not entirely true. We perform another
simulation by changing the mobility model followed by the object to that in
Table 4.4.
With this model, the results for the number of event notifiers per 100 ob-
servations for both PLP and DLP are shown in Figure 4.23. Once again,
notice that the average number of event notifiers for PLP is still higher than
DLP. In general, whenever the object has a higher probability of going to
a certain state, DLP is expected to perform better than PLP in terms of
making correct predictions and reducing the required number of event noti-
fications. Also, Figure 4.24 shows how the error in the estimated transition
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Figure 4.23: Number of event notifiers with DLP and PLP based on
transition probabilities from Table 4.4
probabilities decreases as more observations about the object’s motion are
made. (Figure 4.25 shows a segment of data from Figure 4.24.)
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Figure 4.24: Error in estimated transition probabilities based on Table 4.4
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Figure 4.25: Error in estimated transition probabilities based on Table 4.4
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Figure 4.26: Event notifiers with changing mobility model
We also evaluate how the scheme would respond if the mobility model
for the object could change. For this, we run a simulation in NS-2 where
the object followed a Markov chain with transition probabilities as shown in
Table 4.3. However, after making 7500 transitions, the transition probabili-
ties change to those in Table 4.4. With such dynamically changing mobility
model, we expected that it would take the nodes some time to learn the
modified transition probabilities and we expected just after the switch, there
would be a large number of incorrect predictions leading to a larger number
of event notifiers. This was validated from the results in Figure 4.26 show-
ing how the number of event notifiers vary. We can see in Figure 4.26 that
halfway during the simulation, when the transition probabilities change, the
number of event notifiers increase drastically but soon settle down according
to the new transition probabilities. The running average has been shown
separately for each of the regimes of transition probabilities.
We show how the difference between actual transition probabilities and
estimated ones changes in Figure 4.27. We notice that the error stabilizes
close to zero fairly quickly for the initial transition probabilities. However,
when the transition probabilities change, the error between the estimated and
the actual transition probabilities adapts very slowly. We ran the simulation
for up to 55, 000 event observations, i.e., the object made 55, 000 transitions
following the Markov model. By this time, the object had made transitions
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Figure 4.27: Error in estimated transition probabilities
from nodes 1 → 2, 2 → 3, 3 → 1 approximately 11, 000 times each. Even
with such a large number of observation samples, the error did not reduce to
zero after the change in transition probabilities (as seen by the long tail in
Figure 4.27).
We investigated into this behavior and found that since our model uses all
available observations, however far in the past, this slows down the adapta-
tion of transition probabilities’ estimates. More specifically, even after the
object changes its mobility model, the fact that it had followed the previous
model for a significant period implies that the previous model still influences
the current estimates. We therefore modified our algorithms for estimating
transition probabilities such that they take into account only the most recent
N observations where N may be chosen appropriately. We then repeat the
same simulation in NS-2 after this modification and show the results for error
in estimated transition probabilities in Figure 4.28 (and Figure 4.29).
We chose N = 500 implying that the transition probabilities were esti-
mated based on the 500 most recent observations. With this modification,
we can see in Figure 4.28 that the error does become stable close to zero
much sooner than that in Figure 4.27. This is because observations made
further in past time are filtered out and are not allowed to influence recent
probability estimates. As a result, the location prediction is more accurate,
responds to changes faster and the number of event notifiers is decreased
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Figure 4.28: Error in estimated transition probabilities
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Figure 4.29: Error in estimated transition probabilities
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accordingly. This results in lower observable traffic for the adversary and
therefore, improves location privacy.
4.7 Reducing the Cost of Cover Traffic
As we have discussed earlier, cover traffic (also termed as dummy traffic,
fake source traffic in literature) is commonly used to provide source location
privacy. In addition, when the goal is to achieve perfect privacy or to achieve
privacy against a global adversary, constant-rate cover traffic is the only
solution [54, 64]. In this section, we elaborate on how the location privacy
schemes we have presented can be used in combination with cover traffic
generation.
For cover/dummy traffic to efficiently protect location privacy, it must
appear realistic to an adversary. For example, if dummy traffic generation is
such that it does not traverse all the way to the sink, the adversary may know
that this cannot be carrying a real event message, otherwise it would have
been routed to the sink. By a similar line of reasoning, if real event traffic is
being sent at a certain rate periodically, a cover traffic generator must also
send dummy traffic at the same rate. This implies that if cover traffic is to
be effective in preserving source location privacy, it must exhibit the same
characteristics as the real traffic and both the amount and frequency of cover
traffic must be comparable to that of event traffic.
With this convention, the schemes presented in existing literature must
generate a large amount of cover traffic (especially if the goal is to achieve
perfect privacy) just to ensure that cover traffic shows similar characteristics
as real traffic.
On the other hand, our schemes that send much reduced amounts of traf-
fic, either through the IC-DA strategy from Section 4.2.3, or the suppression
and mobility prediction strategies from Sections 4.4.1, 4.5.2 and 4.5.3, re-
spectively, would need much smaller amounts of cover traffic to provide the
same level of location privacy as the schemes from existing literature.
135
4.8 Discussion
It is clear that if there is some node n ∈ Nadv close to every sensor in
the target network, it may be able to locate the sender in the schemes we
proposed. But we note here that in the presence of such an adversary, leaving
out the case where all nodes always send periodic messages whether or not
they sense an event, all other existing techniques will also be unable to protect
source location privacy. Consider for example, the scheme in [54]. If the
adversary can overhear every message in the network, it can overhear the
first message m0 originated by the sender. It can also use timing correlation
to conclude that this node has not received a message in an interval τ before
originating messagem0 and therefore must be the originator ofm0. Moreover,
privacy is also a function of how many fake sources are simulated per real
object. Mehta et al. [54] provide results for source simulation where there
is only one real object. However, if the adversary is so well-funded and
determined as to achieve global eavesdropping, it can check out all suspected
source locations simultaneously to find real objects. For example, suppose
there are at most Nr real objects in the monitored area and suppose the
sensor network only uses some fake sources to generate dummy traffic. Due
to the presence of fake sources, it may happen that the adversary can sense a
total of Nr + k sources in the network instead of Nr. The adversary may not
be able to distinguish between real and fake sources by merely looking at the
event messages and will have to back-track to each of them. However, if k is
reasonably small compared to Nr, the adversary can check out all suspected
locations and find out the real objects. Therefore, it is important to analyze
just how many fake sources will be needed in a network at a certain time to
make back-tracking difficult for the adversary and to ensure the desired level
of privacy is achieved.
We also point out that schemes which depend on fake sources [54] make
an underlying assumption that fake sources are located where there are no
real objects. Suppose a node has a token to act as fake source in the next
round (or at boot-up). If this node observes an event at the start of the next
round, it is no longer a fake source. This problem is hard to address without
intelligent event prediction mechanisms. Similarly, suppose some nodes are
preloaded with a token to work as fake sources as soon as the network starts
operation. If upon boot-up, the node possessing a token for acting as a fake
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source actually observes an event, then it becomes a real source and will itself
need protection.
Therefore, our understanding is that it will be more feasible to exploit
practical constraints on the adversary’s capabilities rather than depend on
expensive protocols that provide stronger protection against an idealistic ad-
versary model. This is why we propose several ideas in this chapter that
may be used in combination with each other and also with existing schemes.
For example, we showed that use of directional antennas since they degrade
the adversary’s overhearing capability unless it spends more on its deployed
network. However, a very dense network may make it infeasible for the
adversary to gather information in a timely manner for processing and for
making localization decisions. It may also expose the adversary’s own lo-
cation which can further benefit the original network since the sensors can
then avoid transmissions in directions where the adversary is suspected to
be present. Similarly, we propose and evaluate information compression and
event suppression as a way to reduce the amount of information that needs
to be explicitly sent over the wireless medium. We also discuss location pre-
diction as another potential way to reduce the amount of event traffic that
needs to be protected. We discussed how the reduction in information flowing
over the wireless medium can directly result in improving both the network
life (reduced transmissions mean reduced battery drainage) and the location
privacy (reduced traffic may be protected with reduced cover traffic). We
also showed the feasibility of learning an object’s motion over time so that
further information compression may be achieved.
In summary, we provided extensive analysis of several new ideas that can
either directly or indirectly aid in improving source location privacy. A
strength of our strategies is that they offer flexibility and may be combined
with any other existing location privacy schemes.
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CHAPTER 5
ADVANCED METERING
INFRASTRUCTURE AND WIRELESS
WATCHDOGS
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is envisioned to have the potential
to revolutionize the power grid making it the “Smart Grid”. AMI, through
the use of ”smart meters”, promises to strengthen both the stability and
sustainability of the grid. The vision of AMI is to enhance and improve the
electric grid by providing higher and more fine-grained control over pricing
and usage to both the utility and the customers. The promise is so convinc-
ing that there have been rapid large-scale deployments all over the world in
a very short time. In this frenzy of excitement, security of AMI, an issue of
utmost importance, may have been overlooked. In this chapter, we present
preliminary work of an in-depth study of vulnerabilities in AMI against cyber
attacks. We point out vulnerabilities in ANSI C12.22, the protocol specifica-
tion for interfacing smart meters with data networks. We also show how these
vulnerabilities can be used to launch distributed denial of service (DDoS) at-
tacks on the AMI. Since the AMI is a wireless mesh network of smart meters
and relays, we show how watchdog-based solutions [65], that we discussed
extensively in Chapter 2, provide a natural and efficient solution to many of
the attack scenarios that we identify.
5.1 Related Work
“Smart meters” in the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) report real-
time usage statistics over data networks to the utility. These meters receive
pricing information from the utility for a given time of use. The former
provides the utility with better control and more efficient response times
to detection of problems. The latter provides the user with the ability to
make informed decisions about usage. The idea is fast gaining popularity
all around the globe. Building a smart grid was mandated with the Energy
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Independence and Security Act of 2007 resulting in a substantial investment
worth 4.5 billion USD toward the purpose [66]. The Obama administration
has called for 40 million smart meters to be installed in the United States
over the next three years [67]. The drive is not limited to the United States
alone as Europe follows closely with a law mandating smart metering by the
year 2022 [68] and over the next few years, an additional 100 million smart
meters will be added to the existing base of 40 million units worldwide.
The complexity and magnitude of AMI is indicative of the presence of
vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in the system that may expose
certain crucial assets of the network to unauthorized access and unintended
use. New levels of automation combined with extended access to the grid can
provide unforeseen avenues to attackers and in the case of AMI, this poses a
serious threat because of the potential devastation that may result. Imagine
a scenario where a group of hackers takes control and disrupts power supply
to residential areas or even worse, to sensitive facilities like hospitals or those
containing nuclear assets.
The above mentioned concerns have motivated researchers’ recent inter-
est in the possibility of cyber attacks on the smart grid. Smart meters have
been shown to have vulnerabilities that may be exploited to infect them with
malware and then “weaponize” them to spread malware [69] to other meters.
Another major security concern for AMI is the so-called “off switch”. This
functionality enables remote control over the smart meters so that the utility
might enforce load-shedding or be able to cut off power to defaulters. For
an attacker, however, the off-switch opens possibilities of hijacking the grid,
interrupting supply and incurring widespread chaos. Several attack scenarios
based on the off-switch have been proposed in [68]. This work also highlights
threats associated with remote software and firmware upgrades with which
smart meters are compliant. Remote upgrade capability is absolutely neces-
sary for future proofing because manual upgrades to millions of meters every
time a new vulnerability is discovered/fixed may be prohibitively costly. On
the downside, if a hacker can assume control over remote upgrades, then it
can infect the meters with software bugs, or make the meters unresponsive.
Concerns about remote disconnect capability have also been expressed in [70]
which presents an attack tree to achieve a targeted disconnect of electrical
service. To ensure that the smart grid is well protected against any security
breach, a sustained and concerted effort toward extensive and in-depth secu-
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rity and vulnerability analysis is needed. This is a huge endeavor because the
smart grid is characterized by complex interactions of a large variety of de-
vices and underlying technologies. At the same time, it is also crucial to the
success of the smart grid since it can provide measures that must be taken in
order to ensure stronger protection, detection, response and recovery against
a threat base that is still evolving.
All the literature referenced above considers architectural security aspects.
Our contribution in this chapter is that, to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first attempt at characterizing the security holes in the application
protocol to be followed for communications over the AMI. The exploits we
expose remain viable even if some of the architectural concerns like security of
the off-switch are addressed. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
In Section 5.2, we introduce ANSI C12.22 for AMI and gloss over some of
its prominent features. Then, in Section 5.3, we discuss DDoS attacks and
point out two vulnerabilities in ANSI C12.22 that can be exploited to launch
DDoS attacks on the AMI. Next, in Section 5.4, we propose several solutions
to the attack and conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 C12.22 for AMI
The AMI is composed of a combination of several communication networks
and devices. A representation of AMI is provided in Figure 5.1. One of the
major components is a management software called “AMI Headend” that
resides and operates in the utility central office. Communication between
field devices and the headend are carried out over a WAN. At the edges of
the WAN, there lie data collectors or concentrators that provide access and
aggregation of metering data. Finally, there is a mesh network of metering
devices forming a LAN or NAN (Neighborhood Area Network).
Given the magnitude and scale of AMI and the sizeable variety of manu-
facturers that are entering the business, standardization is essential to ensure
interoperability and seamless integration with the existing infrastructure. To
this end, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) has been focus-
ing on defining standards for AMI. The most recent is ANSI C12.22 [71]
which is an application layer specification to allow transport of meter data
over any networked connection including IP and cellular technologies.
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Figure 5.1: AMI system architecture
Before we explain C12.22 vulnerabilities, we provide some definitions and
C12.22 specific terminology and highlight some of its salient features. More
details can be found in [71].
• C12.22 Entities
A new set of functional entities have been defined in ANSI C12.22 along
with a description of their roles. These entities include master relays,
relays, hosts for notification and authentication, end-devices etc. Their
function is to form a hierarchy and cooperate to provide application
level services defined in the standard.
• C12.22 Services
ANSI C12.22 defines thirteen application level messaging services to
address issues of identification, authentication, reading and writing ta-
ble data etc. Since C12.22 is meant to provide reliability, each service
is composed of a request and a corresponding response. In this chapter,
we point out vulnerabilities in these services that may become potential
exploits for attackers.
• C12.22 Client/Server Model
A client/server paradigm can be used to characterize communications
between C12.22 nodes. A client, as the standard defines it, is a node
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that initiates a logon service request (for establishment of a session)
and the server is the target C12.22 node for this request. With this
characterization, smart meters “serve” the requests for metrology data
as requested by the utility’s central office.
• C12.22 Naming
In addition to the legacy transport and IP addresses, C12.22 entities
have been given a new set of application level addresses or names that
uniquely identify each entity. These are called “Application Process
titles” or “ApTitles”. These ApTitles are used to enable routing within
the C12.22 network since they provide source and destination addresses
of a C12.22 message. A C12.22 message contains two fields; a Calling
ApTitle which identifies source of the message and a Called ApTitle
that identifies target or destination of the message.
• C12.22 Routing
Routing in the C12.22 network is done based on ApTitles. C12.22 re-
lays, in a way similar to IP routers, maintain routing tables containing
information about all reachable C12.22 nodes. Each table entry is com-
posed of an “ApTitleMask/ FwdAddress” pair. When a new message
is received, the C12.22 relay searches the routing table sequentially to
find a match for the “Called ApTitle” contained in the message. If no
match is found, the relay returns a < nok > (not-ok) response to indi-
cate that the required destination is unreachable. If a match is found
and the destination address turns out to be another C12.22 relay, the
message is forwarded to the relay and if the destination is a C12.22
node, then the message is delivered directly to that node.
5.3 Vulnerabilities in C12.22 for AMI and DDoS
Attacks
A distributed denial of service attack happens when a number of malicious
network elements collude with each other to direct a large amount of traf-
fic toward a common target victim to exhaust its resources while trying to
accept and process the large traffic volume. At some point, the victim is
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unavailable to function properly and refuses to accept even legitimate traf-
fic. More specifically, a bandwidth depletion DDoS attack targets the victim
system’s network bandwidth. This can be achieved by flooding the victim
with huge amounts of traffic to keep the victim busy in processing the at-
tack traffic and making it unavailable to legitimate users. Another way to
launch a bandwidth depletion attack is via traffic amplification where attack-
ers send messages to a broadcast IP address soliciting replies directed toward
the victim.
For the internet community, DDoS attacks are neither new nor uncommon.
As smart grid and AMI interfaces with IP networks for reaping benefits of
higher speeds and sophisticated technologies, their concern is that it is simul-
taneously inheriting the same vulnerabilities seen in the IP networks. In the
next three sections, we identify DDoS scenarios that exploit vulnerabilities
in ANSI C12.22 services.
5.3.1 Trace Service Vulnerability
ANSI C12.22 provides a “Trace Service” to find out the route that a C12.22
message traverses. This is essentially a list of relays that forwarded the
message on the way toward its destination and can be obtained by making
the message travel a round trip to the destination and collect information
about the route. Now we explain how this is done in C12.22 trace service.
Suppose a C12.22 node with ApTitle x wants to trace the route to another
C12.22 node whose ApTitle is y. The sender initiates a trace service with
the Calling ApTitle (sender id) set to x and the Called ApTitle (destination
id) set to y.
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Figure 5.2: Graphical representation of the C12.22 trace service; for an
attack, the attacker sending trace request will set the calling ApTitle to
that of the victim node and the responses will all be routed to that ApTitle
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When a C12.22 relay receives the trace service request, it extracts the
Called ApTitle and searches for it in its routing table. If a match is found,
the relay forwards this message to the next-hop according to the routing en-
try. Before forwarding, the relay also adds its own ApTitle in the message to
form a list of relays that forward this message. Every subsequent relay also
appends its own ApTitle to this list before forwarding the request further.
This is shown in Figure 5.2 where relays R1 and R2 append their own ApTi-
tles to the trace service request before forwarding it. When the trace request
reaches a C12.22 relay that has the target node (whose ApTitle matches
with the Called ApTitle) as a neighbor, this relay is required to send a trace
service response. In the Figure 5.2, R3 is such a relay since it has node y
as its neighbor. For sending the response, relay R3 creates a trace response
message, copies the list of relays from the request and appends its own Ap-
Title to the response, sets the Called Aptitle to the ApTitle of the originator
of trace request i.e. x and the Calling ApTitle to its own and sends out the
response. Notice that the trace request is not processed by the target node
(node y in Figure 5.2) and is only processed by relays. Note also that the
size of the trace service messages increases as it traverse the network since
all the relays add their own ApTitles to it. For a long route, especially in a
dense mesh network, the messages can grow fairly large because of multiple
hops. This can become problematic since messages that can grow without
bound can crash applications that are unable to handle them.
To see how this service can be vulnerable to DDoS attacks, we present an
attack scenario using Figure 5.2. Suppose the C12.22 node that sends out
trace request (x ) is the attacker and wants to attack another C12.22 node
whose ApTitle is z. When x sends the trace request, instead of writing its
own ApTitle in the Calling ApTitle field, it sets this to z thus spoofing z ’s
identity. When a relay like r3 sends trace response, it copies the Calling
ApTitle from the trace request and sets it as destination of the response. In
the attack scenario, r3 is tricked into sending the response to z instead of x.
When a large number of relays route their responses to the victim node z, its
network resources are exhausted resulting in DDoS. A simple attack tree for
this scenario is shown in Figure 5.3. The leaves of the tree indicate that the
attackers must either spoof the source address of the victim or send the trace
requests via several different routes in order to evade any possible filtering
implemented at the routers. Spoofing the source address of smart meters is
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Figure 5.3: An attack tree for DDoS attack exploiting ANSI C12.22 trace
service
not impractical and in fact the work in [70] uses a meter-spoof program to
demonstrate energy fraud. Sending trace requests through several relays can
also be done without violating the ANSI C12.22 specification since it allows
a node to register with several different relays [71].
5.3.2 Resolve Service Vulnerability
ANSI C12.22 provides a “Resolve Service” to retrieve the native network ad-
dress of a C12.22 relay or node. The native address is used to communicate
directly with other C12.22 nodes on the same native network or LAN. The
service is defined by two messages: A “resolve request” and a “resolve re-
sponse”. The resolve request contains ApTitle of the C12.22 node for which
native address is requested while resolve response contains the required na-
tive address. The C12.22 node that wants to retrieve address of another node
sends out a “resolve request” and includes ApTitle of the requested node as
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denial of service
“Called ApTitle” and its own as the “Calling ApTitle”. Every C12.22 re-
lay capable of forwarding information to this Called ApTitle should return a
“resolve response” to the node identified by the Calling ApTitle. The use of
this service is illustrated in Figure 5.4. Suppose C12.22 node with ApTitle
x wants to discover the C12.22 node with ApTitle y. Node x sends out a
resolve request with the Calling ApTitle (sender id) set to x and the Called
ApTitle (destination id) set to y. When the request reaches relay r, who
knows y, r sends a resolve response to x which contains native address of
y. This can be used by x for future communication with y. This service is
meant to facilitate node discovery. It can be used to find addresses of C12.22
master relays and also to retrieve IP address of C12.22 IP relays that provide
a route out of the C12.22 network segment.
We now explain how this service can be misused to launch a DDoS attack.
Suppose a colluding group of compromised C12.22 nodes broadcast resolve
requests for a certain C12.22 relay. Then, according to the standard’s re-
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Figure 5.5: An amplification DDoS attack using C12.22 Resolve Service;
the dashed lines indicate broadcast messages
quirement, every C12.22 relay, capable of forwarding to that node will return
a response. If the malicious nodes collude and spoof their source addresses
to the victim’s identity, then all the responses will be returned to the victim.
This attack is further exacerbated from the victim’s perspective because a
single broadcasted resolve request may solicit responses from several C12.22
relays hence amplifying the attack traffic. Therefore this attack is particu-
larly tempting for attackers since they do not have to inject all the attack
traffic themselves, the broadcast functionality does it for them.
Figure 5.5 shows a graphical illustration of an attack based on the resolve
service. Attacking C12.22 nodes spoof identity of the victim and broadcast
resolve requests to several relays asking for the network address of some
random node. Every relay capable of forwarding to that node will send a
resolve response to the victim. If the attackers send resolve requests for a
popular node, e.g., a master relay that all relays are aware of, the attackers
can maximize the number of responses and make the attack very effective.
This attack is also viable since if one meter is compromised, then building
an army of compromised meters can be achieved by propagating malware to
them in a way similar to that in [69].
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5.3.3 Urgent Traffic Vulnerability
C12.22 provides for a way to receive preferential treatment of critical mes-
sages such that these messages can get to the central office as soon as possible.
The idea behind this provision is that certain messages, e.g., alert messages
sent by smart meters when they detect power outages, are more important
than others. If these messages are delayed in the network, the utility might
not be able to take any recovery or back-up measures in time. To provide
priority for such messages, ANSI C12.22 provides a 1-bit indicator named
URGENT. The protocol then requires that messages with the URGENT bit
is set to 1 must be forwarded by all relays and acted upon by the final desti-
nation urgently (with high priority). This feature can be easily exploited by
potential attackers by always marking their messages as urgent and stealing
the resources required by legitimate traffic.
5.4 Proposed Solutions
The vulnerabilities identified so far can be masked with careful network de-
sign and planning.
Since the trace and resolve service attacks as well as the “URGENT” bit
attack we have identified are characterized by large volumes of attack traffic,
a rate limiting solution can potentially decrease the severity of these attacks.
In case of the trace service, for example, the priority of trace messages may be
kept low so that other network traffic does not suffer from delays and packet
drops due to trace requests. Both the trace and resolve service exploits
contain at least one invariant: “the victim’s identity”. All the attack traffic
in both these exploits must contain the identity of the victim and this may
be used by the network to distinguish attack traffic from legitimate traffic.
The network operators can then put limits on the number of trace or resolve
requests that may be acceptable from a particular ApTitle. If the number of
requests goes above a certain threshold in a certain period of time, then all
subsequent requests may be dropped. The same argument can be made for
an attack that exploits the “URGENT” bit functionality.
148
5.4.1 Wireless Watchdog-Based Rate-Limiting Solution
The rate limiting solutions we discussed in Section 5.4 may not be effective
when the attacker distributes its traffic over several relays keeping the in-
dividual rate below the threshold. We envision a stronger solution at the
heart of which lies the fact that smart meters and hence nodes and relays
communicate over the wireless channel. Wireless is a shared medium and
when nodes in the AMI mesh send messages, other nodes in the neighbor-
hood can overhear these messages. We have seen in Chapter 2 that with a
watchdog functionality, wireless nodes monitor traffic behavior of their neigh-
bors by operating in promiscuous overhearing mode. One of the popular
arguments against wireless watchdogs is that overhearing (and hence receiv-
ing) consumes significant energy. However, when considering smart meters,
power supply does not remain a significant concern. We will now discuss how
watchdogs may be helpful against the above mentioned attacks.
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Figure 5.6: Wireless watchdogs against the URGENT-bit exploit
Consider Figure 5.6. Here the attacker intelligently distributes its attack
traffic and routes it via several relays so that at each individual relay, the
rate of traffic always remains below the threshold. However, all this traffic
may come together at the intended victim and may overwhelm it. Even
if the victim is able to process and drop it, the attack traffic has already
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consumed resources in the mesh and may have caused delays to legitimate
traffic. To see how watchdogs may help detect the attack, suppose the relay
nodes were acting as watchdogs and maintaining a record of outgoing traffic
from their neighbors. Then, all three relays should be able to overhear all the
messages from the attacker and can independently conclude that this node
is originating attack traffic. Therefore, they can either provide a degraded
quality of service to this node’s traffic or even drop its messages.
5.4.2 Wireless Watchdog-Based Protection against ApTitle
Spoofing
Since the exploits we identify benefit greatly from ApTitle spoofing, we now
suggest how watchdogs can also be helpful against detection of that. Since
nodes in the mesh network maintain a list of neighboring ApTitles, they can
detect when they receive (i.e., directly from) or overhear messages directly
from a previously unknown ApTitle. There could be two reasons due to
which this event might happen:
1. A new node has joined the mesh network and the new ApTitle belongs
to this node.
2. A compromised node is originating messages by spoofing another node’s
ApTitle.
In either case, the nearby nodes (watchdogs) in the neighborhood will update
their routing tables to indicate that this node is reachable in 1-hop. This
information is also propagated through routing updates to the rest of the
network and so all traffic intended for this ApTitle will be routed to the
node that most recently used the new ApTitle. In the first case above, there
is no attack so when intended traffic is routed to the new node, the network
functions just as it should. However, for the second case above, after routing
table updates, the attack traffic will be routed to the attacker instead of the
victim and thus the attacker will be overwhelmed by its own traffic rather
than causing any damage elsewhere.
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5.5 Discussion
Advanced metering infrastructure for the smart grid will bring about rad-
ical changes in how the distribution grid operates. It offers fine-grained
control over energy utilization through automation and remote access and
is expected to fully exploit the highly sophisticated IP network to provide
speed, sustainability and reliability. Smart meters are capable of two-way
communications and can report real-time event data providing opportunities
for efficient energy consumption. All these exciting features have motivated
rapid, large-scale deployment. A growing concern, however, is that security
aspects of smart grid and AMI may have been overlooked amidst all this
hype. It cannot be stressed enough that security must be built into the sys-
tem rather than added in or bolted on. Several security gaps have already
been exposed and it is only a matter of time before more potent attacks on
AMI will become viable.
In this chapter, we pointed out vulnerabilities in the protocol specification
for interfacing the AMI with legacy data networks, i.e., ANSI C12.22. Unless
resolved, these vulnerabilities can become potential exploits for launching
DDoS attacks on AMI. We discuss how the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium may be exploited through wireless watchdogs to thwart several of
these attacks.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this dissertation, we perform a study of the interaction between reliability
and the wireless broadcast medium. We focus on several problems encoun-
tered in wireless networks. We discuss how the broadcast nature of wireless
networks may become a vulnerability and also how it may be exploited to
solve several reliability issues. We discuss problems faced by wireless net-
works and propose and evaluate efficient solutions.
Focusing on TCP, we highlight strengths and weaknesses of using watch-
dogs against wireless misbehavior. We propose simple protocols followed by
several optimizations to reduce overhead and improve throughput of TCP
with watchdogs. We use NS-2 simulations to analyze the performance of
watchdog-based hop-by-hop protection against packet tampering attacks for
both data and ACK packets. We provide a comparison of the throughput
performance of watchdog-based TCP with reference to a baseline TCP. Our
results showed that the overhead of watchdog-based notifications for data and
ACK packets can be offset by the throughput gains that may be obtained
by early detection and discarding of tampered packets. This was concluded
based on comparison with a version of TCP that had an omniscient sink and
therefore it differed from the watchdog-based TCP only in terms of when
and where tampered packets were detected and discarded. As a use case, we
also highlight how watchdogs may be employed to counter several attacks
on the advanced metering infrastructure networks. Our discussion in this
dissertation focused only on networks where the nodes were equipped with
single-channel and single-radio wireless devices. In future, we plan to inves-
tigate the tradeoffs between throughput performance and protection against
packet tampering for the case of multi-channel and multi-interface wireless
networks.
Continuing with the goal of reliability, we also present algorithms for guar-
anteeing reliable communication in the presence of the strongest adversary
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model, i.e., a Byzantine adversary. The problem involves use of multiple par-
allel paths between a fault-free source and fault-free destination and achieving
reliable communication under the assumption that some of the paths may be
Byzantine faulty. We develop a theoretical formulation of the problem and
identify the scenarios where the algorithms achieve the optimal performance.
We first focus on message replication and present algorithms and establish
their optimality. Next, we focus on the use of MDS coding and propose two
possible solutions for reliability. We also present a comparative analysis of
the two solutions and identify the scenarios where one may outperform the
other. As part of future work, we aim to generalize some of the results.
We also discuss the source location privacy problem encountered in wire-
less sensor networks. Our work focuses on identifying potential solutions
that may be used independently or in combination with previous solutions
with the goal of improving location privacy. In this aspect, we focus on two
areas: Reducing the probability of successful eavesdropping by unauthorized
parties (in other words increasing the cost of eavesdropping for unautho-
rized parties) and reducing the amount of observable traffic in the network
thereby decreasing the eavesdropping opportunities available to unauthorized
parties. The solutions in the former area focus on using new hardware capa-
bilities available in wireless sensor nodes, mainly the capability to transmit
directionally. The solutions in the latter area are more diverse and focus
on several ideas including implicit communication between sensor nodes and
sink, reducing the formation of physical regions of high traffic in the network,
intelligently learning and predicting the movements of the objects of interest
to reduce the need for observable traffic on the wireless channel. We argue
that the schemes we propose and their advantages may be seen from two
different perspectives: (a) directly improving location privacy by reducing
observable traffic and (b) identifying avoidable message transmissions, sup-
pressing them and using this credit to create cover traffic which may then be
used directly toward improving location privacy. In the future, we plan to
enhance the schemes and make them tunable by the user, i.e., give the net-
work administrator some control knobs to dynamically meet goals of latency,
energy/battery constraints and location privacy.
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